Royal Australian Navy Submarines to go Nuclear

endure

GCM
"Pump jit sub"
Spent more time dying her hair than doing research, but even if she had she still comes across as monumentally unintelligent. Is she Labour? where undercarriage negates the need for ability and mental capacity to run a country?
She's a right winger.
 
Given that pretty much any route the Aussie boats would have to take would be through Indonesian waters what are the rules? Must they surface or give Jakarta prior notice or just slide on through and hope nobody notices?
Article 20 of the Law of the Sea.
Submarines and other underwater vehicles
In the territorial sea, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag.

Article 22 paragraphs 1 and 2.
1. The coastal State may, where necessary having regard to the safety of navigation, require foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through its territorial sea to use such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as it may designate or prescribe for the regulation of the passage of ships.​

2. The coastal State may, where necessary having regard to the safety of navigation, require foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through its territorial sea to use such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as it may designate or prescribe for the regulation of the passage of ships.
In particular, tankers, nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances or materials may be required to confine their passage to such sea lanes.

Article 22 paragraph 4.
4. The coastal State shall clearly indicate such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes on charts to which due publicity shall be given.
In particular, tankers, nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances or materials may be required to confine their passage to such sea lanes.​

Article 23.
Foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances shall, when exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, carry documents and observe special precautionary measures established for such ships by international agreements.​

Article 30
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 2. Note that Indonesia are an archipelagic State.
1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.

2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.

3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of international law.​

Article 52, paragraph 2.
PART IV ARCHIPELAGIC STATES
2. The archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security. Such suspension shall take effect only after having been duly published.

Article 53, paragraphs 1, 3, and 5.
1. An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes thereabove, suitable for the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea.

3. Archipelagic sea lanes passage means the exercise in accordance with this Convention of the rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.

5. Such sea lanes and air routes shall be defined by a series of continuous axis lines from the entry points of passage routes to the exit points. Ships and aircraft in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall not deviate more than 25 nautical miles to either side of such axis lines during passage, provided that such ships and aircraft shall not navigate closer to the coasts than 10 per cent of the distance between the nearest points on islands bordering the sea lane.


The international laws regarding archipelagic waters were drawn up specifically with Indonesia in mind, so there's not a lot of doubt as to whether they apply in this case.

Here's the sea lanes.

ndonesian-Archipelagic-Sea-Lanes.png

Here's the RAN's interpretation of what all this means.
Semaphore: Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes

In short, Australian submarines can pass through the designated sea lanes submerged, as this doesn't fall under "innocent passage". If they leave the designated sea lanes while passing through Indonesian waters then they must do so on the surface while flying the Australian flag.

However, as noted above in the law of the sea, nuclear powered ships must, even when exercising innocent passage, stick to sea lanes designated for hazardous materials, these being different from the sea lanes mentioned above.

If the international situation starts looking tense, then Indonesia can close the sea lanes and Australia are back to being limited to "innocent passage".

I'm not sure though why Australia would want to operate on the far side of Indonesia when their main concern would apparently be to keep China on the other side of Indonesia.
 
I thought that Australia did have nuclear power? They export Uranium. Do they have any reactors for scientific or other non power production uses?
Australians export uranium, but they have no civilian nuclear power industry. They use coal instead.

But anyway - why not buy a proven SSK design - such as from Italy or Sweden?
They did buy from Sweden, the Collins class. But they decided they had to "Australianize" it, which is where things went wrong.
 
NATO submarine operations are multinational by design, and there is no reason why a Canadian submarine should not work with an American or British (or other) carrier strike group, or an amphibious force. Canada had an important role in NATO naval war planning - and I assume that submarines were part of that.
Canadian subs do exercise with other countries, but they don't get the public profile that surface ships do.

More importantly, the "enemy" over the past few decades has been in places such as Afghanistan or the Middle East where there hasn't been much of a role for submarines.

They have also been getting the short end of the stick in terms of manpower, with them spending much time tied up because their crews were raided for surface fleet deployments.

