Royal Marines Gucci Rebrand

Caecilius

LE
Kit Reviewer
Book Reviewer
Simply untrue.
Shall we drop the argument? You keep claiming that the army managed to lose/waste the 10s of Billions needed to fund the warfighting division, but you don't seem to want to provide any evidence for that.

I don't think there's much point in continuing if you aren't willing to support your argument.
 
Yes, Spearhead units.

ETA: Although it must be said that having a few infantry battalions and supporting units as a contingent for brushfire wars is/was rather different in scale to the all-arms commitment needed in GW1 and 2.

There was a ridiculous headline on The Sun back in the early days of GW1: 'The Paras go in' - except that they weren't, and Aldershot's finest (as they then were) would have done a very short re-enactment of Arnhem against the Republican Guard.

It was simply an orders-of-magnitude different conflict to the Falklands, and no offence is meant to those of 1944 and 1982 in the paragraph above.

We couldn't have done GW1 without affecting BAOR because GW1 needed a BAOR-type commitment... which meant 'goodnight BAOR' for a time at least.

The fact now that we can't sustain an Afghanistan, and even then not without prevailing upon the TA - sorry, Army Reserve - to routinely fill the gaps shows just how thin we are now spread.

Only one thing is going to solve that, and that's money*.




*One could make the point that poor planning has got us to where we are, and that would be a fair point. However, to put things right from where we are, even with very good planning, still requires lots of money.
And what is forgotten these days is that iot deploy 1 (UK) Armd Div (a 'short' division of 2 bdes) on Op GRANBY, 3 and 4 Armd Divs were denuded of equipment and virtually stripped of spares; CR1 power packs springs to mind.

Sent from my SM-G973F using Tapatalk
 

Euclid

War Hero
This is just one part of it. There are a lot of other strands to the FCF work.
I’m sure there are plenty of other strands keeping a cohort of staff officers busy.
But essentially the military equivalent of moving deckchairs around, or tidying your sock draw. Or renaming Royal Mail Consignia.

See also, 1 Avn Bde.
 

Euclid

War Hero
And what is forgotten these days is that iot deploy 1 (UK) Armd Div (a 'short' division of 2 bdes) on Op GRANBY, 3 and 4 Armd Divs were denuded of equipment and virtually stripped of spares; CR1 power packs springs to mind.

Sent from my SM-G973F using Tapatalk
Pretty much. Don’t think there was a spare gun barrel left in the whole of Germany.
 
Shall we drop the argument? You keep claiming that the army managed to lose/waste the 10s of Billions needed to fund the warfighting division, but you don't seem to want to provide any evidence for that.

I don't think there's much point in continuing if you aren't willing to support your argument.
No as you are waffling.
 
A quick question, didn't the money from Herrick (and possibly Telic) come directly from the treasury rather than the MOD/Army budget?
 
I’m sure there are plenty of other strands keeping a cohort of staff officers busy.
But essentially the military equivalent of moving deckchairs around, or tidying your sock draw. Or renaming Royal Mail Consignia.

See also, 1 Avn Bde.
FCF looks nothing like 3 Cdo X.

This kit purchase is mainly about retention, and a visible indication to the Gravs in the Corps that actually things are going to be different.
 

Mölders 1

Old-Salt
Depends. As one of the (probably) very few people here who have fired one I can say it is a great weapon. However, it is not an assault weapon and realistically has a very short effective range. On the other hand it is easy to use, you can carry more rounds for the weight and the rounds also penetrate standard Kevelar CBA. I have one assigned as a personal defence weapon in the unlikely event that I have to go somewhere hostile.
Thank You For The Reply Sir.


Seeing as the Royal Navy seem to be spending money......maybe the could evaluate the new Fabrique Nationale Scar SC 300 Blackout Weapon.....?
 

Caecilius

LE
Kit Reviewer
Book Reviewer
I’m sure there are plenty of other strands keeping a cohort of staff officers busy.
But essentially the military equivalent of moving deckchairs around, or tidying your sock draw. Or renaming Royal Mail Consignia.

See also, 1 Avn Bde.

Wow, there's a lot of uninformed cynicism in here today.

FCF is a relatively significant change of role away from what the brigade has been configured for over the last couple of decades. What you're discussing just a kit announcement - it's obviously not the entirety of the programme.
 
