Sunday Times- RAF preparing to cut 10,000 staff.

Gravelbelly said:
Hawk
Two seats - two aircrew. £42 million in aircrew costs.

Sorry - did I just pluck fictional figures out of the air to support my argument? Only following your example, old chap.
.


Yes you did. Especially as the Hawk in question only has one seat. ;-)


.
 

the_boy_syrup

LE
Book Reviewer
tekirdag said:
Gravelbelly said:
Hawk
Two seats - two aircrew. £42 million in aircrew costs.

Sorry - did I just pluck fictional figures out of the air to support my argument? Only following your example, old chap.
.


Yes you did. Especially as the Hawk in question only has one seat. ;-)


.

Which Hawk only has one seat

Genuine question
 

Gaz_ED

Old-Salt
WAH SHIELD ON

Hawk 200

WAH SHIELD OFF
 

Bowmore_Assassin

LE
Moderator
Book Reviewer
There have been a number of posts referring to the Canadian model of unification of the 3 Services which took place in 1968 under the direction of Paul Hellyer, Canadian Minister of Defense. Some of the posts infer this is the way ahead, especially for CSS type organisations. In 1968, the big argument was that this was introduced by Hellyer to save money (familiar ring to it) although this appears not to have been stated at the time. There is also the fact that he knew nothing about military ethos and departed the job soon after he pushed it through to become Minister for Transport. Bottom line is Unification never truly worked and for those advocating it, you may wish to read some of the background and reality if you have not already.

Short Background

More Background

"Hellyer's Ghosts"

The reality regarding the failure of full Unification is outlined in the essay which can be seen at the last link above. For those who do not want to read all of it, here are a few pertinent lines:

"One of Hellyer’s hopes with respect to reforming the military institution rested upon redirecting the loyalties of the officers away from their traditional service to the newly unified force. Recognizing that CF members would continue to have “intense loyalties to the fighting units and broader associations within it,” he nevertheless strongly believed that loyalty to a CF could be achieved. “It is nonetheless important that a sense of purpose and a sense of belonging to a single Service, covering all aspects of defence and designed to tackle the complex defence problems of the future, be developed,” argued Hellyer.

Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson had reminded Hellyer of the need to retain important elements of “...[the] service traditions and as much of the old distinctions between sea, land and air components.” Still, Hellyer dismissed this wise counsel, believing instead that having all CF personnel wear the same green uniform, within the same rank structure and the same ladder of promotion, and with the opportunity to be employed across all three services, would gradually have service members, particularly officers, identify themselves primarily with the CF, and, over time, it would change their values and loyalties. It has not happened."

"...Military parochialism, a member’s traditional loyalty to service or military specialty over that for the armed forces as a whole, never disappeared in the new unified CF..."

"For a variety of reasons, service loyalties remain important, and they cannot be suppressed entirely, or ignored, or dismissed. Military leaders have always carried the primary responsibility for providing a sense of purpose to members of their units, doing so by identifying and reinforcing shared values and identities, and by linking unit goals and tasks to these values and identities. Hellyer went one step too far in trying to implement his higher loyalty concept above single-service loyalty. As historian Jack Granatstein stated a few years ago in Who Killed the Canadian Military?, “...loyalty to the navy, army, and air force, to corps and regiments, ships, and squadrons was vital for sailors, soldiers and air-men and women whose job was to fight and risk their lives to serve their country’s interests.... t was heritage, tradition, and hard-earned distinctions to fighting men.” Unfortunately, Hellyer did not accept this distinction, and he implemented wholesale unification as the panacea for obtaining a unified defence policy."

"The reality is that a service-centred culture is well ingrained into the existing CF culture. At the unit level of the institution, the three environments continue to play a strong role in fostering a warrior ethos and culture. The younger – and older – members of the CF are proud and dedicated to their military duties and responsibilities, and they clearly identify first with their unit, regiment, or service. Services have therefore an essential role to play in taking the newly recruited soldiers, airmen and airwomen, and sailors, and then turning them into combat-capable individuals, and into fighting units. This important aspect of military ethos is now finally recognized in the CF. The cornerstone manual on the profession of arms in Canada, Duty With Honour, acknowledges, after almost 40 years of denial by the unification conformists, the importance of environmental and regimental identities to the armed forces."

