The US Navy is failing to prepare recruits for madness of shipborne life - lessons for RN?

#41
Agreed.

Failure Is not an option so they tend to just keep replacing people with more and more aggressive commanders who keep making the same mistakes.

Don't know how true this fit is but apparently many years ago the Princess Patricias regiment was on excercise at one of the large American training areas. Cannucks get told 'there's a hill, take you're company of light infantry and defend it. They'll be an American mechanised infantry regiment along shortly who'll attack you. When your Miles gear goes beep your dead.' Basically the classic 'go and die in a loud grotesque military manner.'

If you've ever worked with candians they have a real chip on their back shoulder about the their neighbours so when the Bradley's got close, the cannucks got closer. The entire American assault got bogged down because they couldn't dismount their infantry because as soon as any hatch was opened or ramp dropped on te Bradley a friendly Cannuck infanteer would pop his head up and blat away from point blank range.

The aftermath of that was the tank CO was reprieved of command their and then in a training excercise because he failed.

If you can't make mistakes on a training excercise how the hell are you expected to learn?

It's the same in business though. Remove failure and replace it immediately with somebody who Ian likely to make the sameness mistake again. You end up with a very very small cadre of super brilliant people which is unattainable, or lucky people who can deflect the blame elsewhere. Hardly a great learning environment.

Macrystal for all is faults seemed the right guy. P4 and his team just started to report shite to maleness themselves look good.

You could see it with RC east. A division would be responsible for the AO, give fanciful assessments on the area and what a great job they'd done. Another unit would rotate in, realise they'd been lied to, but couldn't admit things weren't as Rosie as they'd been reported about so continued the bullshit.
I read an interesting article on doctrine man, apparently there's an issue with the 105mm armed Stryker units. Instead of using them as they're intended, the armour centre is seeing commanders trying to fight them as tanks, against armour, leading to the inevitable TES bloodbath.

Mind we're not totally innocent of the 'uber alpha male fucktard' personality type in our army either.
 

Auld-Yin

ADC
Kit Reviewer
Book Reviewer
Reviews Editor
#42
Agreed.

Failure Is not an option so they tend to just keep replacing people with more and more aggressive commanders who keep making the same mistakes.

Don't know how true this fit is but apparently many years ago the Princess Patricias regiment was on excercise at one of the large American training areas. Cannucks get told 'there's a hill, take you're company of light infantry and defend it. They'll be an American mechanised infantry regiment along shortly who'll attack you. When your Miles gear goes beep your dead.' Basically the classic 'go and die in a loud grotesque military manner.'

If you've ever worked with candians they have a real chip on their back shoulder about the their neighbours so when the Bradley's got close, the cannucks got closer. The entire American assault got bogged down because they couldn't dismount their infantry because as soon as any hatch was opened or ramp dropped on te Bradley a friendly Cannuck infanteer would pop his head up and blat away from point blank range.

The aftermath of that was the tank CO was reprieved of command their and then in a training excercise because he failed.

If you can't make mistakes on a training excercise how the hell are you expected to learn?

It's the same in business though. Remove failure and replace it immediately with somebody who Ian likely to make the sameness mistake again. You end up with a very very small cadre of super brilliant people which is unattainable, or lucky people who can deflect the blame elsewhere. Hardly a great learning environment.

Macrystal for all is faults seemed the right guy. P4 and his team just started to report shite to maleness themselves look good.

You could see it with RC east. A division would be responsible for the AO, give fanciful assessments on the area and what a great job they'd done. Another unit would rotate in, realise they'd been lied to, but couldn't admit things weren't as Rosie as they'd been reported about so continued the bullshit.
That last paragraph sound like the Cousins have been trained in Liar dice, not tactics.
 

jrwlynch

LE
Book Reviewer
#43
Was there a real F14 threat, hindsight being 20-20
No. Iran didn't have many flyable F-14s, they were high-value prestige units, they had no useful anti-surface capability. It would be like the USAF using a F-22 Raptor as a kamikaze - theoretically possible but completely stupid.

And that's before the Vincennes managed to start a surface gun battle she didn't need to, misidentified a civilian airliner as a military aircraft, misplotted the ICAO air lane on her system (so an airliner staying exactly where it was meant to be, appeared to be swerving off track), mistook range for altitude (so a climbing airliner was assumed to be diving towards them), read a series of confusing and contradictory warnings, and then - having decided to fire if the contact closed to twenty miles - needed twenty-two attempts and a change of personnel to actually fire her missiles (at eleven miles)

It's a case study in all sorts of things, particularly "scenario fulfilment" (having decided what they expected to see, Rogers and his crew ignored everything that didn't fit their story).
 
