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Terror attacks in Europe in 2018

"Lefties" aren't in power.
Disagree with that mate...it all boils down to what you constitute as 'in power' as.

The BNP could be in 10 Downing street but the civil service "The establishment" will be as ever in recent times.
 
I cannot stress enough how much this evidence, from a UK Security Service officer known only as Witness L, needs to be read. It represents a serious detailed explanation to the problems being dealt with.

MI5 officer tells inquest of Westminster attacker's terror links

Firstly, the work done in order to prevent attacks of necessity goes unremarked. Every now and again the keeper has to make a pretty good save, but if the defender closes the ball down before it gets in the box no one even thinks about the man in the goal.

The volume and complexity of material offers a serious problem for the investigator. As does the problem of the assessment of the threat.

Bare in mind as plots have decreased in complexity, but remain the same in individual lethality, the problem of calling things have increased.

So, if I and the four mates go rubber dinghy rapids and start making bombs at home after radicalisation and preparation; the warning signs and indicators are much more than I wake up one morning and decide to go stabby-stabby in a public place.

(This is why the knife enabled wave of violence was so effective in Israel, the "Knife Intifadah" and the effort of AQ and ISIS to encourge this in the west).

This does sound bad, but is the classic issue - you have finite resources and cannot work every suspect.

Between December 2010 and October 2012 Masood was associated with a number of subjects of interest to MI5 and there was “an indication that he consumed extremist material”, the court heard.

For the next four years he “appeared intermittently in connection with a number of other subjects of interest”, including some linked to banned group al-Muhajiroun, but at no stage was there considered to be enough information to justify investigating him further.

The officer said that even though Masood had a history of violent offending, had been linked to multiple terror suspects, and in 2013 expressed “satisfaction” that the September 11 attacks had drawn people to Islam, the decision not to investigate him was “a sound one”.

Witness L said: “None of these indicators were enough to say that he was involved in activities of significant concern to us.”
If there is no active preparation, no offence committed where are your resources best deployed?

In February 2010 there was a “vague and uncorroborated” report of someone called Khalid Masood, “an extremist based in Saudi Arabia”, helping a UK terror cell plan to travel to Pakistan to receive training from al-Qaida.

As part of the investigation into the cell, Masood was initially classed as someone who posed a threat to national security, but then was downgraded to someone who may pose a threat the following month, when MI5 investigators discovered he was not involved in the plan.
So, if someone is persistently on the edge of the radar - but does nothing, what are the priorities?

At the time of the attack in 2017 the service was facing an “unprecedented” scale of work, with around 500 investigations into Islamist terrorists, 3,000 people considered subjects of interest (SOIs) and 20,000 who had previously been classed as SOIs.

Hough read Witness L a conclusion from a report by former terror watchdog David Anderson after the atrocity that said: “Not everything can be stopped, there will always be a danger of a determined attacker getting through.”

The officer replied: “I’m afraid that’s true.”
I think that this exchange is critical

Gareth Patterson QC, for the families of the four civilians killed in the attack, said: “I suggest a proper investigation would have been likely to have revealed not only his extremist views, which were there to be discovered, but the danger that he posed.”

Witness L replied: “I believe that such a hypothetical investigation would have exposed his extremist views, I don’t believe it would have exposed his attack planning.”
I go back to my example, if I wake up tomorrow having decided that actually AQ have got it right, arm myself and go off to attack; there's no real possibility of detective and prevention.

If I have conducted hostile reconnaissance, or increased my threat profile somehow I increase my impact but increase my chance of detection and intervention.

"Security failure" can also be a operational security success, if you think about it.
 
I cannot stress enough how much this evidence, from a UK Security Service officer known only as Witness L, needs to be read. It represents a serious detailed explanation to the problems being dealt with.

MI5 officer tells inquest of Westminster attacker's terror links

Firstly, the work done in order to prevent attacks of necessity goes unremarked. Every now and again the keeper has to make a pretty good save, but if the defender closes the ball down before it gets in the box no one even thinks about the man in the goal.

The volume and complexity of material offers a serious problem for the investigator. As does the problem of the assessment of the threat.

Bare in mind as plots have decreased in complexity, but remain the same in individual lethality, the problem of calling things have increased.

So, if I and the four mates go rubber dinghy rapids and start making bombs at home after radicalisation and preparation; the warning signs and indicators are much more than I wake up one morning and decide to go stabby-stabby in a public place.

(This is why the knife enabled wave of violence was so effective in Israel, the "Knife Intifadah" and the effort of AQ and ISIS to encourge this in the west).

This does sound bad, but is the classic issue - you have finite resources and cannot work every suspect.



If there is no active preparation, no offence committed where are your resources best deployed?



So, if someone is persistently on the edge of the radar - but does nothing, what are the priorities?



