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WWII AA site question

I did make a point of specifying "after they had been launched". As far as I am aware, there were absolututely no countermeasures at that time for what was, in effect, a rudimentary ICBM already on its way.

The saving grace for us was that both the V1 and V2 were deployed at such a late stage in the war that the progress of the allies after the Normandy landings steadily rendered the development and launch sites unusable. I understand that there were further Vergeltungswaffen nasties in the pipeline.
General Pye did propose an Artillery 'wall of lead ' to disrupt the warhead and quite a bit of work was put into that, but the inaccuracy of the rockets (only 50% fell within a 200 square mile target box) meant that the concentration of artillery peices was not practical; similarly air raid warnings could be given but it was calculated that this would do more harm than good. The most practical thing done, according to that article, was to close watertight doors on the Tube network.
 
General Pye did propose an Artillery 'wall of lead ' to disrupt the warhead and quite a bit of work was put into that, but the inaccuracy of the rockets (only 50% fell within a 200 square mile target box) meant that the concentration of artillery peices was not practical; similarly air raid warnings could be given but it was calculated that this would do more harm than good. The most practical thing done, according to that article, was to close watertight doors on the Tube network.

Are you talking about the V1 or the V2?

As I understand it, the V2 travelled at such a height and speed that its trajectory was not detectable by the technology then available. It's possible that its initial launch might conceivably have been detectable. Even that would have been pushing it, I'd say. Someone else might know.
 
In AA Command - Dobbinson page 449-450 it relates how modifed radars in the UK supplimented by a modifed SCR584 in Holland eventually got to the point where aimed fire against incomming missiles was becomming a practical possibility. London was divided in to two and a half mile squares and the impact square was predicted. Almost a third landed in the predicted square and another 50 per cent were one square out. Permission to fire was eventually given just as the launch site were overrun.
 
Are you talking about the V1 or the V2?

As I understand it, the V2 travelled at such a height and speed that its trajectory was not detectable by the technology then available. It's possible that its initial launch might conceivably have been detectable. Even that would have been pushing it, I'd say. Someone else might know.
It was against the V2, along with EW, however it wasn't until the end of the war that it was learned that neither weapons system had control beams or radio guidance of any kind. Read that well researched article - I proof read early drafts before it was peer reviewed and published.
 
Are you talking about the V1 or the V2?

As I understand it, the V2 travelled at such a height and speed that its trajectory was not detectable by the technology then available. It's possible that its initial launch might conceivably have been detectable. Even that would have been pushing it, I'd say. Someone else might know.
It was against the V2, along with EW, however it wasn't until the end of the war that it was learned that neither weapons system had control beams or radio guidance of any kind. Read that well researched article - I proof read early drafts before it was peer reviewed and published.
In AA Command - Dobbinson page 449-450 it relates how modifed radars in the UK supplimented by a modifed SCR584 in Holland eventually got to the point where aimed fire against incomming missiles was becomming a practical possibility. London was divided in to two and a half mile squares and the impact square was predicted. Almost a third landed in the predicted square and another 50 per cent were one square out. Permission to fire was eventually given just as the launch site were overrun.
Information on date and time of impact and the geographical location of that V2 impact were closely guarded secrets after the war as the Russians were developing operational V2s of their own. It was felt that such information would be an operational research gift to the Russians.
 
It was against the V2, along with EW, however it wasn't until the end of the war that it was learned that neither weapons system had control beams or radio guidance of any kind. Read that well researched article - I proof read early drafts before it was peer reviewed and published.
As I recall, the early models of V2 had a radio command fuel shut off, which was used to set the range. The outgoing missile was tracked by ground radar and the shutoff signal sent when the missile reached the required velocity. Later models were fitted with an integrating accelerometer which did this automatically.

The missile was launched vertically and was set for direction by using the gyro compass to rotate the missile to the required bearing. A clockwork mechanism then tipped the missile over to a set angle at that bearing after the initial launch phase using the fin tabs.

Radio tracking beacons were fitted to occasional V1 and V2 to enable impact tracking, but had nothing directly to do with the guidance. Both missiles were essentially autonomous and would not have been affected by jamming.

Even if we had managed to develop a heat seeking missile at that point in the war, a V2 would have been an extremely difficult target to hit as the rockets only fired for a short time on take off!
 
