In light of the upcoming strategic defence and security review there has been some interesting work on shaping the armed forces for the future
Before the question of 'what do you want the armed forces to do' can be answered the obvious thing to do is ask another question;
What Strategy
RUSI have been doing some analysis of the options so I thought I would throw them up here for discussion
Option 1: The Global Guardian Option
This option focuses more specifically on a continuation of ground operations for robust stabilisation which will provide continuity in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. It will also allow governments to develop and sustain aspirations for global influence through regular and long-term ground commitments, and the ability to act as framework nation for ground operations. Highintensity ground combat capability would be retained to provide effective escalation dominance and to contribute to trans-Atlantic inherent deterrent capability. Naval and air forces would have relatively minor supporting roles. This could be characterised as the âcontinentalâ option in the âcontinentalâ versus âmaritimeâ debate of Jonathan Swift and others of the seventeenth to twentieth centuries. It bears mention that the Swift context was essentially European, but Basil Liddell Hart included an expeditionary aspect to the âcontinentalâ option in a lecture at the Royal United Services Institution. This option allows best for continuity in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, but risks creating a force structure that is not well prepared for other uncertainties, and the prospect of a medium and long term in which there is a general political aversion to commitments to enduring ground occupation.
ARMY WINS
Option 2: The Strategic Raiding Option
This âmaritimeâ option recognises that there is unlikely to be the political will in government or in the electorate for further embroilment in operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. It limits this capacity for ground campaigns and refocuses on short-term operations using agile specialist ground forces. It emphasises sea basing and very early presence and inducement operations. High-intensity ground combat capability is retained, but is very specialised strategically. Special forces, and agile infantry such as the Parachute Regiment, Royal Marines and other air mobile formations, would be supported by light- to medium weight armour with a view to developing ground forces more widely as specialist forces but with a ceiling on numbers in favour of quality. The premise is that a small (relative to other Western nations of similar size) elite ground forces would limit government choices very specifically to short-term early interventions, which would be influential in shaping the pattern of subsequent operations. The UK would make a substantial contribution to maritime security, which would permit a degree of international leadership in this respect. The UKâs contribution to trans Atlantic and European security and inherent deterrence should focus on proactive and maritime capability. This option specifically provides for preventive, precautionary and pre-emptive deployments to contribute to shaping the security environment proactively. The problem with this option is that it is unlikely to be fully achievable while priorities remain in Afghanistan.
NAVY WIN, everyone gets their toys
Option 3: The Contributory Option
A selection would be made from the present capabilities of the UKâs armed forces in order to specifically contribute to the needs identified in an international context, such as the bilateral USUK relationship, the European context (whether within a NATO or European Union force planning construct), or some other multinational context. This option would sacrifice any possibility for national autonomy for intervention operations, because the UK would be dependent on other nations for all the capabilities that it had surrendered.
Option 4: The Gendarmerie Option
This option accepts that aspirations to be a major expeditionary power are unaffordable and focuses ground forces on contributing to stabilisation options as the offer â albeit a weak offer â in a strategic bargain without the aspiration to retain framework nation capacity or significant high-intensity combat capability. This option could also include some constabulary naval capability to contribute to maritime security.
Option 5: The âLittle Britainâ Option
This option focuses specifically on defence and internal security of the British islands, its air space and territorial seas offering such capacity as is available as a contribution to overseas operations if and when the home situation permits. This option abandons any strategic bargain. There is also the question of the UKâs Dependent Territories around the world to which there is a legal obligation for defence and security. A government taking this option would have concluded that these responsibilities are unaffordable and would need to relinquish them and transfer them formally to some other authority or, alternatively, insist that these territories assume their own independence in this respect regardless of capacity and consequences.
Thoughts??
Original article
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/FDR2.pdf
Before the question of 'what do you want the armed forces to do' can be answered the obvious thing to do is ask another question;
What Strategy
RUSI have been doing some analysis of the options so I thought I would throw them up here for discussion
Option 1: The Global Guardian Option
This option focuses more specifically on a continuation of ground operations for robust stabilisation which will provide continuity in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. It will also allow governments to develop and sustain aspirations for global influence through regular and long-term ground commitments, and the ability to act as framework nation for ground operations. Highintensity ground combat capability would be retained to provide effective escalation dominance and to contribute to trans-Atlantic inherent deterrent capability. Naval and air forces would have relatively minor supporting roles. This could be characterised as the âcontinentalâ option in the âcontinentalâ versus âmaritimeâ debate of Jonathan Swift and others of the seventeenth to twentieth centuries. It bears mention that the Swift context was essentially European, but Basil Liddell Hart included an expeditionary aspect to the âcontinentalâ option in a lecture at the Royal United Services Institution. This option allows best for continuity in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, but risks creating a force structure that is not well prepared for other uncertainties, and the prospect of a medium and long term in which there is a general political aversion to commitments to enduring ground occupation.
ARMY WINS
Option 2: The Strategic Raiding Option
This âmaritimeâ option recognises that there is unlikely to be the political will in government or in the electorate for further embroilment in operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. It limits this capacity for ground campaigns and refocuses on short-term operations using agile specialist ground forces. It emphasises sea basing and very early presence and inducement operations. High-intensity ground combat capability is retained, but is very specialised strategically. Special forces, and agile infantry such as the Parachute Regiment, Royal Marines and other air mobile formations, would be supported by light- to medium weight armour with a view to developing ground forces more widely as specialist forces but with a ceiling on numbers in favour of quality. The premise is that a small (relative to other Western nations of similar size) elite ground forces would limit government choices very specifically to short-term early interventions, which would be influential in shaping the pattern of subsequent operations. The UK would make a substantial contribution to maritime security, which would permit a degree of international leadership in this respect. The UKâs contribution to trans Atlantic and European security and inherent deterrence should focus on proactive and maritime capability. This option specifically provides for preventive, precautionary and pre-emptive deployments to contribute to shaping the security environment proactively. The problem with this option is that it is unlikely to be fully achievable while priorities remain in Afghanistan.
NAVY WIN, everyone gets their toys
Option 3: The Contributory Option
A selection would be made from the present capabilities of the UKâs armed forces in order to specifically contribute to the needs identified in an international context, such as the bilateral USUK relationship, the European context (whether within a NATO or European Union force planning construct), or some other multinational context. This option would sacrifice any possibility for national autonomy for intervention operations, because the UK would be dependent on other nations for all the capabilities that it had surrendered.
Option 4: The Gendarmerie Option
This option accepts that aspirations to be a major expeditionary power are unaffordable and focuses ground forces on contributing to stabilisation options as the offer â albeit a weak offer â in a strategic bargain without the aspiration to retain framework nation capacity or significant high-intensity combat capability. This option could also include some constabulary naval capability to contribute to maritime security.
Option 5: The âLittle Britainâ Option
This option focuses specifically on defence and internal security of the British islands, its air space and territorial seas offering such capacity as is available as a contribution to overseas operations if and when the home situation permits. This option abandons any strategic bargain. There is also the question of the UKâs Dependent Territories around the world to which there is a legal obligation for defence and security. A government taking this option would have concluded that these responsibilities are unaffordable and would need to relinquish them and transfer them formally to some other authority or, alternatively, insist that these territories assume their own independence in this respect regardless of capacity and consequences.
Thoughts??
Original article
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/FDR2.pdf