Yemen

I wondered the same. Is the best of the armed forces focusing on regime protection, as is the case elsewhere in the region (?)
Gadaffi would be still in power if his regime security forces were intact and having not being bombed by us.. So I think your on the money. With the added caveat, of an outside chance of the Iranians actually crossing the gulf.

When your enemy is pinned down defending static positions and your reduced to hiring third worlders, that accounts for the houthis continued survival and now success.
 
Gadaffi would be still in power if his regime security forces were intact and having not being bombed by us.. So I think your on the money. With the added caveat, of an outside chance of the Iranians actually crossing the gulf.

When your enemy is pinned down defending static positions and your reduced to hiring third worlders, that accounts for the houthis continued survival and now success.
It is a sort of catch 22 - protect the key areas of the country and regime and avoid commiting predominantly Saudi units, at the cost of actually losing because those forces that are committed are sometimes failing, for whatever reasons.
 
It is a sort of catch 22 - protect the key areas of the country and regime and avoid commiting predominantly Saudi units, at the cost of actually losing because those forces that are committed are sometimes failing, for whatever reasons.
When gauging an enemy, their inherent strengths are often the biggest weaknesses to go after. Totally agree on a good reason NOT to deploy Saudi citizens to the front. As history tends to see the veterans of those expeditions, have a strong tendency to come home and take up arms.

The Saudi Strength is Firepower and a belief that you can buy the loyalty of anyone. The Houthis appear to be immune to bribery and fight in an unconventional way making firepower a recruiter for the insurgent, rather than an answer.. I can see a strong danger that this Saudi led war will eventually have enough of an impact on the poor of the kingdom to see alternatives and apart from the usual, hiring hessians I can't see the alternatives.
 
As a minor note, there were a couple of more FN2000s and a SCAR-L to be seen.
Thank you for the information. One thing can, fairly safely, be said: the Saudi issue is not materiel - the outpost overrun at the start of the video was well-provisioned.
The equipment seen is generally good and modern.
Speculating, one could say that the Saudis have a problem with how they protect the border which they haven't yet resolved, or even thought through. What is the purpose of the outposts? They seem not to be mutually supportive, nor easily reinforced/evacuated. In the Houthi videos (caveat - a single perspective) the Houthi seem well-versed in how to capture them. When armour protects an outpost, it does not seem very effective.
When the outposts are atop steep slopes, the defenders may have to expose themselves to directly fire at attackers. The scenes are reminiscent of ISIS attacking NDF outposts in Syria: a highly motivated and capable force attacking a poorly motivated though sometimes well equipped opponent.
The road network in the area seems vulnerable, even for large KSA convoys.
I am not sure what the answer is. The KSA needs one.
 
Last edited:
Thank you for the information. One thing can, fairly safely, be said: the Saudi issue is not materiel - the outpost overrun at the start of the video was well-provisioned.
The equipment seen is generally good and modern.
Speculating, one could say that the Saudis have a problem with how they protect the border which they haven't yet resolved, or even thought through. What is the purpose of the outposts? They seem not to be mutually supportive, nor easily reinforced/evacuated. In the Houthi videos (caveat - a single perspective) the Houthi seem well-versed in how to capture them. When armour protects an outpost, it does not seem very effective.
When the outposts are atop steep slopes, the defenders may have to expose themselves to directly fire at attackers. The scenes are reminiscent of ISIS attacking NDF outposts in Syria: a highly motivated and capable force attacking a poorly motivated though sometimes well equipped opponent.
The road network in the area seems vulnerable, even for large KSA convoys.
I am not sure what the answer is. The KSA needs one.
The KSA must have decent NVG and they thus appear absent Advanced Infantry training and decent time consuming Patrolling to dominate the ground around their outposts and to interdict an attack before it happens, with a night ambush or sniper outside the outpost. One assumes, the KSA don't have ROEs and with free fire rules no outpost should be falling, unless the insurgent has total cover up to the wire line.

The KSA Forces are entirely road-bound and will never defeat an Insurgent that way.
 
2
I remember watching the Saudi Infantry return to Base at KKMC Hafr Al Batin from the Yeman border c. 98 or thereabouts. I was out running and they were cheering and waving as one does when returning from some great victory. Played a lot of football with some of them (9pm kickoff due to the heat) and I can confirm these guys were fit.
97/98. They took a fair few casualties on that one according to the girls at the military hospital - we bombed up ready to go but they didn't use the IDS on that occasion. I left shortly after due to a climbing accident which more or less fecked me for that line of work. Was offered an office job, due to Saudi intervention, but knocked them back.

Fitness OK but lightweights for the most part
 
You missed the reference to mercenaries and the west, who were involved against the Egyptians in yemen.... I was suggesting the merc recruitment of third world troops wasn't going well and at some point, it wouldn't surprise me if they started to tap the same programme again.

Though as others have pointed out, the Houthis seem to be a determined a little bunch. One wonders how much the Iranians and the Houthis have begun to build a network inside the kingdom and the regular army is likely needed to react to any kind of shia intifada in the east.
You said "in their last incursion" so that's how I took it. It wasn't.

There's no Houthi/Iranian network inside the country. There are shia dissidents, funded and aided by Iran but they've had a severe malleting. Much greater threats are the economy, external attacks by Houthi using drones, followed by AQAP through they're not as active as they were. For now.
 
