Text of Zawahiris Letter to Zarqawi

Discussion in 'Current Affairs, News and Analysis' started by tomahawk6, Oct 13, 2005.

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  1. Hmmm.... interesting article T6...

    I find one of the concerning aspects of the letter is their appreciation of the importance of winning over moderate Muslims. I only skimmed over the letter but I think in one part Zawahiri is saying "hey Zarqwai, lay off the attacks on shias - it makes us look bad and for us to win we have to get the Muslim population on side". So conversely, I'd say Zawahiri feels that when the coalition use dubious practices it only alienates moderate Muslims away from the coalition. This is a follow on from our conversation here... http://www.arrse.co.uk/cpgn2/Forums/viewtopic/t=23655.html

    Tricam.
     
  2. at the moment most of the bombing are killing Muslims, coalition soldiers only make a small fraction of the victims , not a good way of gaining support for muslim causes.
     
  3. If they are able to form the "amirate" then it's full speed ahead to Bahrain, Kuwait and the rest of the Gulf States. What price Dubai duty free, Techno geek city and those impossibly expensive hotels then?
    Even if Z is told to lay off cutting heads off as it's also bad media. Even those who support the cause appear to be hacked off (pardon the pun) with the media coverage each outrage attracted.
    All in all, a very good piece of work. It is gen? You can never tell with the spooks.
     
  4. The link ain't workin' at the mo T6....any clues?
     
  5. It is a strange letter.

    But let's look at the letter.

    I expected something like this:

    The gracious brother/Abu Musab, God protect YOU and watch over YOU... So the letter was not sent to namely Abu Musab al-Zarqawi? It is obvious:

    There are many other strange places in the letter.

    Look, Chechnya was placed first and Kosovo was not mentioned at all. It is a very strange polit-correctness. 'Far-flung regions'? Can guy like this bearded nutter use such expressions?

    Jihadist groups? How you like it. Why not gangs? In real letter this moron could use expressions like 'warriors of Jihad'.

    And so on and so forth.
     
  6. Read it again KGB , there are some even stranger passages.
     
  7. True Semper - But that's my point - Zawahiri realises the importance of keeping the public onside and he is warning Zarqwai about the risks he is running of alienating Muslims.


    Sergey - I presume the letter was written in arabic originally, the translation would explain the slightly unusual wording eh?

    Tricam.
     
  8. I have an impression that the letter was written in English first and then translated in Arabian.

    But who are they - these mysterious supporters of polytheism? Vikings? I would like to see word-by-word translation of Arabian variant.

    Btw, al-Qaeda described the letter as falsehood.

    http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/F73A57D8-D113-4FF9-8A61-D384B80A2DFF.htm
     
  9. There seems to be a industry creating these letters which suit the progaganda need of the moment.

    I would have thought that the bad guys were to busy replacing No 1 aides/key figures in the organization to write them
     
  10. 1. Well, since Zawahiri is bin Laden's 2i/c, I guess he had some spare time on his hands.
    2.How could it be propaganda when it was not intended for general circulation, but instead was private correspondence?

    It actually suggests to me a number of things:

    1. The AQ leadership is actually trying to bring Zarkawi, if not under their control, then under their influence. Right now he's too much of a loose cannon to them, which brings me to my second point.

    2. I'm not sure that I'd agree that this is necessarily evidence of progress being made by the coalition. What it does suggest to me is that Zawahari and bin Laden are more politically savvy than many people give them credit for. AQ know, from their experience in Afghanistan with the Soviets, what the Vietnamese knew. That is, an insurgency and a guerilla campaign cannot succeed without at least the acquiescence or tacit support of the people among whom the fighters live and operate. Hence the call to stop attacking the Shia, random killings of civilians and the slaughter of hostages etc. as it's eroding their support.

