Will MOD Cancel Warrior CSP?
When the Warrior IFV entered service in the mid 1980s it was in many ways a revolutionary vehicle for the British Army but it had flaws that were created by the attitudes prevailing in the MoD from the late 70s onward. It had a semi-automatic 30mm gun, which while it was a vast improvement on the GPMG on the FV432 it worked on a 3 round clip. Was this a legacy of the prevailing view in the MoD that machine guns apart automatic weapons were to be avoided? Just remember a previous generation of middle ranking officers had downgraded the FN Fal to produce the less capable semi-automatic SLR because Tommy Atkins couldn’t be trusted with an automatic weapon. This 1950s attitude also meant that Warrior lacked basic sensible equipment such as air-conditioning as the chaps didn’t deserve it, or waterproof clothing, or decent boots.
Fast forward until Warrior has been in service 20 years and a combination of mission creep and UORs has increased Warrior’s in service weight by 10 tons, the poor old girl is gasping and panting in a series of desert conflicts she was ill designed to fight. The decision was taken to upgrade Warrior, give her a few new toys and a decent modern automatic gun. If you watch what has happened here you may notice the officers taking this decision are two generations on and have spent their careers using the SA80 with its automatic capability, introduced around the same time as Warrior.
Now here is where MOD herd mentality came into play. The fashionable view at the MoD was referred to as the ABB policy, “Anybody But BAE Systems.” DE&S staff were guilty of muttering in the coffee bars and meeting rooms that BAE Systems stood for Big & Expensive and they “needed teaching a lesson” Over the previous 50 years all the major national defence industrial businesses had agreed, unofficially, to take the public blame when programmes were late into service and over budget. That these delays and cost over-runs were frequently caused by the MoD and armed forces changing the requirement half way through the design and build rarely reached the press. Look at the F35 catapult debacle for example. Now the scene was set for an ill thought out cake and arse party motivated by spite.
Over the next few years programmes that logic dictated were in the bag for BAE Systems got strangely awarded to companies with little experience of the job in hand or capability on shore for example Ajax went to a company that didn’t have a UK factory to build it. Jackal series production went to a shipyard (the only defence capable UK shipyard not controlled by BAE Systems!) Virtus was awarded to an Israeli company that had never made military load carriage but were famous for sandals and Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (CSP) went to Lockheed Martin at Ampthill. Shortly before Lockheed Martin bought Insys at Ampthill it had been publicly shamed by the cancellation of the Soothsayer project; a programme so grossly mismanaged by the team at Amphill now operating under the Lockheed Martin banner.
Meanwhile in a quiet shed in France BAE Systems (Hiss! Boo!) and Nexter of France had been working on a Anglo-French Government funded research programme to build CTA40, a twin feed automatic 40mm weapon using innovative cased telescoped ammunition. This gave a weapon that could fire and switch between armour piercing or airburst without ceasing fire.
France and the UK commenced vehicle programmes at roughly the same time. The French specified CTA40 onto their EBRC Jaguar vehicle, while the UK MoD specified only the specified parts of CTA40 made by Nexter out of spiteful determination to deny BAE Systems any work. This Nexter only variant was also specified onto the General Dynamics Ajax vehicle giving Lockheed Martin two turret contracts for the price of one. All Ampthill had to do was build two versions of the turret and make a new ammunition feed and ancillaries. So all the UK millions invested in developing CTA40 had subsidised the French in acquiring a shiny new 40mm weapon and Ampthill had to start again using components that they didn’t design or understand.
The first version of the Warrior CSP turret was too small and the gun didn’t fit, the second version is vastly overweight and the new Lockheed Martin-Nexter CTA40 can only fire when stationary unless you want to risk a jam. The version of the turret for Ajax is 2 tonnes above specified weight plus having the gun that doesn’t work. Both programmes are now years late with no solution to make the turrets work. The French Jaguar vehicle is now in service.
When you factor in BREXIT and the fall in the value of Sterling the MOD equipment budget is suddenly in trouble. UK manufactured equipment has barely changed in price but overseas equipment is 15-10% more expensive than it was 18 months ago. The MOD desperately needs to cancel some projects and push the costs out by 5-7 years in order to trim its sails.
An obvious candidate programme is the now over budget, over weight, non-functioning Warrior CSP. For a fraction of the CSP budget the MOD can drop the Ampthill white elephant, do a quick and dirty refresh on some basic Warrior systems and win itself a breathing space in which to force the original BAE Systems-Nexter CTA40 into Ajax. Everyone saves face except Lockheed at Ampthill and in 2023 the MOD can announce either a second purchase of Ajax Mk2 or more likely a fleet replacement of CV90s when the ABB mob have retired.
In the meantime we will be able to judge how many ABB officers remain when we learn the identity of the preferred bidder for the Challenger 2 upgrade, another one where BAE Systems should have it in the bag.