If we unified, there is (edited due to original mong typing) plenty of reason to believe it would fail, as did the Canadian model. In fact, my personal opinion is it would be an unmitigated disaster and totally undermine British military capability and credibility. It is not where we want to go.

IMHO, a much better model for us to look at would be that of the US Marines which is very different to the ethos originally intended by Canadian integration. Depending on the outcome of the Strategic Defence Review, the USMC track might well be the way to go as we may have no choice. The reality is that the current fighting for funds between the Services is doing us all a disservice, regardless of cut of cloth. I am also pretty convinced that whilst we are fighting in the here and now, we are losing sight of where future conflict is likely to happen (IMHO future conflict will always be 'among the people' and the terrain will be mainly urban and littoral, but mainly 'human'). Whatever the SDR comes up with, I assume it will take note of this and look to structure for future success. To that end, a USMC model appears somewhat apt.

Having said all that, money is the real issue. Simple solution really; the Government has as its primary responsibility, defence of the nation. To do this you need a decent, well-funded military. Therefore we need more money. Therefore government needs to prioritise funding. A slightly selfish attitude needs to apply here and we could easily justify down-sizing the British contribution to the European Union and other overseas aid in order to redirect funding to defence. We also, really must have a reality check on the equipment programme - what do we need in the short-term to succed in winning the AFPAK strategy and then what do we really need to fight in the predicted human terrain in a world where approx over 60% of the population will be living in urban environments by 2020 ? That's where we need to go I would suggest. This does require a wide range of capabilities and interoperability (which should influence of Equipment programme) between ourselves and our allies, but especially the USA (again, I refer to the equiment programme).

In this mix is 'Jointery' but politically correct Jointery and 'Purpleness' just to save money is damaging and thus Jointery should only go so far. I cannot fight a ship or a Squadron of JSF - nor do I want to. Why then are there a bunch of light and dark blue chaps who think they know how to plan and/or conduct a land campaign or run land based logistics ? We need to be realistic about our skill sets and utilise the right people in the right job. Currently, this is not always the case and it is not helping our cause.

In the grand scheme if things, all hope lies on a realistic SDR, but I suspect it will be another excuse to cut costs in order to allow the next Govt to claw back cash to pay off our ridiculous debt level, engendered by the incompetents currently in charge of this country.
 
BA,

Firkin good post that!

Whilst I am all for 'crab bashing' the most pertinent point you raise is that there needs to be 3 distinct services within the Armed Forces - now if we can get the raf to behave as if they were a team member rather than try to pre-empt the SDR in a bid for 'ringfenced' funds then we might get on a little bit better.

Another well raised point was this little chestnut:

Why then are there a bunch of light and dark blue chaps who think they know how to plan and/or conduct a land campaign or run land based logistics ?

Would any of our crustacian cousins care to expand on the point raised here?
 
Bowmore_Assassin said:
T
If we unified, there is no reason to believe it would fail, as did the Canadian model. In fact, my personal opinion is it would be an unmitigated disaster and totally undermine British military capability and credibility. It is not where we want to go.

IMHO, a much better model for us to look at would be that of the US Marines which is very different to the ethos originally intended by Canadian integration. Depending on the outcome of the Strategic Defence Review, the USMC track might well be the way to go as we may have no choice. The reality is that the current fighting for funds between the Services is doing us all a disservice, regardless of cut of cloth. I am also pretty convinced that whilst we are fighting in the here and now, we are losing sight of where future conflict is likely to happen (IMHO future conflict will always be 'among the people' and the terrain will be mainly urban and littoral, but mainly 'human'). Whatever the SDR comes up with, I assume it will take note of this and look to structure for future success. To that end, a USMC model appears somewhat apt.
capabilities and interoperability (which should influence of Equipment programme) between ourselves and our allies, but especially the USA (again, I refer to the equiment programme).



In the grand scheme if things, all hope lies on a realistic SDR, but I suspect it will be another excuse to cut costs in order to allow the next Govt to claw back cash to pay off our ridiculous debt level, engendered by the incompetents currently in charge of this country.

