US troops ordered to ignore Afghan allies pederast tendancies

#41
They then went to the Taliban - before dawn the next day the Taliban had surrounded the compound, rescued the boys and tried and executed their kidnappers.

Then bummed the boys themselves.
Same people, just different organisation.
Eliminate the opposition.
 
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No.4 Mk.1

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#42
They then went to the Taliban - before dawn the next day the Taliban had surrounded the compound, rescued the boys and tried and executed their kidnappers.

Then bummed the boys themselves.
Same people, just different organisation.
I know this is the serious bit, and I'm not wanting to detract from that but if we take the "women for babies, boys for pleasure" bit can we then assume the ones now doing the buggering have hoops like a basketball net thereby perpetuating the whole cycle of incest, child abuse etc.
Watch from 52.00 to 54.00 for an ANP acting chief saying just that (there's a bit about his Grandma's pussy).

It remains my understanding that the Taliban banned this practice.
This Is What Winning Looks Like | VICE | United Kingdom
 

Caecilius

LE
Kit Reviewer
Book Reviewer
#43
Watch from 52.00 to 54.00 for an ANP acting chief saying just that (there's a bit about his Grandma's pussy).

It remains my understanding that the Taliban banned this practice.
This Is What Winning Looks Like | VICE | United Kingdom
The Taleban banned a lot of things that they nevertheless continued to practice. Don't believe all the hype!

When I was there I did see a lot of signs of this going on. I remember a particularly amusing SITREP written by a U.S. callsign which expressed faux innocent belief in the ANSF story about how a 12 year old with a gunshot wound to the leg came to be dressed in full AUP rig including thermal underwear. This kind of stuff was par for the course with the ANSF, but it's a case of adopting a position of moral relativism or just simply never working with certain overseas partners.

That said, I probably would have acted if I found a boy literally chained to a bed though. That's beyond the pale, even for Afghans.
 
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#44
The Taleban banned a lot of things that they nevertheless continued to practice. Don't believe all the hype!

.
Bumming boys is banned/illegal in the UK and every other civilized country in this world, but it still happens, frequently.
 
#45
Opium poppy growing and the production of heroin and opium under the Taliban fell by more than 99%:



However some people believe that the Taliban had stored huge amounts of the drug before the ban, and then used the resultant explosion in the price of heroin
I'm also given to understand that the Iranians were making dire threats as to what they were going to do ( before we stepped in ) to the Taliban if they didn't stop it as a lot of the trade was hitting Iran. We missed a trick there.
 
S

Spider39

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#46
Yes I have heard the same, and it is exactly the way the Taliban made their reputation at first and got so much support and traction when they first swept the warlords out of power. By Afghan standards they do have a functioning and relatively incorruptible justice system, unlike the Warlords in the 1990's or what we have established since 2002

It is surely just a matter of time before we start hearing story's of America arming the Taleban to fight ISIS .
 
#47
No need, there is all the guns and ammo in the World there already and the Afghans / Talib are very territorial and like their own local power, ISIS will threaten that and will get knocked off for their troubles.

Iran has been recruiting Afghan Shia to go to Syria, with some success using good T&C, the Persians follow the old observation that you can never buy a Afghan you can only hire them for a while, that applies to Iran, to us and everybody else. .

Anyway back on thread
 
#48
Iran has also been backing some commanders amongst their old enemy talibans against IS. They really are not picky despite the occasional genocidal massacre by Terry against Shia. It's more than likely we'll do the same if IS advances in Afghanistan.

We've happily backed some pretty dubious beards in Syria and were quite near to supporting AQ fighters there more directly. That's instead of just indirectly by backing the rebel rear echelons they often fight in front of against Asad. There's also been allegations that some of our "moderate" chums there are rather rapey bandits.

A chap's Jimmy Saville like sexual habits are about as likely to enter into the equation as cruelty to dogs. I mean get a grip this is not BBC light entertainment in the 70s. Afghan warlords are a bunch of veteran war criminals who do far worse things for a giggle. The police are a bunch of predatory bandits. The main concern is they'll do what you bribe them to and not flip sides.
 

MoleBath

LE
Kit Reviewer
Book Reviewer
#49
. 'A woman for business, a boy for pleasure, a goat for choice' is an old Pathan proverb, and one of the most famous of Pathan songs, the 'Zakhmi Dil' ('Wounded Heart') begins with the words, 'There's a boy across the river with a bottom like a peach, but, alas, I cannot swim.'
 