#44
- having decided to fire if the contact closed to twenty miles - needed twenty-two attempts and a change of personnel to actually fire her missiles (at eleven miles)
Twenty-two launch attempts?! That doesn't sound very optimal, as it were. Long ago I saw a news report of a Canadian(?) infantry unit in Afghanistan where the SAW gunner couldn't make his weapon go bang during a contact, yet which passed completely unremarked -- as did footage of an NCO pulling a grenade pin, rushing 10m to a wall, running back for a corrective O-group for the section, then going forwards again and posting the grenade in to the compound. I was a little surprised at what is acceptable these days. (Yes, I'm old and I remember THAT rifle).
 
#45
No. Iran didn't have many flyable F-14s, they were high-value prestige units, they had no useful anti-surface capability. It would be like the USAF using a F-22 Raptor as a kamikaze - theoretically possible but completely stupid.

And that's before the Vincennes managed to start a surface gun battle she didn't need to, misidentified a civilian airliner as a military aircraft, misplotted the ICAO air lane on her system (so an airliner staying exactly where it was meant to be, appeared to be swerving off track), mistook range for altitude (so a climbing airliner was assumed to be diving towards them), read a series of confusing and contradictory warnings, and then - having decided to fire if the contact closed to twenty miles - needed twenty-two attempts and a change of personnel to actually fire her missiles (at eleven miles)

It's a case study in all sorts of things, particularly "scenario fulfilment" (having decided what they expected to see, Rogers and his crew ignored everything that didn't fit their story).
And Rogers and his crew got Combat Action Ribbons (Rogers himself got the Legion of Merit) for their work in the Gulf.
 
#46
The US simply has no tolerance for people failing at programmes, and even less tolerance for personal failings - sex, booze and gambling. But against that, they are entirely fine with toxic leaders who produce results.
There was a documentary on one of the US Carriers and they had a run ashore while deployed
One of the NCO's had been spotted in a bar with one of the females and was hauled in for a chat and admitted getting a kiss and a grope off her nothing to serious.
No difference reduced back to the ranks and fined for breaking the fraternization rules
No tolerance at all as you say done and dusted with out any comeback or appeal
Lad had a fair few years in as well
 
#47
Fraternisation is something I simply don't get. It's not just sex, do a round of golf with someone too far removed from your rank, and in a small group, and it's just as likely you'll be hauled up for frat.

God forbid you should have a consensual sexual relationship, conducted with due regard for CoC etc. That's a quick way to jail.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
#48
I think it was 1999 or 2000 when the US Armed Forces barred enlisted personnel from having relationships with Officers. Why?
 

rampant

LE
Kit Reviewer
Book Reviewer
#49
I think it was 1999 or 2000 when the US Armed Forces barred enlisted personnel from having relationships with Officers. Why?
To prevent officers abusing their rank and coercing those lower down the chain with unwanted advances, harassment etc
 
#50
I think it was 1999 or 2000 when the US Armed Forces barred enlisted personnel from having relationships with Officers. Why?
To prevent officers abusing their rank and coercing those lower down the chain with unwanted advances, harassment etc
There is a wider cultural point.

They don't like talking about sex. They don't like to acknowledge that placing men and women in their early to mid 20s, in an enclosed space at sea, will result in sex. So instead of trying to manage it, they ban it and act outraged when it happens.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
#51
Yet no one has be able to state if an F14 was in the area and armed and flying towards the US boat!
Oh, they have. There was no F-14 in the area - even the USN acknowledged that from the start. Here's a USNI article:
Vincennes: A Case Study | U.S. Naval Institute

Determined apologists rather come unstuck when they claim that the Airbus should have listened to the VINCENNES warnings - but given that the warnings were to "Iranian fighter descending towards..." and the Airbus was very definitely climbing, as witnessed by the competent USN operators in the vicinity, it's rather like listening to the Russians try and avoid blame over MH17... there was no missile. It was a Su-25 Frogfoot that shot it down. It was a Ukrainian missile. There was an F-14 testing its radar at Bandar Abbas, and "ducting"...

Added to it, the VINCENNES CIC team couldn't even read their own screens; and so started claiming that the Airbus was descending towards them, when in fact it was climbing. They didn't manage to work the switches properly to launch (it took someone else to tell the AAWC what to select). It did lead to a major change in the AEGIS user interface on USN ships...

https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/aeronau...ed-systems-spring-2004/projects/vincennes.pdf

Lt Clay Zocher was the boss of Air Alley, which was responsible for air warfare, but he had only stood watch at that post twice before and had never fully learned and mastered the console routines. In fact, when he was finally given the green light to fire upon the incoming aircraft, he pressed the wrong keys 23 times, until a veteran petty officer leaned over and hit the right ones.
 
#52
No. Iran didn't have many flyable F-14s, they were high-value prestige units, they had no useful anti-surface capability. It would be like the USAF using a F-22 Raptor as a kamikaze - theoretically possible but completely stupid.

