I realise this may seem the wrong forum for a book review. My heart has ruled my head as I feel that the book Ministry of Defeat deserves wider attention than would come if it were hidden away in what is the more appropriate forum. I have banners reading "MODS RULE"! Richard North does not appear to be given any high regard here. However, he has just produced a book that deserves examination and comment from those with reasoned critical skills. I do not regard âIts all boloxâ as any significant contribution. Ministry of Defeat is his exposition of how things went wrong in Iraq. He seems to centre his case upon the selection and deployment of Snatch vehicles but ranges through high level incompetence and decisions taken from political standpoints. For those of you who donât do links, Iâll repeat the Publishers review â it is pretty accurate. They say âThis book presents a damning analysis of Britain's military involvement in the Iraq conflict. "Ministry of Defeat" is a devastating account of military and strategic incompetence. When Tony Blair insisted that British Armed Forces form part of the invasion of Iraq, little attention was paid as to how this might work out in practice or what the consequences might be. Here we have for the first time a detailed account of just what an abject failure Britain's military intervention in Iraq has been. The British occupation of south eastern Iraq has lasted six years, a period longer than the Second World War. Despite the astonishing bravery of countless individual soldiers the only real success of the British Government has been to hide from view, thanks to catastrophic misjudgements, this has become one of the most humiliating chapters in British Military History. The British Army leaves Iraq in July 2009, ahead of schedule, and the full story of the campaign needs to be told. Richard North presents in considerable detail one of the most painful and lasting legacies of the Blair era.â North backs his statements and findings with exhaustive links to MSM reports from the times and that is where my dissatisfaction commenced. He refers to press manipulation both in Iraq from MOD spokespersons and from other faceless ones here in UK. And yet he uses the writings from those who, for all the reader may know, have been manipulated and massaged. Also, the communiquÃ© he uses to bolster his case was written in the heat of the moment with the facts as they were then available. As an example, he devotes a very short paragraph or two to the Para actions at Majar al-Kebir and the massacre of the six Redcaps but does not refer to any media etc. later than 2003. He thus avoids any later developments regarding these events. So â Ministry of Defeat. A good read? Yes but I would be reluctant to base any serious criticism of what happened solely on this 256 page volume.