Laughs in Royal Navy to our Irish poster (@PhotEx ).I did point out that detail. Jarrett was meant to be covering - she'd got "confused". Your lack of comprehension continues to impress - if you can't even read what's being written, no wonder your understanding is so flawed.
Visual detection aboard Missouri when the missile was three miles out. Too late for countermeasures, though Phalanx might have had a chance if the missile had been in parameters.
Note no radar detection by any of the US ships with their super-duper betterest systems. (Jarrett later claimed that her radar had detected at about six miles, but it never formed a track or reported it on the CSH - it was only picked up in the after-action analysis)
And indeed Gloucester's air team had just come out of a huddle where a contact had come down that lane below 1,000', 450 knots, no IFF, no radar, didn't answer warnings... until locking a 909 on persuaded the USN A-6 that perhaps he should let the warship know who he was. There was a justified concern that most flying things were likely to be friendly and fratricide was a real concern.
But then a US author (Marvin Pokrant, "Desert Storm At Sea", 1999 Greenwood) points out that every time an unidentified contact closed the force, Gloucester had made a correct identification, and did so again in this case.
(The US ships solved the problem by not seeing it at all - you don't have to identify a target you never detected...)
London never held it on radar - the reconstruction indicated it flew right down a 968 null, and 967M was whited out by EMI.
Note also that this was indeed Seersucker cruise height, and "lack of emitter" might mean a failed seeker head, or targeting error... or it might be a HY-2A with an infrared seeker.
You might also include the US volleying off soft-kill, both too late to be any use and in defiance of the pre-agreed force AAW policy, but that might be a little awkward. (Both Gloucester and London correctly held softkill)
It does seem that you've got only the most superficial, and sometimes incorrect, understanding of the incident - might I suggest you read some of the actual analysis? Look through the recordings? Perhaps speak to a couple of participants? It's theoretically possible you might learn something by doing so.
However, since you're thicker than a whale omelette, your determination that "detecting, correctly identifying, and successfully reacting to" a threat is grossly inferior to letting it get so close that a lookout only spots it fifteen seconds out will doubtless remain unchallenged.
Let me guess, next you're going to explain to us all how much better the USS Vincennes did than all those incompetent British ships on the Armilla Patrol?