I'm not sure about the V2, but V1 impact locations were deliberately misreported and also channeled through spy networks in order to cause the German technicians to recalibrate the weapons, causing them to undershoot or overshoot the intended target areas and to land harmlessly in more sparsely populated rural areas.
 
Information on date and time of impact and the geographical location of that V2 impact were closely guarded secrets after the war as the Russians were developing operational V2s of their own. It was felt that such information would be an operational research gift to the Russians.
Indeed, Pile, in Ack-Ack says "even mow I may not give details of our scheme"
 
As I recall, the early models of V2 had a radio command fuel shut off, which was used to set the range. The outgoing missile was tracked by ground radar and the shutoff signal sent when the missile reached the required velocity. Later models were fitted with an integrating accelerometer which did this automatically.

The missile was launched vertically and was set for direction by using the gyro compass to rotate the missile to the required bearing. A clockwork mechanism then tipped the missile over to a set angle at that bearing after the initial launch phase using the fin tabs.

Radio tracking beacons were fitted to occasional V1 and V2 to enable impact tracking, but had nothing directly to do with the guidance. Both missiles were essentially autonomous and would not have been affected by jamming.

Even if we had managed to develop a heat seeking missile at that point in the war, a V2 would have been an extremely difficult target to hit as the rockets only fired for a short time on take off!
One of the first V2s (remains thereof) that was smuggled to Britain had been fitted with a radio guidance system that didn't work and Dornberger and von Braun dropped the idea. However, and not unnaturally, the intelligence community assumed that radio guidance would be used and a huge amount of effort was expended by 100 Gp RAF in trying to identify non-existent signals.
 
I'm not sure about the V2, but V1 impact locations were deliberately misreported and also channeled through spy networks in order to cause the German technicians to recalibrate the weapons, causing them to undershoot or overshoot the intended target areas and to land harmlessly in more sparsely populated rural areas.
Managed by the 'Twenty Committee' ie Roman XX, ie double cross. Estimates of around 10000 lives were saved by range gating these two systems towards an MPI on Croydon. The committee operated from the Chapel Royal of St James' palace.
 
As I recall, the early models of V2 had a radio command fuel shut off, which was used to set the range. The outgoing missile was tracked by ground radar and the shutoff signal sent when the missile reached the required velocity. Later models were fitted with an integrating accelerometer which did this automatically.

The missile was launched vertically and was set for direction by using the gyro compass to rotate the missile to the required bearing. A clockwork mechanism then tipped the missile over to a set angle at that bearing after the initial launch phase using the fin tabs.

Radio tracking beacons were fitted to occasional V1 and V2 to enable impact tracking, but had nothing directly to do with the guidance. Both missiles were essentially autonomous and would not have been affected by jamming.

Even if we had managed to develop a heat seeking missile at that point in the war, a V2 would have been an extremely difficult target to hit as the rockets only fired for a short time on take off!
Such was the effectiveness of the XX committee, the Nazis didn't believe their own telemetry, preferring to rely on agent reporting and on friendly embassies (ie Spain).
 
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I did make a point of specifying "after they had been launched". As far as I am aware, there were absolututely no countermeasures at that time for what was, in effect, a rudimentary ICBM already on its way.

The saving grace for us was that both the V1 and V2 were deployed at such a late stage in the war that the progress of the allies after the Normandy landings steadily rendered the development and launch sites unusable. I understand that there were further Vergeltungswaffen nasties in the pipeline.
Since the V-Weapons have come up, if anyone with an interest is in the vicinity then Peenemunde is well worth a visit. You'll need to pay and display if driving and it's not particularly cheap to get into the museum/power station but it is well worth it, especially if the Cold War bits are open, too - the sub', gunboat, airfield and so on.
 
I have heard stories about the 3.7" in the anti tank role forever, that it strained the carriage, damaged the recoil system or it couldn't cope and now it's the trunnions it seems. Does anyone know the truth about it as there are photos of it being used as field artillery which must come close.
Not often mentioned but into action time. For an 88, 5min but in an emergency could fire off the carriage; for 3.7, in excess of 20min, which mitigated against use in a fluid situation. I have read that some were used in an anti tank role during the siege of Tobruk
 

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