Tim Bax on Rhodesian COIN

_Chimurenga_

LE
Gallery Guru
#2
Errrmmm ... isn't Steven Hatfill the guy that falsely claimed service in the Selous Scouts and/or Rhodesian SAS ?
 
D

Deleted 20555

Guest
#4
Steve Hatfil was at University of Cape Town Microbiology doing his PhD in the 1980's - he was called Captain Courageous by two actual ex RLI mates of mine who were in the dept at the time - waltier than the most walty of walts - very strange little man - got himself arrested for anthrax terrorism in yankland and the FBI drained the pond at the bottom of his garden looking for evidence. Turns out his boss was the terrorist and old Steve got mega moola - but still a weird little fecker.
 
#5
Steve Hatfil was at University of Cape Town Microbiology doing his PhD in the 1980's - he was called Captain Courageous by two actual ex RLI mates of mine who were in the dept at the time - waltier than the most walty of walts - very strange little man - got himself arrested for anthrax terrorism in yankland and the FBI drained the pond at the bottom of his garden looking for evidence. Turns out his boss was the terrorist and old Steve got mega moola - but still a weird little fecker.
Great stuff, perhaps they used the bucks to purchase land in Puerto Rico:

Now 61 years old, a very lean and fit Bax still holds training exercises about once a month for members of the Delta Force, Navy Seals and parachute jumpers at a remote jungle training camp in Puerto Rico that he purchased and runs with his friend Steven Hatfill, a professor of emergency medicine at George Washington University, a doctor and bio-weapons expert.
B
 
#6
Steven Hatfill is a former member of the Selous Scouts / Special Branch.
It will come as little surprise to those who took note of Deleted 20555's warning on this fella
that his name does not appear in Col Raid-Daley's Selous Scouts Nominal Roll.
Whilst BSAP SB worked closely with the Scouts it would be wrong to claim to have earnt his wings.
As a consequence I would seriously doubt as well him being in SB either.
Though this too can be checked with the Regimental Association if he persists with his spurious claims.
 
D

Deleted 20555

Guest
#7
They're also talking complete shite - Fireforce isn't particularly transferable to other coin ops - in Afghanistan it would be a complete cock up and even if it did work - the point is that kill ratio's actually don't mean all that much - what is required is for everyone to come to realise that the only way out of the quagmire - for both side - is to sit down and negotiate.
 
#8
They're also talking complete shite - Fireforce isn't particularly transferable to other coin ops - in Afghanistan it would be a complete cock up and even if it did work
Fire-Force was not a new concept, as tactically there was very little difference to the concept of AirCav in Vietnam, only in Rhodesia we had far fewer assets getting troops on the ground with modest air support but a more known enemy and easier terrain. In Afghanistan helo insertions with airstrikes in support are going on daily. Though the thought of jumping into the Kunar from a C-47 might raise an eyebrow or two! I always wondered why the Sovs never tried "externals" hitting the muj training camps in the FATA areas during the '80s under the guise of the DRA acting in "hot pursuit". Had they been determined, and a little more competent than they in reality were, they may have had their own Chimoio or Westlands Farm successes. However neither the Sovs nor the DRA had either the stomach politically or the capability militarily with their conscript forces of carrying out such attacks. Just an aside, Terry is a far different enemy than the muj the Sovs ever fought [with the possible exception of the Panjshiris]. Few of the muj were ever willing to close with the enemy, let alone have the technical know-how & sophistication of IEDs, and the thought of suicide bombers was entirely foreign to their MO. There is no relevant comparison of Terry/muj to the terrs of the Rhodesian war.
- the point is that kill ratio's actually don't mean all that much
Bodycounts are never an accurate measure of whether you are winning a COIN war. Floppies don't have neither the hearts nor the minds that matter any longer.
- what is required is for everyone to come to realise that the only way out of the quagmire - for both side - is to sit down and negotiate.
The similarity which you elude to is correct, that without gaining their acceptance we might as well go home, and therefore the only solution will have to negotiated and this will mean money and loss of original principal of leaving a government that will not be susceptible to AQ. Sickening, considering the amount of coalition blood & treasure spent to see the Karzai kleptocracy walking away with bulging bank accounts, leaving some form Terry government to return. A not too dissimilar hand of cards as dealt to General Elphinstone in 1842's winter withdrawal, merciful only for not needing to go through Khord Kabul, Gandamak and Jegdalek on our exit.
 
