By Andrew Gilligan
Published: 9:58PM GMT 21 Nov 2009
On the eve of the Chilcot inquiry into Britainâs involvement in the 2003 invasion and its aftermath, The Sunday Telegraph has obtained hundreds of pages of secret Government reports on âlessons learntâ which shed new light on âsignificant shortcomingsâ at all levels.
They include full transcripts of extraordinarily frank classified interviews in which British Army commanders vent their frustration and anger with ministers and Whitehall officials.
The reports disclose that:
Tony Blair, the former prime minister, misled MPs and the public throughout 2002 when he claimed that Britainâs objective was âdisarmament, not regime changeâ and that there had been no planning for military action. In fact, British military planning for a full invasion and regime change began in February 2002.
The need to conceal this from Parliament and all but âvery small numbersâ of officials âconstrainedâ the planning process. The result was a ârushedâoperation âlacking in coherence and resourcesâ which caused âsignificant riskâ to troops and âcritical failureâ in the post-war period.
Operations were so under-resourced that some troops went into action with only five bullets each. Others had to deploy to war on civilian airlines, taking their equipment as hand luggage. Some troops had weapons confiscated by airport security.
Commanders reported that the Armyâs main radio system âtended to drop out at around noon each day because of the heatâ. One described the supply chain as âabsolutely appallingâ, saying: âI know for a fact that there was one container full of skis in the desert.â
The Foreign Office unit to plan for postwar Iraq was set up only in late February, 2003, three weeks before the war started.
The plans âcontained no detail once Baghdad had fallenâ, causing a ânotable loss of momentumâ which was exploited by insurgents. Field commanders raged at Whitehallâs âappallingâ and âhorrifyingâ lack of support for reconstruction, with one top officer saying that the Government âmissed a golden opportunityâ to win Iraqi support. Another commander said: âIt was not unlike 1750s colonialism where the military had to do everything ourselves.â
The documents emerge two days before public hearings begin in the Iraq Inquiry, the tribunal appointed under Sir John Chilcot, a former Whitehall civil servant, to âidentify lessons that can be learnt from the Iraq conflictâ.
Senior military officers and relatives of the dead have warned Sir John against a âwhitewashâ.
The documents consist of dozens of âpost-operational reportsâ written by commanders at all levels, plus two sharply-worded âoverall lessons learntâ papers â on the war phase and on the occupation â compiled by the Army centrally.
The analysis of the war phase describes it as a âsignificant military successâ but one achieved against a âthird-rate armyâ. It identifies a long list of âsignificantâ weaknesses and notes: âA more capable enemy would probably have punished these shortcomings severely.â
The analysis of the occupation describes British reconstruction plans as ânugatoryâ and âhopelessly optimisticâ.
It says that coalition forces were âill-prepared and equipped to deal with the problems in the first 100 daysâ of the occupation, which turned out to be âthe defining stage of the campaignâ. It condemns the almost complete absence of contingency planning as a potential breach of Geneva Convention obligations to safeguard civilians.
The leaked documents bring into question statements that Mr Blair made to Parliament in the build up to the invasion. On July 16 2002, amid growing media speculation about Britainâs future role in Iraq, Mr Blair was asked: âAre we then preparing for possible military action in Iraq?â He replied: âNo.â
Introducing the now notorious dossier on Iraqâs supposed weapons of mass destruction, on Sept 24, 2002, Mr Blair told MPs: âIn respect of any military options, we are not at the stage of deciding those options but, of course, it is important â should we get to that point â that we have the fullest possible discussion of those options.â
In fact, according to the documents, âformation-level planning for a [British] deployment [to Iraq] took place from February 2002â.
The documents also quote Maj Gen Graeme Lamb, the director of special forces during the Iraq war, as saying: âI had been working the war up since early 2002.â
The leaked material also includes sheaves of classified verbatim transcripts of one-to-one interviews with commanders recently returned from Iraq â many critical of the Whitehall failings that were becoming clear. At least four commanders use the same word â âappallingâ â to describe the performance of the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence.
Documents describe the âinability to restore security early during the occupationâ as the âcritical failureâ of the deployment and attack the âabsence of UK political directionâ after the war ended.
One quotes a senior British officer as saying: âThe UK Government, which spent millions of pounds on resourcing the security line of operations, spent virtually none on the economic one, on which security depended.â
Many of the documents leaked to The Sunday Telegraph deal with key questions for Sir John Chilcot and his committee, such as whether planning was adequate, troops properly equipped and the occupation mishandled, and will almost certainly be seen by the inquiry.