97/98. They took a fair few casualties on that one according to the girls at the military hospital - we bombed up ready to go but they didn't use the IDS on that occasion. I left shortly after due to a climbing accident which more or less fecked me for that line of work. Was offered an office job, due to Saudi intervention, but knocked them back.

Fitness OK but lightweights for the most part
Certainly lightweight, but wiry.
 
I wondered the same. Is the best of the armed forces focusing on regime protection, as is the case elsewhere in the region (?)
Their armed forces are a feckin' big employment and education scheme, they begin sending them all off to the borders to get killed, fathers will be less willing to punt off their second sons if they risk losing them.

There's the SANG and Army BTW, not the same people. SANG are the tribes beholden/loyal to the al Saud family - that's a gross simplification but good enough to be going on with. They're completely separate COC's - the LAVs were prolly SANG.
 
Certainly lightweight, but wiry.
They bounced off me and I'm not the biggest or roughest left back in the world.
 
Their armed forces are a feckin' big employment and education scheme, they begin sending them all off to the borders to get killed, fathers will be less willing to punt off their second sons if they risk losing them.

There's the SANG and Army BTW, not the same people. SANG are the tribes beholden/loyal to the al Saud family - that's a gross simplification but good enough to be going on with. They're completely separate COC's - the LAVs were prolly SANG.
I knew the forces on the border were SANG and some mercenaries (again a simplification) but not the relationship between the tribes and the SANG, so thank you. I did not know about the employment angle but it makes complete sense.
 
They bounced off me and I'm not the biggest or roughest left back in the world.
I was about to say exactly the same thing......and I was slow by then (55 playing 19 yr olds) - they said I was 'too tuff' - truth be told, clout them was all I was capable of at that age in their company. They were generally ok kids.
 
You said "in their last incursion" so that's how I took it. It wasn't.

There's no Houthi/Iranian network inside the country. There are shia dissidents, funded and aided by Iran but they've had a severe malleting. Much greater threats are the economy, external attacks by Houthi using drones, followed by AQAP through they're not as active as they were. For now.
Wasn't the underlying point that the Saudis may well have a handle on internal dissent, but that comes at a cost in its external affairs, such as Yemen........ On your other point, Insurgencies where the political problems have not being dealt with, will see reactivated cells of sunni (AQ), or shia (iranian backed) the instant the security forces are otherwise busy.

Your own point however is a fair one. The economics and network of bribes is critical to keep the place chugging along. Many people have talked about rotten structures and their is nowt more rotten than the KSA.
 

Grownup_Rafbrat

LE
Book Reviewer
Mr Bone Saw should come to the front ,and personally take charge, :rolleyes: Warms My heart to see two groups of medieval clowns have at each other there.
So long as no British Military personnel are stationed in the crossfire.
 

Grownup_Rafbrat

LE
Book Reviewer
The KSA must have decent NVG and they thus appear absent Advanced Infantry training and decent time consuming Patrolling to dominate the ground around their outposts and to interdict an attack before it happens, with a night ambush or sniper outside the outpost. One assumes, the KSA don't have ROEs and with free fire rules no outpost should be falling, unless the insurgent has total cover up to the wire line.

The KSA Forces are entirely road-bound and will never defeat an Insurgent that way.
I wonder where are all the Sandhurst-trained KSA officers, and whether they are using anything they learned there?

And indeed whether training needs to be updated in light of all this.
 
I wonder where are all the Sandhurst-trained KSA officers, and whether they are using anything they learned there?

And indeed whether training needs to be updated in light of all this.
Since the advent of modern radios, I would imagine most of the perfumed princes are in air conditioned commcens….. Forced into the field, they will stay close to their aircon and their grandfathers are probably less than impressed.
 
I wonder where are all the Sandhurst-trained KSA officers, and whether they are using anything they learned there?

And indeed whether training needs to be updated in light of all this.
It is ongoing apparently:

Being trained, especially in COIN or even just low level armoured recce, is one thing. Putting what you have learnt into practice and accepting Lessons Identified and implementing them into a cohesive unit structure and training regime is another.
 
Wasn't the underlying point that the Saudis may well have a handle on internal dissent, but that comes at a cost in its external affairs, such as Yemen........ On your other point, Insurgencies where the political problems have not being dealt with, will see reactivated cells of sunni (AQ), or shia (iranian backed) the instant the security forces are otherwise busy.

Your own point however is a fair one. The economics and network of bribes is critical to keep the place chugging along. Many people have talked about rotten structures and their is nowt more rotten than the KSA.
AQAP are busy in Yemen, one of the drivers for the KSA/UAE invasion. It and its predecessors are the biggest internal terrorist threat. They're still active in the kingdom and periodically there's a shoot out. What happened in Syria has been sobering for the populace at large and has totally shattered any romanticism attached to jihad. A fortunate and purely co-incidental benefit is those who felt inclined to have a bash haven't generally returned as they did from Afghanistan, mainly due to being severly dead.

There hasn't been much in the way of shia terrorism, dissent yes, AQAP and its predecessors were always it though they may have assisted Iran/Houthi with the latest cruise/drone attacks. Iran was facilitating AQ way back, because they were the guys to do stuff in kingdom.

Pressure for change is the same as in the other ME dictatorships/repressive regimes (including Iran) and comes for the visions they see of the West and elsewhere. The Arab Spring hasn't died, see Egypt. This is what MBS is most worried about.
 

Latest Threads

Top