No.4 Mk.1

On ROPS
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#50
. 'A woman for business, a boy for pleasure, a goat for choice' is an old Pathan proverb, and one of the most famous of Pathan songs, the 'Zakhmi Dil' ('Wounded Heart') begins with the words, 'There's a boy across the river with a bottom like a peach, but, alas, I cannot swim.'
There's an old Westminster adage:

"A wife is for diplomatic dinners and vulnerable children in care are for drugging & ******* at Dolphin Square establishment parties, and no one can do a ******* thing to stop us."​
 
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No.4 Mk.1

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#51
The Afghan government have finally ended this shameful practice - apparently someone had forgot to make it illegal to rape little boys! (good job we checked that before installing governments and arming police forces... )

http://www.khaama.com/afghanistan-finalizes-law-to-criminalize-bacha-baazi-02966
The Afghan government for the first time has finalized a law to criminalize the bullying and sexual abuse of children (Bacha Baazi).

Officials in the ministry of justice of Afghanistan have said the draft law finalized by the government criminalizes the abuse of children.

 
#52
The Afghan government have finally ended this shameful practice - apparently someone had forgot to make it illegal to rape little boys! (good job we checked that before installing governments and arming police forces... )

http://www.khaama.com/afghanistan-finalizes-law-to-criminalize-bacha-baazi-02966
The Afghan government for the first time has finalized a law to criminalize the bullying and sexual abuse of children (Bacha Baazi).

Officials in the ministry of justice of Afghanistan have said the draft law finalized by the government criminalizes the abuse of children.

You're oddly optimistic.

We know, don't we, from experience under PMs B'liar and Broon, that you can pass thousands of laws in the space of a few months.

That is not the same as making good laws, or even laws that can be effectively policed.

So far, this is no more than a gesture, probably for the benefit of external audiences, would be my take on it.
 
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#53
As far as I can tell, both missions deteriorated into aimless bimbling about
No issue with that, but its a bit too easy to blame everyone else, especially those nasty liberals and socialists. This was largely self-inflicted by an Army that should have known better,

whilst the liberal chatterati insisted on unworkable ROEs and the avoidance of anything which might remotely look like basic civilised standards being imposed on a pack of murderous savages
I don't remember reading anything in the Guardian that debated our RoEs. Given the amount of ammunition expended and ordnance dropped, it's hard to make the case that they were that restrictive. Indeed, I know here some former JTAC types express guilt over league tables for who could drop the most in 6 months. I also seem to remember "courageous restraint" as being self-imposed and championed by Stan McChrystal amongst others. I don't think I'd call him a member of the liberal chatterati! At least not to his face :)

and all this while risk-averse politicians tried to find the exit door, senior commanders struggled with complex speak the truth v keep your job dilemmas and everybody responsible for the whole horrible mess blustered about how it was all somehow a great and glorious triumph.
The politicians did not have a monopoly on risk aversion. Does anyone seriously think you can win a guerilla war with the 6-month tour approach, a protection trumps all and the 'heavy infantry' mindset that was adopted, denying all the lessons of recorded military history because somehow Afghanistan was "different"? There's a great slide in a presentation doing the rounds at the moment comparing Templer's oversight of Malaya (with Briggs) versus the numerous grip and grin photos of successive TFH Commanders handing over to each other every 6 months. MS was never going to let us appoint a campaign commander and staff who were in it for the long haul. History will not judge us kindly.

We are happy to teach the importance of the Moral Component and we seem equally happy to undermine it through politically correct temporising when on operations. Hopefully Captain Quinn will find a wiser employer.
I don't think political correctness comes in to this equation. You can regard DFID's ham-fisted attempts to tell Pashtun elders all about Western 'civilisation' and all its benefits in the early days of HERRICK, which played a part in the alienation of the British mission as politically correct. Not confronting the criminal and unacceptable behaviour of our Allies because we as an Army had neither the corporate moral-courage, the will, the authority or the resources to do so is another matter that goes to heart of the flawed mission in Afghanistan. Perhaps a few more right-on types from DFID out on the ground bleating on about women and children's rights during the campaign might have badgered us into confronting a few more of the inconsistencies in our approach.

'Which all goes to the question of why we were there.

The various options I heard then and now include:

To 'civilise' Afghanistan (whatever that means)?
To defeat the Taleban (whatever that means and who ever they are)?
To defeat A-Q (ditto)?
To keep Britain's streets safe from terror (and possibly drugs) (really)?
Or to find a convenient short-lived war to reestablish the UK military's reputation at home and abroad

I wonder if we will ever be clear what it actually was. Assuming that there was actually a mission.
 