However, it is not clear whether they will be published by it.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/new...t-papers-reveal-blunders-and-concealment.html
Published: 9:58PM GMT 21 Nov 2009
On the eve of the Chilcot inquiry into Britainâs involvement in the 2003 invasion and its aftermath, The Sunday Telegraph has obtained hundreds of pages of secret Government reports on âlessons learntâ which shed new light on âsignificant shortcomingsâ at all levels.
They include full transcripts of extraordinarily frank classified interviews in which British Army commanders vent their frustration and anger with ministers and Whitehall officials.
The reports disclose that:
Tony Blair, the former prime minister, misled MPs and the public throughout 2002 when he claimed that Britainâs objective was âdisarmament, not regime changeâ and that there had been no planning for military action. In fact, British military planning for a full invasion and regime change began in February 2002.
The need to conceal this from Parliament and all but âvery small numbersâ of officials âconstrainedâ the planning process. The result was a ârushedâoperation âlacking in coherence and resourcesâ which caused âsignificant riskâ to troops and âcritical failureâ in the post-war period.
Operations were so under-resourced that some troops went into action with only five bullets each. Others had to deploy to war on civilian airlines, taking their equipment as hand luggage. Some troops had weapons confiscated by airport security.
Commanders reported that the Armyâs main radio system âtended to drop out at around noon each day because of the heatâ. One described the supply chain as âabsolutely appallingâ, saying: âI know for a fact that there was one container full of skis in the desert.â
The Foreign Office unit to plan for postwar Iraq was set up only in late February, 2003, three weeks before the war started.
The plans âcontained no detail once Baghdad had fallenâ, causing a ânotable loss of momentumâ which was exploited by insurgents. Field commanders raged at Whitehallâs âappallingâ and âhorrifyingâ lack of support for reconstruction, with one top officer saying that the Government âmissed a golden opportunityâ to win Iraqi support. Another commander said: âIt was not unlike 1750s colonialism where the military had to do everything ourselves.â
The documents emerge two days before public hearings begin in the Iraq Inquiry, the tribunal appointed under Sir John Chilcot, a former Whitehall civil servant, to âidentify lessons that can be learnt from the Iraq conflictâ.
Senior military officers and relatives of the dead have warned Sir John against a âwhitewashâ.
The documents consist of dozens of âpost-operational reportsâ written by commanders at all levels, plus two sharply-worded âoverall lessons learntâ papers â on the war phase and on the occupation â compiled by the Army centrally.
The analysis of the war phase describes it as a âsignificant military successâ but one achieved against a âthird-rate armyâ. It identifies a long list of âsignificantâ weaknesses and notes: âA more capable enemy would probably have punished these shortcomings severely.â
The analysis of the occupation describes British reconstruction plans as ânugatoryâ and âhopelessly optimisticâ.
It says that coalition forces were âill-prepared and equipped to deal with the problems in the first 100 daysâ of the occupation, which turned out to be âthe defining stage of the campaignâ. It condemns the almost complete absence of contingency planning as a potential breach of Geneva Convention obligations to safeguard civilians.
The leaked documents bring into question statements that Mr Blair made to Parliament in the build up to the invasion. On July 16 2002, amid growing media speculation about Britainâs future role in Iraq, Mr Blair was asked: âAre we then preparing for possible military action in Iraq?â He replied: âNo.â
Introducing the now notorious dossier on Iraqâs supposed weapons of mass destruction, on Sept 24, 2002, Mr Blair told MPs: âIn respect of any military options, we are not at the stage of deciding those options but, of course, it is important â should we get to that point â that we have the fullest possible discussion of those options.â
In fact, according to the documents, âformation-level planning for a [British] deployment [to Iraq] took place from February 2002â.
The documents also quote Maj Gen Graeme Lamb, the director of special forces during the Iraq war, as saying: âI had been working the war up since early 2002.â
The leaked material also includes sheaves of classified verbatim transcripts of one-to-one interviews with commanders recently returned from Iraq â many critical of the Whitehall failings that were becoming clear. At least four commanders use the same word â âappallingâ â to describe the performance of the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence.
Documents describe the âinability to restore security early during the occupationâ as the âcritical failureâ of the deployment and attack the âabsence of UK political directionâ after the war ended.
One quotes a senior British officer as saying: âThe UK Government, which spent millions of pounds on resourcing the security line of operations, spent virtually none on the economic one, on which security depended.â
Many of the documents leaked to The Sunday Telegraph deal with key questions for Sir John Chilcot and his committee, such as whether planning was adequate, troops properly equipped and the occupation mishandled, and will almost certainly be seen by the inquiry.
However, it is not clear whether they will be published by it.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/new...t-papers-reveal-blunders-and-concealment.html