    3. AQ are now evidently moving to create at least the prospect of an alternative political model for the country and the region. This makes a lot of sense. Until now the provisional government, along with the US and UK admnistrations, have been able to focus their message on the simple fact that the insurgency's only purpose thus far has apparently been to cause chaos, death and disruption. By articulating a possible alternative to the Iraqi people, in terms and language they already understand (as opposed to Western Liberal Democratic traditions), they hope to bolster popular support.

    4. There is the prospect of a coalition withdrawal. Bush 43 will be gone on 20Jan09 and, all other things being equal, this war will be a major campaign issue and the candidates will be expected to come up with a plan for the end of a US commitment. Witness the campaign of 1968, for example. (It is also relavent to note, Nixon's reversal and extension of the war in subsequent years and how it came to dominate debate again in 1972.) There is also the question of next year's midterm elections that might lead to an increase of congressional activism in foreign policy, both before and after Nov 06. As Bush comes in for more criticism, there will be spillover onto Members of Congress, who will be asked why they were so acquiescent over the previous 6 years.

    5. There are uncertainties on the other side however. The language in both versions (English and Arabic) is very diplomatically scripted. The text would suggest that the AQ leadership doesn't have control over Zarkawi and his people. There is also the likelihood that Zarkawi does not have the self-control to moderate his actions, or constrain the actions of his lieutenants. It should be remembered that the core of his operation developed from what was little more than a street gang.

    My own assessment is that Zarkawi almost certainly does not have the political instincts of the AQ leadership. I would also be sceptical of the extent to which religious and political factors motivate him. There is evidence to suggest that there are other factors at work, principally a psychological desire to be protrayed as a folk hero or, more worryingly, a motive based on greed, profit and gain from his activities. I think it is safe to say that he will be receiving considerable financial backing from overseas and, as everyone from the Mafia to the IRA has found out, terrorism can be a pretty profitable enterprise (racketeering, extortion etc.)

    6. My last general point concerns the wisdom of the DNI's decision to publish this letter. While it is clear evidence of collusion between the two organizations, I think the fact that there was at least general liaision was never in doubt- so what was the point of the release? There is also the risk of the revelation of sources and methods.

    The final reservation is actually the very simple fact that this letter is now available to anyone with internet access (or presumably by now) a fax machine. A lot more Iraqis, Egyptians, Jordanians, Saudis, Omanis etc. and potential sympathisers all over the world just found out what the strategy and objectives of the insurgency and AQ's wider plan for the region is. Some of them are going to like the sound of it. Making this move is basically like having CNN repeatedly showing a controversial political ad on their shows. They just got a hell of a lot of free press.
     
  11. Reuters currently reporting that there are suggestions that the letter may be fake. Al Qaeda in Iraq are at the top of the naysayers, along with some analyst from the Congressional Research Service (normally pretty reserved chaps who talk a lot of sense) and a couple of former Agency types. Govt sources are, predictably, maintaining the letter is genuine but are, understandably, unwilling to give more details in order to protect sources an methods.

    My inclination is to suggest, supposing the letter is genuine, that this denial is a big fcuk-you from Zarqawi to Zawarhiri- indicating that al Qaeda 2.0 is a lot weaker in terms of co-ordination than many people suppose.

    If it is a fake, then I would suggest that it is part of a grey propaganda campaign by the coalition to shame the insurgents into not trying to tear the place to pieces too much on Saturday.

    Bear in mind that this analysis is made on the basis of access to open source info only. I don't have all the gen I would need to make an accurate appraisal of the situation.

    As an aside, Godspeed to everyone out there at the moment. Hopefully, this weekend won't be too hairy.
     

  12. For a couple of years now we have had similar letters all of which fit the neocon fantasy at the time. Why is this different? Maybe they are disinformation/propaganda from???
     
  13. One letter sent A-B-C......Y-Z fails to arrive/gets translated and spread world wide.Should be a simple exercise for AQ CI to stop the leak UNLESS the "sources an methods" mean "we made it up"