And that's before the Vincennes managed to start a surface gun battle she didn't need to, misidentified a civilian airliner as a military aircraft, misplotted the ICAO air lane on her system (so an airliner staying exactly where it was meant to be, appeared to be swerving off track), mistook range for altitude (so a climbing airliner was assumed to be diving towards them), read a series of confusing and contradictory warnings, and then - having decided to fire if the contact closed to twenty miles - needed twenty-two attempts and a change of personnel to actually fire her missiles (at eleven miles)

It's a case study in all sorts of things, particularly "scenario fulfilment" (having decided what they expected to see, Rogers and his crew ignored everything that didn't fit their story).
Yet during the Falklands conflict the RN task group was able to avoid something similar. According to Sandy Woodward (from his account in One Hundred Days) a suspected Argentine Boeing 707 (used for reece) was approaching the task group, and preparations were made to splash it with Sea Dart. Woodward asked one of his staff to plot a line of where its heading would take it, which suggested a Brazil - South Africa course. He ordered Weapons Tight and a Sea Harrier was scrambled to intercept and make a visual ID. It was an airliner.

So how come the checks and balances of a task group steaming to war against what they knew would be a capable and determined foe worked, but those of the Vincennes did not.

Is there a common theme here? Are the frailties of humans under stress ignored due to a macho hard charging culture?
 
#53
Lt Clay Zocher was the boss of Air Alley, which was responsible for air warfare, but he had only stood watch at that post twice before and had never fully learned and mastered the console routines. In fact, when he was finally given the green light to fire upon the incoming aircraft, he pressed the wrong keys 23 times, until a veteran petty officer leaned over and hit the right ones
Maybe he (the officer with the ridiculous name and appalling level of knowledge) would have benefitted from a bit of fraternisation. I do hope he was de-qualled.
 
#54
So how come the checks and balances of a task group steaming to war against what they knew would be a capable and determined foe worked, but those of the Vincennes did not.(sic)
Oh, I don't know. Maybe...

...a Sea Harrier was scrambled to intercept and make a visual ID. It was an airliner.
Finger trouble combined with lack of positive ID. Wonder what the Task Force would have done without the Sea Harrier to ping a closing threat? Never know I guess.
 
#55
Back on track about the US Navy. The SCPO , sorry now he is a ITSO but it might change next week but he has 20 years in the US Navy bit like a WO1 in the UK Army.

Sending him the link Shipboard Service Is Harsh, And The Navy Isn't Preparing Recruits For It

He agreed 100%. Trying to joke that I have seen tv and films about the US N. Even worked with them about 10 years ago and loved the “ surf and turf” on the ship/boat. He started laughing ?

Surf and turf? Yep we get that, ever time before the suck and **** when the commander / Chief starts the port and starboard shifts for about 3 weeks.

Seem it is a shite place to be on a US ship/ boat.
 
#57
Laugh, when the Andrew can recruit to man the few ships it has left...
 

ugly

LE
Moderator
#58
Oh, they have. There was no F-14 in the area - even the USN acknowledged that from the start. Here's a USNI article:
Vincennes: A Case Study | U.S. Naval Institute

Determined apologists rather come unstuck when they claim that the Airbus should have listened to the VINCENNES warnings - but given that the warnings were to "Iranian fighter descending towards..." and the Airbus was very definitely climbing, as witnessed by the competent USN operators in the vicinity, it's rather like listening to the Russians try and avoid blame over MH17... there was no missile. It was a Su-25 Frogfoot that shot it down. It was a Ukrainian missile. There was an F-14 testing its radar at Bandar Abbas, and "ducting"...

Added to it, the VINCENNES CIC team couldn't even read their own screens; and so started claiming that the Airbus was descending towards them, when in fact it was climbing. They didn't manage to work the switches properly to launch (it took someone else to tell the AAWC what to select). It did lead to a major change in the AEGIS user interface on USN ships...

https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/aeronau...ed-systems-spring-2004/projects/vincennes.pdf

Lt Clay Zocher was the boss of Air Alley, which was responsible for air warfare, but he had only stood watch at that post twice before and had never fully learned and mastered the console routines. In fact, when he was finally given the green light to fire upon the incoming aircraft, he pressed the wrong keys 23 times, until a veteran petty officer leaned over and hit the right ones.
Thanks, instead of If that would have been a better word!
 
#59
Its a culture of risk aversion.
Based on four + years working for the Royal Navy, it isn't just an American issue.
Of course, killing a couple of people and two crown censures during “routine” training may have something to do with that...


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk
 
#60
'(Officers) engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failure, too busy to talk with or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety of tasks'.

And that was the Americans own opinion of its Officers in a 1970 War College study
 

Similar threads

Top