USS John S McCain collides with merchant ship

Discussion in 'Current Affairs, News and Analysis' started by rampant, Aug 21, 2017.

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  1. Strange..I've seen fost staff in green foulies since then. I can also assure you that on t22(when we had them) and t23 the skipper used the bridge wings with pilot. Not the bridge roof.
  2. Not wearing green foulies today, just normal foulies with FOST on them...
  3. I'm guessing once the the RN switched to the current foulies - they still had a few years stock of green ones from old supplier to get through first! Remember when the new ones came in - I got mine then was drafted to the Cornwall which nobody onboard had been issued them yet. Had to scrounge "normal foulies" for harbour stations for about a year until rest of the ship's company got the new ones. Had the same shit when they issued the Norgie jumper style 8's / 4's.
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  4. For ferries, possibly the same two tight spaces day in and day out for an entire career. You should get the hang of it. A Master with regular experience of a port will be exempt the requirement for a pilot for entering and leaving that port.
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  5. Getting back to Bridge procedures on US warships; I stumbled across an interesting blog article on the US Naval Institute website written by a retired USN Captain - which contained a surprising recollection: (full article is here)

    "I will not pretend to have a clue regarding the circumstances that led to the collisions of the USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) or the USS Fitzgerald (DDG-63) so I won’t comment on what might or might not have happened. Nor am I the guy to critique the navy’s process for training and selecting officers for command-at-sea. But what I will say is that sometimes avoiding a collision is much more difficult than you’d think. In fact, I’m surprised it doesn’t happen more often.

    In a career that included seven ships, six of them came mere feet away from catastrophes like what happened on the John S. McCain and the Fitzgerald. While roughly half of those near misses were the direct result of ownship negligence or poor watch-standing, the others were caused by either severe weather, low visibility, shipping density, engineering casualties, inherently risky missions in restricted waters, or some combination of those factors."

    Even if half of them were the result of external factors; it strikes me as an extraordinarily large number of near miss ' catastrophes for one person to have experienced.
  6. Last edited: Sep 22, 2017
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  7. I see one of the commentators below the article is saying that AIS shouldn't be turned on as it will tell the US's enemies where they are. They're in the Singapore Straits FFS. All you need to see them is a pair of binoculars.
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  8. I am waiting for the adhoc reckoning of our oracle on this latest update.
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  9. NSP

    NSP LE

    Indeed. His pronouncements on running lights, shapes and the workings of the autopilot were an absolute revelation. Who knew...?

    I mean, I've only spent nineteen years working at sea; other ArRSers moreso and with actual navigational responsibilities and experience.
  10. Was he known as 'Uncle Albert'? ;)
  11. rampant

    rampant LE Reviewer Book Reviewer

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  12. A bit off topic - sorry - but one of the oddities of the RN during the Second World War was that two of the most highly regarded vessels for consistently superb ship-handling were the Belgian corvettes, HM Ships Buttercup and Godetia; there were not enough Belgian sailors to form a Free Belgian Navy, but instead they formed a Belgian Section within the RN itself. They were mostly from the cross-Channel ferry community (which was why they had been safe in the UK when the Germans invaded). The two corvettes' crews were distinctly average on ASW tasks, but since every watch-keeping officer was a fully qualified Master, it was generally reckoned that if you got torpedoed, there was no ship you would rather see coming to pick you up, as they were superlative at those key seamanship skills. Pulled off some heroic rescues in the foulest of conditions, including the monstrous HX229/SC122 battle in 1943.
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  13. seaweed

    seaweed LE Book Reviewer

    In sixties the RN, assisted by the Applied Psychology Unit at Cambridge, gave a lot of thought to watchkeeping routines when it realised that ships might substantially have to be fought in port and starboard Defence Watches [that was one of the reasons for (eventually, in 1972) switching from deep specialist Gunnery and ASW officers to a hybrid called the Principal Warfare Officer]. One offering that lasted for a while was 7 & 5, whereby one watch was on 0100-0800 and 1300-1800, the other the opposite way, with no creeping adjustment via the 2 hour dog watches 1600-2000. The OOW on the bridge however would typically be in traditional three 4 hour watches but would also be taking a turn at other things like Flight Deck Officer for the helo when required. It was a belated acknowledgment that fatigue is not necessarily a sign of moral weakness. 7 & 5 eventually largely gave way to six and six. The time off however has to cover action stations, replenishment, the day job, meals, personal housekeeping so you still don't get the medically recommended quantity of continuous sleep. We won two world wars without that so who cares!