#54
It is surely just a matter of time before we start hearing story's of America arming the Taleban to fight ISIS .
Almost a year to the day since you posted this. You were only a little off in your prediction; the Afghan Government (I'm sure with US complicity) has been arming some Taliban factions for at least 6 months now to fight ISIS. You couldn't make it up. And I haven't before anyone asks.
 
#55
The Afghan government have finally ended this shameful practice - apparently someone had forgot to make it illegal to rape little boys! (good job we checked that before installing governments and arming police forces... )

http://www.khaama.com/afghanistan-finalizes-law-to-criminalize-bacha-baazi-02966
The Afghan government for the first time has finalized a law to criminalize the bullying and sexual abuse of children (Bacha Baazi).

Officials in the ministry of justice of Afghanistan have said the draft law finalized by the government criminalizes the abuse of children.

Another empty gesture by the Afghan Government to appease the international community. They cant enforce this and they know it. MPs have already said they will block the law.
 

FORMER_FYRDMAN

LE
Book Reviewer
#56
No issue with that, but its a bit too easy to blame everyone else, especially those nasty liberals and socialists. This was largely self-inflicted by an Army that should have known better,
The army(ies) certainly have their share of blame but the mission was defined (or not) by the politicians who, at some point along the twisted trail, decided that we could make a democratic shangri-la out of a murderous cesspit, on what basis I still can't fathom. The mission should have been to go in, put supporting attacks on the west very firmly on the loss side of the Taleban's profit and loss ledger, ideally with a sideways glance at certain elements in Pakistan, and then leave them to it.

I don't remember reading anything in the Guardian that debated our RoEs. Given the amount of ammunition expended and ordnance dropped, it's hard to make the case that they were that restrictive. Indeed, I know here some former JTAC types express guilt over league tables for who could drop the most in 6 months. I also seem to remember "courageous restraint" as being self-imposed and championed by Stan McChrystal amongst others. I don't think I'd call him a member of the liberal chatterati! At least not to his face :)
I'm not talking about dropping random amounts of high explosive which, again, we should have learned the futility of, I'm talking about extending the protection of the law of armed conflict to individuals who fight out of uniform and, arguably use civilians as cover. I see no moral problem with such individuals being shot on the spot and indeed I find it bizarre that we were prepared to risk bombing civilians whilst extending all manner of protection to those who physically attacked us and recognised no limits on their own behaviour. McChrystal's response was misguided but fairly rational - under the circumstances we weren't going to win so why make things worse. One day someone's going to tumble to the fact that the bad guys can shoot people faster than you can win hearts and minds therefore the bad guys have to be neutralised completely, at speed and by whatever means necessary - hence my point about the chatterati.

The politicians did not have a monopoly on risk aversion. Does anyone seriously think you can win a guerilla war with the 6-month tour approach, a protection trumps all and the 'heavy infantry' mindset that was adopted, denying all the lessons of recorded military history because somehow Afghanistan was "different"? There's a great slide in a presentation doing the rounds at the moment comparing Templer's oversight of Malaya (with Briggs) versus the numerous grip and grin photos of successive TFH Commanders handing over to each other every 6 months. MS was never going to let us appoint a campaign commander and staff who were in it for the long haul. History will not judge us kindly.
I agree with you entirely, but the politicans set the tone and underpin the moral component. If they're casualty averse, as they were, it's unrealistic to expect those reporting to them to resist that pressure indefinitely.

I don't think political correctness comes in to this equation. You can regard DFID's ham-fisted attempts to tell Pashtun elders all about Western 'civilisation' and all its benefits in the early days of HERRICK, which played a part in the alienation of the British mission as politically correct. Not confronting the criminal and unacceptable behaviour of our Allies because we as an Army had neither the corporate moral-courage, the will, the authority or the resources to do so is another matter that goes to heart of the flawed mission in Afghanistan. Perhaps a few more right-on types from DFID out on the ground bleating on about women and children's rights during the campaign might have badgered us into confronting a few more of the inconsistencies in our approach.
It was entirely political correctness. The only alternative to leaving well alone was to destroy Afghanistan's tribal culture, root and branch and the blueprint for eradicating a highly religious and tribal warrior culture is what we did to the Highlands after the '45. Since we weren't hard boiled enough to take that option we instead opted for an approach which made western liberals feel warm and fuzzy but did nothing for the Afghans and ensured that anyone stupid enough to buy in to what we were offering can look forward to a real hammering when the Taleban return.

'Which all goes to the question of why we were there.