#9
Without wanting to hi-jack your thread did anyone ever run across a chap who called himself Frank (aka Danny) Larsen?

He used to hang around Aldershot in the mid 1980s claiming to be ex Rhodesian SB and stated he was involved in developing the process used to turn SEP to work for the SS in counter-gangs.

Some times he would appear in uniform sporting a Capts rank IIRC but dont rember ever seeing him in head dress so I dont know what cap badge- maybe RAMC because he claimed to be a shrink as well.
 
#10
Steve Hatfill to my knowledge never served in the Selous Scouts, RLI or RhSAS. He is definitely not on the nominal rolls for the Selous Scouts or the RhSAS. Tim Bax on the other hand is genuine.
 

AIRBORNEJOCK

War Hero
Kit Reviewer
Book Reviewer
#11
Fire-Force was not a new concept, as tactically there was very little difference to the concept of AirCav in Vietnam, only in Rhodesia we had far fewer assets getting troops on the ground with modest air support but a more known enemy and easier terrain. In Afghanistan helo insertions with airstrikes in support are going on daily. Though the thought of jumping into the Kunar from a C-47 might raise an eyebrow or two! I always wondered why the Sovs never tried "externals" hitting the muj training camps in the FATA areas during the '80s under the guise of the DRA acting in "hot pursuit". Had they been determined, and a little more competent than they in reality were, they may have had their own Chimoio or Westlands Farm successes. However neither the Sovs nor the DRA had either the stomach politically or the capability militarily with their conscript forces of carrying out such attacks. Just an aside, Terry is a far different enemy than the muj the Sovs ever fought [with the possible exception of the Panjshiris]. Few of the muj were ever willing to close with the enemy, let alone have the technical know-how & sophistication of IEDs, and the thought of suicide bombers was entirely foreign to their MO. There is no relevant comparison of Terry/muj to the terrs of the Rhodesian war. Bodycounts are never an accurate measure of whether you are winning a COIN war. Floppies don't have neither the hearts nor the minds that matter any longer. The similarity which you elude to is correct, that without gaining their acceptance we might as well go home, and therefore the only solution will have to negotiated and this will mean money and loss of original principal of leaving a government that will not be susceptible to AQ. Sickening, considering the amount of coalition blood & treasure spent to see the Karzai kleptocracy walking away with bulging bank accounts, leaving some form Terry government to return. A not too dissimilar hand of cards as dealt to General Elphinstone in 1842's winter withdrawal, merciful only for not needing to go through Khord Kabul, Gandamak and Jegdalek on our exit.
Obviously the aircav used heli extensively in vietnam for insertions/assaults etc and the same happens in astan now I think the fireforce concept isn't just the use of helis/para as an insertion technique but more the fact they would react offensively with it to hunt down/cut off and destroy groups of terrs (who had been preseen or just in contact) which I don't think was done in Vietnam and astan on the same level ..... Open to debate.
 
D

Deleted 20555

Guest
#12
Oh great - make an off the cuff comment and out comes crawling pendant obsessive compulsive internet crawlers.
 
D

Deleted 20555

Guest
#13
When people post on your blog that it's time you upped your meds - perhaps you should start checking out local mental healthcare proffs. There is no "investigation" it's over and done with - you're a weird little ****** in the Hatfield mode - probably with a beard and one of those multi pocket jackets that before the internet came along no one ever had to know existed.

Piss off you stupid ******. You remind me of that **** Ralph.
 