When the Warrior IFV entered service in the mid 1980s it was in many ways a revolutionary vehicle for the British Army but it had flaws that were created by the attitudes prevailing in the MoD from the late 70s onward. It had a semi-automatic 30mm gun, which while it was a vast improvement on the GPMG on the FV432 it worked on a 3 round clip. Was this a legacy of the prevailing view in the MoD that machine guns apart automatic weapons were to be avoided? Just remember a previous generation of middle ranking officers had downgraded the FN Fal to produce the less capable semi-automatic SLR because Tommy Atkins couldn’t be trusted with an automatic weapon. This 1950s attitude also meant that Warrior lacked basic sensible equipment such as air-conditioning as the chaps didn’t deserve it, or waterproof clothing, or decent boots.
Fast forward until Warrior has been in service 20 years and a combination of mission creep and UORs has increased Warrior’s in service weight by 10 tons, the poor old girl is gasping and panting in a series of desert conflicts she was ill designed to fight. The decision was taken to upgrade Warrior, give her a few new toys and a decent modern automatic gun. If you watch what has happened here you may notice the officers taking this decision are two generations on and have spent their careers using the SA80 with its automatic capability, introduced around the same time as Warrior.
Now here is where MOD herd mentality came into play. The fashionable view at the MoD was referred to as the ABB policy, “Anybody But BAE Systems.” DE&S staff were guilty of muttering in the coffee bars and meeting rooms that BAE Systems stood for Big & Expensive and they “needed teaching a lesson” Over the previous 50 years all the major national defence industrial businesses had agreed, unofficially, to take the public blame when programmes were late into service and over budget. That these delays and cost over-runs were frequently caused by the MoD and armed forces changing the requirement half way through the design and build rarely reached the press. Look at the F35 catapult debacle for example. Now the scene was set for an ill thought out cake and arse party motivated by spite.
Over the next few years programmes that logic dictated were in the bag for BAE Systems got strangely awarded to companies with little experience of the job in hand or capability on shore for example Ajax went to a company that didn’t have a UK factory to build it. Jackal series production went to a shipyard (the only defence capable UK shipyard not controlled by BAE Systems!) Virtus was awarded to an Israeli company that had never made military load carriage but were famous for sandals and Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (CSP) went to Lockheed Martin at Ampthill. Shortly before Lockheed Martin bought Insys at Ampthill it had been publicly shamed by the cancellation of the Soothsayer project; a programme so grossly mismanaged by the team at Amphill now operating under the Lockheed Martin banner.
Meanwhile in a quiet shed in France BAE Systems (Hiss! Boo!) and Nexter of France had been working on a Anglo-French Government funded research programme to build CTA40, a twin feed automatic 40mm weapon using innovative cased telescoped ammunition. This gave a weapon that could fire and switch between armour piercing or airburst without ceasing fire.
France and the UK commenced vehicle programmes at roughly the same time. The French specified CTA40 onto their EBRC Jaguar vehicle, while the UK MoD specified only the specified parts of CTA40 made by Nexter out of spiteful determination to deny BAE Systems any work. This Nexter only variant was also specified onto the General Dynamics Ajax vehicle giving Lockheed Martin two turret contracts for the price of one. All Ampthill had to do was build two versions of the turret and make a new ammunition feed and ancillaries. So all the UK millions invested in developing CTA40 had subsidised the French in acquiring a shiny new 40mm weapon and Ampthill had to start again using components that they didn’t design or understand.
The first version of the Warrior CSP turret was too small and the gun didn’t fit, the second version is vastly overweight and the new Lockheed Martin-Nexter CTA40 can only fire when stationary unless you want to risk a jam. The version of the turret for Ajax is 2 tonnes above specified weight plus having the gun that doesn’t work. Both programmes are now years late with no solution to make the turrets work. The French Jaguar vehicle is now in service.
When you factor in BREXIT and the fall in the value of Sterling the MOD equipment budget is suddenly in trouble. UK manufactured equipment has barely changed in price but overseas equipment is 15-10% more expensive than it was 18 months ago. The MOD desperately needs to cancel some projects and push the costs out by 5-7 years in order to trim its sails.
An obvious candidate programme is the now over budget, over weight, non-functioning Warrior CSP. For a fraction of the CSP budget the MOD can drop the Ampthill white elephant, do a quick and dirty refresh on some basic Warrior systems and win itself a breathing space in which to force the original BAE Systems-Nexter CTA40 into Ajax. Everyone saves face except Lockheed at Ampthill and in 2023 the MOD can announce either a second purchase of Ajax Mk2 or more likely a fleet replacement of CV90s when the ABB mob have retired.
In the meantime we will be able to judge how many ABB officers remain when we learn the identity of the preferred bidder for the Challenger 2 upgrade, another one where BAE Systems should have it in the bag.