The various options I heard then and now include:

To 'civilise' Afghanistan (whatever that means)?
To defeat the Taleban (whatever that means and who ever they are)?
To defeat A-Q (ditto)?
To keep Britain's streets safe from terror (and possibly drugs) (really)?
Or to find a convenient short-lived war to reestablish the UK military's reputation at home and abroad

I wonder if we will ever be clear what it actually was. Assuming that there was actually a mission
Which is pretty much my point. We went into Afghanistan to say thank you for 9/11, and arguably did a good job with a light footprint. We hung around because western liberal elites are uncomfortable with hammering foreigners for mundane reasons like self-defence and they saw a wonderful opportunity to impose a liberal western democratic model on arguably the most politically intractable and homicidally-inclined piece of real estate anywhere in the world, despite all the historical evidence to the contrary. Finally, we couldn't make a hasty exit because, yet again, the west found itself over-invested in a political tar pit of little or no strategic value and certainly nothing to compensate for the expenditure of blood and treasure.

It's now China's turn to make the same miscalculation at some future time, at which point the Afghans can shout 'House'.
 
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#57
The army(ies) certainly have their share of blame but the mission was defined (or not) by the politicians who, at some point along the twisted trail, decided that we could make a democratic shangri-la out of a murderous cesspit, on what basis I still can't fathom. The mission should have been to go in, put supporting attacks on the west very firmly on the loss side of the Taleban's profit and loss ledger, ideally with a sideways glance at certain elements in Pakistan, and then leave them to it.



I'm not talking about dropping random amounts of high explosive which, again, we should have learned the futility of, I'm talking about extending the protection of the law of armed conflict to individuals who fight out of uniform and, arguably use civilians as cover. I see no moral problem with such individuals being shot on the spot and indeed I find it bizarre that we were prepared to risk bombing civilians whilst extending all manner of protection to those who physically attacked us and recognised no limits on their own behaviour. McChrystal's response was misguided but fairly rational - under the circumstances we weren't going to win so why make things worse. One day someone's going to tumble to the fact that the bad guys can shoot people faster than you can win hearts and minds therefore the bad guys have to be neutralised completely, at speed and by whatever means necessary - hence my point about the chatterati.



I agree with you entirely, but the politicans set the tone and underpin the moral component. If they're casualty averse, as they were, it's unrealistic to expect those reporting to them to resist that pressure indefinitely.



It was entirely political correctness. The only alternative to leaving well alone was to destroy Afghanistan's tribal culture, root and branch and the blueprint for eradicating a highly religious and tribal warrior culture is what we did to the Highlands after the '45. Since we weren't hard boiled enough to take that option we instead opted for an approach which made western liberals feel warm and fuzzy but did nothing for the Afghans and ensured that anyone stupid enough to buy in to what we were offering can look forward to a real hammering when the Taleban return.



Which is pretty much my point. We went into Afghanistan to say thank you for 9/11, and arguably did a good job with a light footprint. We hung around because western liberal elites are uncomfortable with hammering foreigners for mundane reasons like self-defence and they saw a wonderful opportunity to impose a liberal western democratic model on arguably the most politically intractable and homicidally-inclined piece of real estate anywhere in the world despite all the historical evidence to the contrary. Finally, we couldn't make a hasty exit because, yet again, the west found itself over-invested in a political tar pit of little or no strategic value and certainly nothing to coompensate for the expenditure of blood and treasure.

It's now China's turn to make the same miscalculation at some future time, at which point the Afghans can shout 'House'.
Very good post, wish I could give you more likes.
 

No.4 Mk.1

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On ROPs
#59
The army(ies) certainly have their share of blame but the mission was defined (or not) by the politicians who, at some point along the twisted trail, decided that we could make a democratic shangri-la out of a murderous cesspit, on what basis I still can't fathom.
Remember John Reid saying we'd be "happy to leave again in three years' time without firing one shot.", just as we embarked on the ink spot strategy?

It was the military, apparently commanded by Helmand governor Mohammed Daoud (a civilian irrigation engineer with no power base in Helmand) who decided to occupy the Platoon Houses without the SoS for Defence being aware of the mission expansion.

The year before the SAS recce had said "there isn't an insurgency in Helmand but i can give you one", and so a political decision was made in London to sack the previous governor and most powerful man in Helmand, Sher Mohammed Akhtar. Six months later, once the poppy crop was in, the British then occupied SMA's home town (Musa Qala) as part of the platoon house disaster strategy.

I believe this was when the battle for Helmand was both started and lost. Other opinions are available.

Richards was CO of ISAF forces at the time.
 

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