The submarine faction recently were involved in an operation monitoring North Korean shipping and the press were given access to this, so they do seem to be learning how to toot their own horn.

As things stand now however, unless there is a change in attitude in the RCN, any new submarines will be rammed down their unwilling throats by cabinet.
 

RTU'd

LE
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And more in case you like you ICBM Nukes from Submarines.
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And the red menace at work.
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Is this a case of IF China have new subs, we will share some around as well?
And I see New Zealand PM says no nuke subs will visit her.
 
NATO submarine operations are multinational by design, and there is no reason why a Canadian submarine should not work with an American or British (or other) carrier strike group, or an amphibious force. Canada had an important role in NATO naval war planning - and I assume that submarines were part of that.
I'll take a second try at this. as simply answering your question as it stands doesn't really answer your question.

American and European NATO value Canadian ASW frigates, so the RCN were heavily tilted in that direction. Given that virtually the entire history of the RCN has been as an ASW force, that was a continuing tradition. If you are doing that, you are doing what the RCN has done since WWI.

Many in the RCN only saw a role for submarines as being only for helping to train the ships doing ASW. The submariners had to struggle to define an independent role for themselves.

From a Canadian perspective NATO is a one way street, with Canada contributing to defend allies in Europe but nothing happening in the reverse direction. In the Cold War there were still reasons for Canada to do that, and there are still various diplomatic advantages to it today which I won't spend the time to enumerate.

In that context though, the other NATO members value Canadian surface ships more than they value Canadian submarines.

From a purely Canadian perspective though there is a strong undercurrent of wanting a submarine force to operate primarily in the Arctic. Yes they could theoretically conduct other operations involving NATO, but that wouldn't be their raison d'être.

So to put it simply a large submarine forces equals putting Canadian interests first, while no submarines means putting European interests first. Canada's own interests have no direct benefit to someone looking at things from the perspective of Brussels, Berlin, Paris, or Washington however, so they get sacrificed for diplomatic reasons. But as I said before, the declining relevance of NATO and continental Europe may weaken that influence over time.


Australia on the other doesn't have these sorts of considerations. Instead they just worry about themselves and how to get other people to come to help them on top of that. They can therefore simplify the questions down to what do they need for the region around Australia.
 
We trained them well...
It has been an amusing day. The French complaining about losing a contract where the first sub was light years away from service; the Chinese getting stressed; the BBC/Guardian bemoaning the lack of an EU role...

The only unsettling thing has been reading about Gen Milley (sic) apparently phoning his Chinese counterpart, at the time of the US presidential election, to reassure him that no surprise US attack on China was planned [fair enough - seems sensible], and if an attack was intended, Milley would call China to warn them. I can't get my head around that part.
 
Australians export uranium, but they have no civilian nuclear power industry. They use coal instead.


They did buy from Sweden, the Collins class. But they decided they had to "Australianize" it, which is where things went wrong.
According to the Sub Brief video (very interesting BTW in terms of how some contractors and advisers came out of the French sub matter very well), it was only really the French who were prepared to agree to the subs being built in Australia. However, the 'built in Australia' part was apparently never defined in the contract, and the Australian-built part had fallen from an anticipated 90% to around 60%.
Sub Brief's account makes the French contract seem a financial and defence disaster.
 
They do have a right to be pretty angry, this is a major kick in the teeth for them and a huge industrial/financial loss!

Also if the situation had been reversed I can assure you there are plenty of British politicians who would have made a fairly stroppy response, our Prime Minister hardly has a reputation for being tactful does he...

Also lets be honest problems with the Attack Class are not just down to Naval Group, Australia wanted a capability that other manufacturers felt was unrealistic...an SSK that performs like an SSN! The other offerings were lower risk enhanced SSK, France was the only offering that bit the bullet and offered an SSN converted into an SSK. France offered the Barracuda with French systems but Australia wanted US furnished equipment which further complicated matters, they would have also prefered partial build in France. All the other offerings didn't have full build in Australia as they felt Australian industry wasn't up to delivering what the RAN was asking for. Only France bit the bullet and offered a full Australia build despite all the risk that entailed.

