http://www.rusi.org/research/hsr/intro/commentary/ref:C46AD9E1302254/ Whilst the link above is a simple commentary from the Shadow Security Minister, it does lift a few good points. With increasing demands on ops, and obvious recruiting and retention problems, is it still feasible for the TA to respond with the required manpower to a major and immediate emergency? Why do a majority of UK Resilience Plans rely on TA assets, when in reality these may not be immediately/fully available or fully functioning? The article also notes that (whilst TA manning numbers dwindle slightly) a larger workforce may be available from elements of the community who would train and prepare for Resilience/Emergency Response, but do not, because the current role (being a TA soldier/officer) also requires them to be part of the military, bear arms and be available to mobilise. Would it be a good idea to form a UK Civil Defence Force, of which, the TA would provide additional manpower, but not be the sole workforce? Or would it be a bad idea, because providing CCRF capabilities is half of our bipartite justification for existence? (The other half being to bolster numbers on Ops, through a medium of IRs or mobilised sub-units etc) Or would it simply lead to a waste of taxpayers money by being a bureaucratic and unnecessary appendage to the civil service? I'm pretty junior, and may have got the 'wrong end of the stick' so to speak, but given recent floodings and a possible return of the Foot & Mouth crisis, or any other pandemic scares (Avian Flu) or possible natural and human disasters, there seems to be an increasing likelihood of a need to call CCRF assets forward... only to find that the CCRF capability has been overlooked, and is under-manned and underfunded (like most parts of the TA) and, henceforth, incapable of providing a swift and timely response to the arising emergency - an emergency evolving in our own country to our own people, and not overseas. --- Just out of interest, are the RAFR or RMR also liable for CCRF?