The USMC is not an example of integration/unification but rather of a basic infantry/artillery force with limited logistic support (which is what it was 100 years or so ago) developing additional capabilities organically within itself. Hence the lack of "inter-service" rivalry. You can't change the history and ethos of the British armed forces, as the Canadians couldn't change theirs, so I fail to see how the USMC model is relevant.

EDIT:

The USMC also lacks many capabilities that the British armed forces have. It has no naval capability whatsoever; all amphibious shipping is part of the USN, down to LCUs and LCACs. It has no strategic air transport and only limited AAR capability. USMC F-18 squadrons today operate to a large extent as part of USN carrier air wings, leaving the USMC with the Harrier as effectively its only fixed-wing combat aircraft. The USMC is able to appear "leaner and meaner" because it is dependent on the other armed services for a significant amount of its training and logistic support. For example armour and artillery crew and maintainer training is done at US Army establishments, while aircrew training is done with the USN.
 

dkh51250

Old-Salt
BPS, in exactly the same cack handed manner that land thought they could look after air stores?

The resulting debacle of Donnington/Dulmen/Bicester has yet to be recovered from resulting in IPTs, sorry PTs, having to purchase further equipment to replace items that have been mislocated or lost.



As mentioned in my earlier post the best part of 20 years, with all the financial ramifications that brings, has been lost due to the pig headedness of a senior officer and his failure to adopt a system (USAS) head and shoulders above the outmoded efforts of the QMs department.
 
BPS666 said:
Why then are there a bunch of light and dark blue chaps who think they know how to plan and/or conduct a land campaign or run land based logistics ?

You do know that some 90% of all logistics supporting the RAF are land and sea? You do know that RAF bases are on the surface of the earth rather than floating just above it? :roll:

Of all the aspects of jointery, I'd say logistics is the closest across the 3 Services - mostly common processes, many common systems, working towards truly joint in the next couple of years. The Supply Chain has been Joint for some time - pick a new target if you want to put down the non-Army elements of that one.
 

Bowmore_Assassin

LE
Moderator
Book Reviewer
baboon6 said:
Bowmore_Assassin said:
T
If we unified, there is [every] reason to believe it would fail, as did the Canadian model. In fact, my personal opinion is it would be an unmitigated disaster and totally undermine British military capability and credibility. It is not where we want to go.

IMHO, a much better model for us to look at would be that of the US Marines which is very different to the ethos originally intended by Canadian integration. Depending on the outcome of the Strategic Defence Review, the USMC track might well be the way to go as we may have no choice. The reality is that the current fighting for funds between the Services is doing us all a disservice, regardless of cut of cloth. I am also pretty convinced that whilst we are fighting in the here and now, we are losing sight of where future conflict is likely to happen (IMHO future conflict will always be 'among the people' and the terrain will be mainly urban and littoral, but mainly 'human'). Whatever the SDR comes up with, I assume it will take note of this and look to structure for future success. To that end, a USMC model appears somewhat apt.
capabilities and interoperability (which should influence of Equipment programme) between ourselves and our allies, but especially the USA (again, I refer to the equiment programme).



In the grand scheme if things, all hope lies on a realistic SDR, but I suspect it will be another excuse to cut costs in order to allow the next Govt to claw back cash to pay off our ridiculous debt level, engendered by the incompetents currently in charge of this country.

The USMC is not an example of integration/unification but rather of a basic infantry/artillery force with limited logistic support (which is what it was 100 years or so ago) developing additional capabilities organically within itself. Hence the lack of "inter-service" rivalry. You can't change the history and ethos of the British armed forces, as the Canadians couldn't change theirs, so I fail to see how the USMC model is relevant.

EDIT:

The USMC also lacks many capabilities that the British armed forces have. It has no naval capability whatsoever; all amphibious shipping is part of the USN, down to LCUs and LCACs. It has no strategic air transport and only limited AAR capability. USMC F-18 squadrons today operate to a large extent as part of USN carrier air wings, leaving the USMC with the Harrier as effectively its only fixed-wing combat aircraft. The USMC is able to appear "leaner and meaner" because it is dependent on the other armed services for a significant amount of its training and logistic support. For example armour and artillery crew and maintainer training is done at US Army establishments, while aircrew training is done with the USN.

