Small wars or small minds


Here's one good way to make your only ally feel welcome:

1. In the South the U.S. is doing little. The energy sector funnels billions to corrupt officials, criminals, militias and insurgents. The Brits weren’t able to impose control. The hope is that the south remains a long-term mafia-type mess, and does not spill north to Baghdad.

At least the author acknowledges this:

2. Erratic standards of patrolling. The patrol is the basic tool in the US military inventory. Without patrols, there is no US presence or influence. The variation in the size and duration of patrols from location to location is astounding. One MiTT persuades an IA battalion to conduct twelve patrols a day; another in the same locale does six. One US company runs 15/day; another, 5. The variation is not caused by the actual threat; some of the toughest locales have the most patrolling. It is caused by an extreme variation in intuitively assessing the threat and setting the balance between force protection and mission accomplishment. A little ops analysis by experienced infantry of how often we are really on the streets and how one determines patrol size and mounted vs. dismounted would go a long ways.


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