I think that this exchange is critical



I go back to my example, if I wake up tomorrow having decided that actually AQ have got it right, arm myself and go off to attack; there's no real possibility of detective and prevention.

If I have conducted hostile reconnaissance, or increased my threat profile somehow I increase my impact but increase my chance of detection and intervention.

"Security failure" can also be a operational security success, if you think about it.
Doesn't surprise me at all. During the inquest into the 7/7 Bombings, a high ranking Security Service officer said that to stop almost every attack would require MI5 alone recruiting another 100,000 staff. He also said it can take up to two dozen officers to maintain 24 hour surveillance on one high priority suspect. Multiply that by the vast number of people MI5 has to watch and frankly it's surprising more attacks don't make it through.
 
I cannot stress enough how much this evidence, from a UK Security Service officer known only as Witness L, needs to be read. It represents a serious detailed explanation to the problems being dealt with.

MI5 officer tells inquest of Westminster attacker's terror links

Firstly, the work done in order to prevent attacks of necessity goes unremarked. Every now and again the keeper has to make a pretty good save, but if the defender closes the ball down before it gets in the box no one even thinks about the man in the goal.

The volume and complexity of material offers a serious problem for the investigator. As does the problem of the assessment of the threat.

Bare in mind as plots have decreased in complexity, but remain the same in individual lethality, the problem of calling things have increased.

So, if I and the four mates go rubber dinghy rapids and start making bombs at home after radicalisation and preparation; the warning signs and indicators are much more than I wake up one morning and decide to go stabby-stabby in a public place.

(This is why the knife enabled wave of violence was so effective in Israel, the "Knife Intifadah" and the effort of AQ and ISIS to encourge this in the west).

This does sound bad, but is the classic issue - you have finite resources and cannot work every suspect.



If there is no active preparation, no offence committed where are your resources best deployed?



So, if someone is persistently on the edge of the radar - but does nothing, what are the priorities?



I think that this exchange is critical



I go back to my example, if I wake up tomorrow having decided that actually AQ have got it right, arm myself and go off to attack; there's no real possibility of detective and prevention.

If I have conducted hostile reconnaissance, or increased my threat profile somehow I increase my impact but increase my chance of detection and intervention.

"Security failure" can also be a operational security success, if you think about it.
Hmmm, forgive me if I'm interpreting this wrong but - is that not akin to a rapist getting caught, then his Pornhub search history being revealed and retrospectively saying "something should have been flagged up then!"
 
Hmmm, forgive me if I'm interpreting this wrong but - is that not akin to a rapist getting caught, then his Pornhub search history being revealed and retrospectively saying "something should have been flagged up then!"
Indeed.

So do we arrest or put under surveillance everyone on pornhub? Oh, because it is (a) not proportionate, (b) unlawful and (c) doesn't actually help solve the problem.

Some of the thick individuals on this site would appear to want to do so (if they happened to be brown or of 'the religion of peace').

And why can't we lock up every aspiring rapper on the same logic.
 
To be fair though...being 'an aspiring rapper' is a fair combat indicator for a w@nker - who could well use the experience of the varied methods of dealing with police station stairs.
 
To be fair though...being 'an aspiring rapper' is a fair combat indicator for a w@nker - who could well use the experience of the varied methods of dealing with police station stairs.
Fortunately Mrs May shut the nicks.

Thanks, and don't forget to vote.
 
When the attacker always seems to be the bloke on the periphery then just carrying on with normal jogging does seem unsustainable long term. One thing would be to tweek the law on sentencing for preparing acts of terrorism to massively increase the custodial term. That would allow for early arrests of the belters who are lit up like xmas trees as they plan to build a radioactive dirty bomb then hijack the Queen Mary 2 and fly her into the shard, freeing up resource to focus on the peripheral figures.
 
When the attacker always seems to be the bloke on the periphery then just carrying on with normal jogging does seem unsustainable long term. One thing would be to tweek the law on sentencing for preparing acts of terrorism to massively increase the custodial term. That would allow for early arrests of the belters who are lit up like xmas trees as they plan to build a radioactive dirty bomb then hijack the Queen Mary 2 and fly her into the shard, freeing up resource to focus on the peripheral figures.
Do you see many burglars going to prison?

Prisons are full mate.
 

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Do you see many burglars going to prison?

Prisons are full mate.
True. West Falkland isn't though. Personally I think any party that committed to a high security facility offshore where Islamists would be held on conviction for any terrorism related offence would win by a bloody landslide.
 
True. West Falkland isn't though. Personally I think any party that committed to a high security facility offshore where Islamists would be held on conviction for any terrorism related offence would win by a bloody landslide.
The Isle of Sheppy would do, it might even improve the gene pool over there
 

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