Point taken ref holistic capability of USMC. My point is, any move toward Unification would be better served trying it on a USMC model as opposed to the Canadian. Ack ref naval capability and this would have to be incorporated as would other capabilities we hold which the USMC does not.

I am not saying we should do it but I raise it as a place where we could look to for the future depending on SDR results. The RAF might be trying to 'get in early' but I do not think for one minute the Army or Navy will get away with no cuts. On the contrary IMHO I think big change is coming and pain with it.

Please note I changed the pretext of my comment ref us unifying due to original mong typing. If we went down the unification route in a similar fashion to the Canadians, I think it would fail. But I do think if we were going anywhere near it, modelling it along USMC lines could be a good start point. I refer back to my original post though - Government, defence costs big bucks so reprioritse to give us the money we need to maintain a Tri-Service capability at a capability which is credible and realistic or expect failure in the future.
 

Bowmore_Assassin

LE
Moderator
Book Reviewer
Mr_C_Hinecap said:
BPS666 said:
Why then are there a bunch of light and dark blue chaps who think they know how to plan and/or conduct a land campaign or run land based logistics ?

You do know that some 90% of all logistics supporting the RAF are land and sea? You do know that RAF bases are on the surface of the earth rather than floating just above it? :roll:

Of all the aspects of jointery, I'd say logistics is the closest across the 3 Services - mostly common processes, many common systems, working towards truly joint in the next couple of years. The Supply Chain has been Joint for some time - pick a new target if you want to put down the non-Army elements of that one.

Not unreasonable points.

Perhaps I was less than clear in my point. You are right, the Joint Support Chain, as it is now known, is indeed Joint and I have worked within it. My point is more about the Land (as opposed to land) campaign and within this - the bit that ground forces undertakes in Theatre - there are a number of light and dark blue elements who do not and will never understand how ground fighting and CSS (chinook resupply and AD aside)combine together in reality, on the ground. In my view, a number of them are shipped into Theatre lacking knowledge on how the Army does it's business but end up on desks where they are simply not qualified. I am not being disparaging about what they do and I respect them for it - they fight ships and a/c and are good at it and the RAF have their log systems in good order, the Navy less so and the Army has a few issues ! Likewise, there are probably Army chaps in Joint jobs they should not be doing. Some cross-fertilisation is good but not to the point where operational effectiveness can be affected.

Ground based log resupply for the tactical element is not an any 'loggie from any Service can plan it and do it.' The Canadian forces tried it on Unification; it did not work and the fact is that although they still have one Logistic Service for all three elements (Army, Navy, AF), the reality is that their Loggies all see themselves as soldiers or sailors or airmen and that is what they do. They don't move across tactical boundaries to do a bit of each.

Again, my point is we have 3 Services for a reason and long may they remain but if we are to get it right, we need not pander to politically correct Jointery just to get someone a tick in the box for the future (this goes all ways across all disciplines and Services) and nor should we do more Jointery to save money. It does none of us any favours. Right person with right quals and experience for the right job - simple.
 
B_A - I partly agree with you. However, I'm currently working in Land Equipment and I can give a hundred examples of the Army not properly understanding land ops and the logistic support required. It doesn't need any colour of blue to hamper - they are doing a fine job themselves.

There have been far more suitable people to put on some of those desks in JFS(A). However, politics messed up the chance to put them there.
 

Bowmore_Assassin

LE
Moderator
Book Reviewer
Mr_C_Hinecap said:
B_A - I partly agree with you. However, I'm currently working in Land Equipment and I can give a hundred examples of the Army not properly understanding land ops and the logistic support required. It doesn't need any colour of blue to hamper - they are doing a fine job themselves.

There have been far more suitable people to put on some of those desks in JFS(A). However, politics messed up the chance to put them there.

Ack. Back to horses for courses but as you rightly point out, politics and 'positioning' get in the way and not always the right man or woman gets the job.

Begs the question though, if as you suggest (and I know you are right) there are a, "hundred examples of the Army not properly understanding land ops and the logistic support required," where do we fill the training deficit ? Another topic for another thread ?
 
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