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Caecilius

LE
Kit Reviewer
Book Reviewer
OK, let's assume for the moment that NACMO funded all the costs derived from Afghanistan and Iraq (this isn't true, but let's work with the assumption). Where did the 10s of Billions that you think should have been spent on the equipment programme go? Thin air?
 
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jrwlynch

LE
Book Reviewer
This is broadly my point. There's a definitely a decent amount of money wasted for various reasons, but where projects were cancelled it's generally because the funding was needed to support HERRICK and TELIC. There just wasn't enough money to fund those operations and keep the warfighting division (or even brigades) equipped with the latest kit.

Could we have spent the cash we had better? Probably. Was it anything like enough to have fully equipped a warfighting division with modern kit? No, not even close.
The problem remains, that the plan to equip a solid brigade-plus for a decent-size war - at least, with effective fires - was underway in 2002ish (indeed, I got offered a job on the early phase of IFPA...) with maturity expected to take 10-15 years. That's the sort of timescale and focus that the funding available, and in some cases the technological ask, required.

The Army abjectly failed to hold focus on that long term: it wasn't about equipping a full division with the latest bestest kit within three years, it was managing the lifecycle of the existing capability (by replacing and updating equipment to keep up with technology and manage obsolescence), but it would take time, some funding and a modicum of attention to sustain it to fruition, and it got none of the three.

At a point where the Army had claimed to be able to meet the SDR'98 requirements (particularly that of two concurrent medium-scale - i.e. brigade-level) deployments, it proved severely unable to do so. So, it conducted a slash-and-burn clearance to free up funding for things it had claimed to be able to achieve, and sustain operations well below what it had said was well within its capability, as well as driving raids on the other Services (for instance, the RN lost three frigates in 2004 to free up funding for 'contingent operations in Iraq' - I was there in Millenium Hall hearing the briefing from, IIRC, Fleet Commander - and another four plus a LSL in 2010).

All thinking of "...and what happens after HERRICK winds down?" seemed to have been abandoned, even to the point of a distinct pull from Andover of "...and this is how we'd go back and do HERRICK better" in 2015. This turned into a mad scramble of "there's something called a Strike Brigade and that's the future of warfighting!" which lasted until Russia rediscovered its near abroad and a Strike Brigade was wargamed in a "peer-vs-peer warfighting" scenario and died like baby mice under a lawnmower, whereupon a Pauline conversion back to the merits of tanks, IFVs and even Land Fires was made.

And now, six years after HERRICK ended, there's still no coherent plan and no actual progress being made to address the issues identified with Fires in 2002 and still live - and much nearer their deadlines - today, though very large sums have been spent on studies, prototypes, UORs and cancellations. And this is only the area I know directly, it sounds like it's pretty much just as bad in lots of other capabilities.


As Caspar Weinberger used to say, "A billion here, a billion there, pretty soon you're talking real money".
 

A2_Matelot

LE
Book Reviewer
Getting back to the thrust of the thread.

The new RM capability is based on a new gun, a new uniform and a white ensign badge. Fcking genius.

Where the fcuk are we getting our senior officers from these days and why isn’t anyone reigning them in?
It is way more than that.
 

Caecilius

LE
Kit Reviewer
Book Reviewer
At a point where the Army had claimed to be able to meet the SDR'98 requirements (particularly that of two concurrent medium-scale - i.e. brigade-level) deployments, it proved severely unable to do so. So, it conducted a slash-and-burn clearance to free up funding for things it had claimed to be able to achieve, and sustain operations well below what it had said was well within its capability, as well as driving raids on the other Services (for instance, the RN lost three frigates in 2004 to free up funding for 'contingent operations in Iraq' - I was there in Millenium Hall hearing the briefing from, IIRC, Fleet Commander - and another four plus a LSL in 2010).
I think this is the big failure of army leadership* over the last few decades, as touched on by @alfred_the_great earlier. We appear to have fallen into the classic military trap of doing the best we can with what we've been given rather than having an honest chat with the politicians, explaining that the army is using a lot of smoke and mirrors to 'meet' it's commitments, and decisions need to be made about what the army is being asked to do. I believe the Navy did this a few years back when they were in danger of serious overcommitment.

For too long we've seemingly told the government that they can have warfighting, COIN, and everything in between without any increase in funding. The phrase 'do more with less' gets trotted out but that really should be seen as a failure of moral courage.


*And maybe the STRIKE concept, but I think that was probably a mistake rather than a leadership failure.
 
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