#14
Obviously the aircav used heli extensively in vietnam for insertions/assaults etc and the same happens in astan now I think the fireforce concept isn't just the use of helis/para as an insertion technique but more the fact they would react offensively with it to hunt down/cut off and destroy groups of terrs (who had been preseen or just in contact) which I don't think was done in Vietnam and astan on the same level ..... Open to debate.
Helicopter-borne quick reaction forces were used fairly extensively in Vietnam, under various names, such as "Eagle Flights" and Air Cavalry aero-rifle ("Blue") platoons within the US Army, and "Sparrowhawks" within the USMC. Not exactly the same thing as Fireforce but then of course the circumstances weren't exactly the same, something a lot of people tend to forget.

Eagle Flights:

Vietnam Choppers (Revised Edition ... - Google Books

Eagle flights prey on fleeing Viet Cong - News - Stripes

Blues:

Organisation of Divisional Air Cavalry Troop in Vietnam

Huey Vets - EMU, Inc.

http://www.survivalebooks.com/free manuals/1969 US Army Vietnam War Air Cavalry Squadron 164p.pdf

Sparrowhawks:

Vietnam War Sparrow Hawk rapid reaction force
 

AIRBORNEJOCK

War Hero
Kit Reviewer
Book Reviewer
#15
Had heard of the blues being used for QRF for LRP patrols obviously there will be numerous occasions of others having airborne/heli reaction forces as you said though not exactly fireforce.
 
#16
Another thing people don't seem to understand is that the Rhodesian Air Force didn't use Alouettes as troop-carrying aircraft because they thought it was a good idea but because that was all they had. I'm sure if like the SAAF they had Pumas in service they would have used those instead. The RhAF did eventually get some Hueys (locally known as Cheetahs) which were mainly used for external strike ops but also sometimes for Fireforce duties. The South African equivalent of Fireforce, known as "Valkgroep" (Hawk Group) mainly used Pumas for lift and Alouettes for gunship/command duties.
 
#17
Another thing people don't seem to understand is that the Rhodesian Air Force didn't use Alouettes as troop-carrying aircraft because they thought it was a good idea but because that was all they had. I'm sure if like the SAAF they had Pumas in service they would have used those instead. The RhAF did eventually get some Hueys (locally known as Cheetahs) which were mainly used for external strike ops but also sometimes for Fireforce duties. The South African equivalent of Fireforce, known as "Valkgroep" (Hawk Group) mainly used Pumas for lift and Alouettes for gunship/command duties.
Having spent three years on Fireforce as a subbie back then I would like to comment. Tim Bax was two years my senior (and we both served in 3 Commando) and he left at the end of his subbie period (three years) for the Scouts where he suffered a severe leg wound (on the first Mapai raid) which restricted his operational (on the ground) involvement thereafter. I bumped into him a year or so later at a place called Hot Springs where he was running a Scouts pseudo operation when my Troop was deployed as the Fireforce troops in support of his operation. The historical part of his Fireforce paper is accurate while his recommendations for application in Afghanistan are open to debate. I never met Hatfill.

True that the Aloutette III choppers were all we had and it was when we got the Bell 205s that we realised how lucky we had been with the Alouette. It was the quick in and out of tight LZs that provided the ability to quickly land 4-man sticks in cut off or assault positions. Difficult to shoot down too where they had to get the pilot or the fuel line or the tail rotor. Given the number of flying hours over the years on Fireforce the Alouette had a remarkable survivability rate. Also they could be maintained in the field. At Chimoio (Op Dingo) the tech/gunners did tail and main rotor changes in the admin area 10 kms from the target and at Tembue (two days later) did a full engine in that admin base using empty avtur drums as a workbench. My troop operating in Mozambique were up lifted by a flight of Alouettes from under the Cabora Basa powerline - down to under the lines, sideways under the lines, onto the ground, pick up the toopies and then the reverse to get out. Excellent pilots, great little choppers. I flew many hours in an Alouette over the years but am not blinded by some romantic notion about the Alouette, in fact I like many others were wounded while flying in a chopper as sadly some were KIA. The truth is that they could come in fast and close, land on a sixpence, drop their stick and get out fast.