Now consider this, Australia wants to build a nuclear submarine an even more complex type of vessel...
I'm sorry, are you actually supporting the French on this...?

on ARRSE.....?
 
She's a right whinger.
fixed that for you...

She's the leader of the equivalent of the BNP, has a number of sprogs and if you look hard enough you can find nude pictures of her on the net. Not that I would waste the time myself....
 
This video was previously posted on another thread, but I thought it probably belongs here as well.

The problme with that is that it's true. China makes a lot of money out of Australia, at the moment. If they decided one day that they want more than money, and feel that they should just take Darwin for example then the trading partner becomes the enemy.

Did anyone mention the fact that the company who has a 50% share in the port of Newcastle is Chinese? Or the company who have the lease to run the port of Darwin are Chinese?
 
I thought that Australia did have nuclear power? They export Uranium. Do they have any reactors for scientific or other non power production uses?

But anyway - why not buy a proven SSK design - such as from Italy or Sweden?
No, it’s forbidden under two pieces of legislation. The only reactor in Australia is a research unit that makes medical isotopes.
 
The problme with that is that it's true. China makes a lot of money out of Australia, at the moment. If they decided one day that they want more than money, and feel that they should just take Darwin for example then the trading partner becomes the enemy.

Did anyone mention the fact that the company who has a 50% share in the port of Newcastle is Chinese? Or the company who have the lease to run the port of Darwin are Chinese?
On another thread there was an extensive discussion of Australia's trade with China. The big economic problem which Australia is facing is that their economy is heavily dependent upon iron ore and coal (particularly metallurgical coal to go with the iron ore) to China.

In order to keep this short I will just say that this won't last, coal and steel demand are set to decline significantly in China due to fundamental economic changes relating to the fact that the infrastructure that this steel was building is now more or less built, and Australia have no real alternative markets until such time as an India driven resource super-cycle replaces the China driven one.

So Australia may export a fair bit to China now (although it's a very small proportion of China's imports), but that may be set to decline in the near future due to the forces I have outlined above. This could result in a long term budget crisis which makes supporting an expensive defence program difficult.


What I see as Australia's real defence problem is that they are on the periphery of a region which is rapidly becoming the centre of global economic power, or arguably already are. The two greatest powers of the region, China and India, the latter of which are on their own trajectory upwards, will, as these things do, struggle for dominance. The other countries of the region will stick their oar in the water as well.

Australia are not directly in the line of conflict path, but they are close enough to it to be affected. They could try to be like Belgium and be the small country that gets rolled over every time the titans clash, or they could try to be like to be Switzerland and try to appear to be a tough enough nut that it's not worth anyone else's time to crack it.

What they can't be is a major regional power themselves. They don't have the population base to support it and they never will. Their relative strength in the region will decline and they will become less and less influential.

So Australia's defence challenge is how to make themselves look like a more difficult target than is worth bothering with. Part of this strategy has been to pull the US in as an ally, but that strategy has its limitations as the US's and Australia's agendas only partially line up. The US want to wrestle with China for global influence, while Australia want to not get squashed as a side effect of someone else's war. Once the US don't see an advantage to using Australia as a base, the Australians will be on their own again.

Having a good submarine force is I think a useful part of Australia's defence. However, I suspect that where it would be useful is in keeping other parties at bay. Dreams of the RAN challenging the great powers for control of the South China Sea are unrealistic. More realistic would be figuring out how to for example use the Indonesian archipelago as a defensive barrier which channels and restricts the movements of opposing navies and channels them elsewhere.
 

Fedaykin

Old-Salt
I'm sorry, are you actually supporting the French on this...?

on ARRSE.....?
It is not about supporting the French just pointing out the Realpolitik of the situation, some here might find it funny what has happened but this will have strained relations with an important strategic partner and this will have long term consequences.
 

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