The Architects Of War On Islam

Discussion in 'Syria, Mali, Libya, Middle East & North Africa' started by alib, Aug 6, 2012.

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  1. No it's not a cabal of shadowy Neocons.

    In 3QD The Architects Of War On by Maniza Naqvi
    This is worth reading in full, it's an interesting view.

    All the Abrahamic faiths are sometimes misconstrued as faiths that sprang from the desert. In fact they are all inventions of urban folk, particularly Islam which is the work of a Meccan merchant not a desert Bedu. Often they do not sit well with wild nomadic folk, who don't have much room for compassion, charity or fine aesthetics. Shrines are key feature of most Muslims lives. The austere Saud version of Islam Wahabism is thought by some Muslim scholars to be heretical and has a long history of destroying much loved places of prayer even in Mecca.

    It's ironic that this tribe of philistines is custodian of Islam most holy places and not surprising that their care often looks like vandalism. They've also used their oil money to run roughshod over the traditional Islam of places like the Punjab with its gallery of saints and their holy places.

    I noticed in Mali recently where the Takfiri have been tearing down shrines, there's been some talk of branding them as Kufr, violators of tradition and not proper Muslims at all. You could compare it to iconoclastic Reformation Prods white washing out idolatrous Papist religious art, I'm sure the feelings are just as bitter.

    It's perhaps not coincidental that a great icon of Mamon, the WTC was targeted by men of Wahibi faith on 9-11.
     
  2. Very grateful for the link.

    Interesting that the source of the single Islamist narrative is that jihad is a defensive fhard ayn (religious duty), that the aggressor is the pernicious west. Fun to see a point of view suggesting that the other may be true.

    People in a couple of hundred years may look back of what is happening to Islam now in similar light to how we view the reformation. Shame we (and they) have to live through it.
     
  3. I recall yerman Sardar writing a piece on his time at the Haj Research Institute that was very critical of Saudi attempts to turn Mecca into Las Vegas without the fun bits.

    The clash of civilization was always a deeply foolish model of our relationship with Islam. We are largely peripheral to events in the Umma which Muslims also fancy to be far more monolithic and less fluid than it is. Our colonies have faded down to a tiny disputed patch of the shtetl in the Holy Land. Apart from that Muslims are now mostly preoccupied with other Muslims.

    Our extractive interests lead us into some conflicts but pouring vast amounts of wealth into oily but largely deeply reactionary Muslim kingdoms is an underestimated part of our footprint. It's that that has allowed the Saud to spread its largely malign influence since 32. And even within the Magic Kingdom its often been destabilizing. It's the oil boom of the early 70s that caused first glimmers reform in Saudi and then a stout rival in the forces of reaction, that manifested to us most painfully as AQ.

    Takfiri are almost by definition not fighting a defensive Jihad, they are in practice mostly warring on the faithful. The near enemy is the Islamic nation state, a practical institution that even many Islamists are attached to. Bin Laden having been a shadow warrior of the House Of Saud turned against it when the Kingship preferred American defense. Pindi, the embodiment of Pakistani Islamic nationalism finds itself both running taliban against us and fighting their quest for the caliphate domestically.

    You could see Saudi as being like Calvin's gloomy Geneva where the pious were happy to send other Prods to the flames over minutia. Early Protestant kingdoms both burnt zealots and simultaneously employed them as shock troops. Takfiri as levelers troubling Cromwell's state.
     
  4. I understand (mostly from an educated and moderate Saudi member on another forum) that the Saudi royal family isn´t a monolithic block, but contains both reformers and reactionaries. I know that my internet friend was glad that the previous crown prince and minister of the interior, a hardline conservative, died before his halfbrother, King Abdullah, so that he couldn´t tuen back the reforms. It also seems that King Abdullah and the reformers are walking on thin ice, since they are still dependent on the support by the mostly arch conservative feudal tribal leaders and clerics, but King Abdullah has been cutting back on this group´s influence.
    It also seems that most Saudis don´t want the country to become a copy of Dubai or the West, but that on the other hand they would approve more freedoms. I also wonder if the support for radicals like AQ or the Salafists is official state policy or if it more the work of rich Saudi individuals.
     
  5. The Saudi royal family is about 5K strong, you are correct that it is not a monolithic block, there are all the usual dynastic tensions, it's also a squabbling kleptocracy with a very big pie to portion out. Elements are very radical, others effete and westernized. The current King is seen as a reformer within Saudi but you have to remember how conservative Saudis are. He is an arch-conservative and definitely closer to the radical side of the spectrum. His domestic reforms are mainly economic. He's bettered the condition of Saudi women slightly but this was actually in decline since the early 70s, in this he's really only correcting a reactionary charge to the right by previous kings.

    As in Pakistan the line between what is state policy and what is the action of rogue intelligence officers is blurred. It's very difficult to believe support for various taliban groups we are fighting and the Deobandi Madrassas is not Saudi state policy. It's of a very large scale dates back over a century. It's clearly Pindi's policy to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan and they have the support of their increasingly close ally the Saudis. This was frankly the case in the days of the 40th army when Bin Laden was a loyal GIP bagman. It's more covert now as the enemy is also an important Saudi ally, DC. There are other examples of a longterm strategy of exporting Wahhabi style Salafi beliefs worldwide, I think we can assume it is state policy as its done now in the teeth of a good deal of complaint from DC.

    Likewise while elements in the Saudi state vocally supported the invasion of Iraq others were deeply uneasy. When it became clear DC intended to end a millennia of Sunni hegemony and create a Shia dominated democracy the reaction was inevitable, this was a direct blow to Saudi interests. The Saudi Ulema bigoted but also deeply afraid of the spread of Shia influence went ballistic denouncing the Iraqi Shia as lower than dogs and Joos and demanding Jihad. Saudi resources flowed towards the al Anbar insurgency. I'd see the hand of the Saudi state in this as well as individuals, it is just more visible in Syria.

    The likes of AQ are both a threat to the House Of Saud and an occasionally useful policy instrument, the Saudi state has spent considerable resources hounding Takfiri domestically but the movement has also had its uses. In the build up to 9-11 there is much evidence to tie AQ to the Haqqani clan and their ISI handlers. In the process of supporting the Jihad elements of the intelligence services do become ideologically captured by it. Given 9-11 was mainly a project of Saudi citizens there have been suspicions of links to royal family members and intelligence officials. However it's not very plausible that Pindi let alone the Saudi state would ever commission such an act, it after all would be an invitation for the US to seize the Empty Quarter and send the tribe of Saud back out to its tents.