Now contrast that to the long slow 'flair' of the Bell coming into land needing a larger LZ. Didn't work for Fireforce so the happy compromise was that the Bells were used in support of SAS operations into Mozambique and Zambia (carrying more and further) and we got to keep our beloved Alouettes. The four-man lift was fine too as each stick had an FN MAG LMG which was and remains a magic weapon (and devastating in the hands of a skilled troopie - my gunner for a year or so was ex-Scots Guards who was lethal).

The term 'Valk' as used in the SADF (I served for two and a half years after Rhodesia in the Parachute Battalion as a Company 2IC and Coy Comd) was really their version of a 'stick' and a Puma load as the (even then) risk averse SADF never operated in small callsigns (on non-special forces ops).

Finally, over the years I have heard many people say that the Fireforce concept would not/could not be applied to say Afghanistan. My standard reply has always been to ask the person making the statement to explain what they understood by the Fireforce concept. None had a clue what Fireforce was all about.

Can the Fireforce concept be applied in Afghanistan? Don't know... but has anyone really given it serious consideration.
 
#18
H

True that the Aloutette III choppers were all we had and it was when we got the Bell 205s that we realised how lucky we had been with the Alouette. It was the quick in and out of tight LZs that provided the ability to quickly land 4-man sticks in cut off or assault positions. Difficult to shoot down too where they had to get the pilot or the fuel line or the tail rotor. Given the number of flying hours over the years on Fireforce the Alouette had a remarkable survivability rate. Also they could be maintained in the field. At Chimoio (Op Dingo) the tech/gunners did tail and main rotor changes in the admin area 10 kms from the target and at Tembue (two days later) did a full engine in that admin base using empty avtur drums as a workbench. My troop operating in Mozambique were up lifted by a flight of Alouettes from under the Cabora Basa powerline - down to under the lines, sideways under the lines, onto the ground, pick up the toopies and then the reverse to get out. Excellent pilots, great little choppers. I flew many hours in an Alouette over the years but am not blinded by some romantic notion about the Alouette, in fact I like many others were wounded while flying in a chopper as sadly some were KIA. The truth is that they could come in fast and close, land on a sixpence, drop their stick and get out fast.

Now contrast that to the long slow 'flair' of the Bell coming into land needing a larger LZ. Didn't work for Fireforce so the happy compromise was that the Bells were used in support of SAS operations into Mozambique and Zambia (carrying more and further) and we got to keep our beloved Alouettes. The four-man lift was fine too as each stick had an FN MAG LMG which was and remains a magic weapon (and devastating in the hands of a skilled troopie - my gunner for a year or so was ex-Scots Guards who was lethal).
Thank you I was not aware of that.

The term 'Valk' as used in the SADF (I served for two and a half years after Rhodesia in the Parachute Battalion as a Company 2IC and Coy Comd) was really their version of a 'stick' and a Puma load as the (even then) risk averse SADF never operated in small callsigns (on non-special forces ops).

.
Yes I know but wasn't the reaction force of Valks the closest SADF equivalent to Fireforce?
 
#19
"Finally, over the years I have heard many people say that the Fireforce concept would not/could not be applied to say Afghanistan. My standard reply has always been to ask the person making the statement to explain what they understood by the Fireforce concept. None had a clue what Fireforce was all about.

Can the Fireforce concept be applied in Afghanistan? Don't know... but has anyone really given it serious consideration. "

I don't know a whole lot about it but surely the 1 Para (Yes I know they have a fancy new Gucci name but they are still 1 Para) drop in helmand was a sort of Fireforce type op? I think 2 Coys dropped in to act as a stop group. I'm more than willing to be corrected.

Also a question for you Once a Soldier; I once met an ex FireForce troopie who said he had done 5 jumps onto hot DZs in one day- was he over egging the pudding a bit there? I do believe he was ex RLI but thought that figure might be excessive.
 
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