USS Bonhomme Richard on Fire

Goatman

ADC
Book Reviewer
BAe Systems prolly negotiated a hold-out with MoD.
 

NSP

LE
Someone needs to tell Scoldilocks that global vegetation density has increased to put the carbon we've taken from the ground and put into the air back into the ground. We're not manufacturing the stuff. There's a finite amount; we just move it around.
 

maritime

Old-Salt
Talking of Halon. Quick dit. Got stung for said welding sentry once. Turned up at HQ1. “Right we’re is it, hangar.?” “No, engine room”. “WHAT!” . Got one of the stokers to take me down there.(Hey I was a roof rat) Climbs down throu entry with my AFFF and dockyard dandy into a stinking ,oily,smelly,crowded machinery space. My mind naturally turned to survival, I asked “what happens if there’s a bfo fire?”. “Well,see that light near the one And only exit.That will Flash on and a alarm will sound and anybody in here has got about 4,5 seconds to get out before Halon is pumped in to the compartment... see ya”. I looked around at the sets of ladders,gantries,narrow passageways and thought, Jesus no ones getting out of here alive. Note. We used to use BCF Extinguishers as well which was also nasty stuff .
 
Talking of Halon. Quick dit. Got stung for said welding sentry once. Turned up at HQ1. “Right we’re is it, hangar.?” “No, engine room”. “WHAT!” . Got one of the stokers to take me down there.(Hey I was a roof rat) Climbs down throu entry with my AFFF and dockyard dandy into a stinking ,oily,smelly,crowded machinery space. My mind naturally turned to survival, I asked “what happens if there’s a bfo fire?”. “Well,see that light near the one And only exit.That will Flash on and a alarm will sound and anybody in here has got about 4,5 seconds to get out before Halon is pumped in to the compartment... see ya”. I looked around at the sets of ladders,gantries,narrow passageways and thought, Jesus no ones getting out of here alive. Note. We used to use BCF Extinguishers as well which was also nasty stuff .
Apparently RM Bandsmen had one of the highest casualty rates in WW2 as they manned the fire control centre right down in the bowels of the ship on Cruisers and Battleships. This was a mechanical computer which worked out the direction and distances of the guns.

The Bandsman got the role due to their aptitude with instruments for some reason. With the ship closed down and watertight doors they had very little chance of getting out if the ship was going down. Having visted HMS Belfast and seen their station, I could understand why.
 
The sum total of my knowledge of NavArch is "ooft, that's not going to polish out".
Never mind, the dabbers will be able to get enough paint down to cover it up and make it structurally sound.
 
Never mind, the dabbers will be able to get enough paint down to cover it up and make it structurally sound.
Was you on Cov during the fire in the Fwd amr?
 

rampant

LE
Kit Reviewer
Book Reviewer
This might be worth a thread of its own, but I see some interesting points of research and learning with respect to the style of leadership within the RN and USN. Would the RN have suffered the same fate with a ship alongside? Or would the damage control party be more aggressive in the attack of the fire. Would there been any better command and control decisions? Seems we are not immune from our own failures, with the 7th July being the 18th year since HMS Nottingham went aground on Wolf Rock. I, like many others have seen the results of the shoring up of her hull breaches in the DRIU. Would these learnings make us any more effective?

This article also goes on to discuss an alleged systemic failure. Something the authour doesn't subscribe to. Perhaps the sheer scale of the fleet and operations magnifies the issues that are potentially there, but what did we do when we had a vaguely similar naval force. Were we any better?
 

rampant

LE
Kit Reviewer
Book Reviewer
This might be worth a thread of its own, but I see some interesting points of research and learning with respect to the style of leadership within the RN and USN. Would the RN have suffered the same fate with a ship alongside? Or would the damage control party be more aggressive in the attack of the fire. Would there been any better command and control decisions? Seems we are not immune from our own failures, with the 7th July being the 18th year since HMS Nottingham went aground on Wolf Rock. I, like many others have seen the results of the shoring up of her hull breaches in the DRIU. Would these learnings make us any more effective?

This article also goes on to discuss an alleged systemic failure. Something the authour doesn't subscribe to. Perhaps the sheer scale of the fleet and operations magnifies the issues that are potentially there, but what did we do when we had a vaguely similar naval force. Were we any better?
Can't say for certain but there has been issues highlighted with regard to an unsafe working culture as seen with the Fitzgerald. Again, without being certain, with Naval matters that is, but with regard to safety culture in the workplace in general the US have a very different approach than we do. The US approach seems to try minimise the effects when an accident does occur, whilst we try to minimise the chances of the accident occurring in the first place.
 
If Red Adair had still been around, the fire would have been extinguished five days ago.

And probably with a lot less damage.
 

A2_Matelot

LE
Book Reviewer
This might be worth a thread of its own, but I see some interesting points of research and learning with respect to the style of leadership within the RN and USN. Would the RN have suffered the same fate with a ship alongside? Or would the damage control party be more aggressive in the attack of the fire. Would there been any better command and control decisions? Seems we are not immune from our own failures, with the 7th July being the 18th year since HMS Nottingham went aground on Wolf Rock. I, like many others have seen the results of the shoring up of her hull breaches in the DRIU. Would these learnings make us any more effective?

This article also goes on to discuss an alleged systemic failure. Something the authour doesn't subscribe to. Perhaps the sheer scale of the fleet and operations magnifies the issues that are potentially there, but what did we do when we had a vaguely similar naval force. Were we any better?
What Damage Control Party? Depending on the refit timeline it could be entirely in the hands of BAE and if there were a fire it's a case of retreat and await the local Fire Brigade who just love the notion of ship fires.
 
This might be worth a thread of its own, but I see some interesting points of research and learning with respect to the style of leadership within the RN and USN. Would the RN have suffered the same fate with a ship alongside? Or would the damage control party be more aggressive in the attack of the fire. Would there been any better command and control decisions? Seems we are not immune from our own failures, with the 7th July being the 18th year since HMS Nottingham went aground on Wolf Rock. I, like many others have seen the results of the shoring up of her hull breaches in the DRIU. Would these learnings make us any more effective?

This article also goes on to discuss an alleged systemic failure. Something the authour doesn't subscribe to. Perhaps the sheer scale of the fleet and operations magnifies the issues that are potentially there, but what did we do when we had a vaguely similar naval force. Were we any better?
For a start only Faslane has on site fire cover, most large US mil docks have fire depts
 

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