I have just finished reading Frank Ledwidge's "Losing Small Wars". Whilst I don't think it was quite the Book of Revelations that many reviewers had touted, it did contain many striking points about our Army today. One aspect that was mentioned, but was never really expanded on in any depth, was the tooth to tail ratio in theatre and its impact on effectiveness in the environment of a capped ceiling on troop numbers deployed. To that end, proportionally how many support troops in rear bases do we actually need to sustain and enable the 'boots on the ground'? Is there a case of bloated headquarters sucking valuable slot numbers that could be used to deploy Riflemen instead? How much of the essential support services could be contracted out, as already occurs to a degree? I realise that the Americans have a greater proportion of support services to line infantry, but their ability to deploy in such numbers as required, negates the effect of the quantity of one denuding the other.