Reality behind the Surge

Discussion in 'Current Affairs, News and Analysis' started by AndyPipkin, Jan 12, 2007.

Welcome to the Army Rumour Service, ARRSE

The UK's largest and busiest UNofficial military website.

The heart of the site is the forum area, including:

  1. Got this from Defence One does wonder how one chubby little cleric has managed to evade the US and Iraqi forces for so long:

    The Speech: Sadr Bought Off? (Updated)
    Has Moktada Al-Sadr, the Shi'ite strong man, been bought off, somehow? This is just a theory, an intellectual exercise -- not even a guess -- based on the President's speech.

    Hear me out: A big part of Bush's plan relies on Iraq's cops. "18 Iraqi Army and National Police brigades [will be] committed to" securing Baghdad. And "these Iraqi forces will operate from local police stations" there. But last time I checked, these police units were largely fronts for thuggish militias like Sadr's Mahdi Army. Also, the President talked about avoiding the "sectarian interference [that] prevented Iraqi and American forces from going into neighborhoods in Baghdad." How is that interference being avoided, or run over? By buying off its leadership, maybe?

    UPDATE 01/11/06 10:50 AM: Or maybe not. "Iraq's prime minister has told Shi'ite militiamen to surrender their arms or face an all-out assault by U.S.-backed Iraqi forces, senior Iraqi officials" tell the AP.

    On the other hand, "An Army officer who recently commanded a battalion in Baghdad predicted [to the Washington Post] last night that the plan would fail because Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his government 'will do things to maintain protection' of Sadr's forces."

    UPDATE 11:24 AM: "I would suggest that PM Nuri al-Maliki's warning to the Mahdi Militia to disarm or face the US military is in fact code," Juan Cole says. "He is telling the Sadrists to lie low while the US mops up the Sunni Arab guerrillas. Sadr's militia became relatively quiescent for a whole year after the Marines defeated it at Najaf in August, 2004. But since it is rooted in an enormous social movement, the militia is fairly easy to reconstitute after it goes into hiding."

    (Big ups: Nicholas Weaver, in the comments)

    UPDATE 12:47 PM: Check out the weirdly ambiguous interchange between a reporter and SecDef Gates today, courtesy of Inside Defense.

    Q: Is the United States military and/or the Iraqi government prepared now to arrest or kill Muqtada al-Sadr as part of this new increase?...

    SEC. GATES: I think a source of frustration for both Iraqi and American forces in the past has been political interference during clearing operations... I think one of the most important commitments that the prime minister has made is that in this offensive, the military will have the authority to go after all law breakers. There are no exceptions. I'm not going to hang specific targets on specific people, but all law breakers are susceptible to being detained in this -- or taken care of in this campaign.

    Q: Sir, why are you vague on the treatment of al-Sadr? Because he has a long history here in this conflict as being on the most-wanted list of the United States; then the Iraqis persuaded the U.S. not to arrest him; he leads the Mahdi Army. I mean, this is the bad guy that the United States makes clear is helping to bring down this government, so why not commit to what our posture is with regard to him now?

    SEC. GATES: What I will say is that all parts of Baghdad are going to be involved in this campaign, including Sadr City. (Cross talk.) (Laughter.)
  2. Our US friends messed up big time a couple of years ago when they did not take out Sadar and his army.
    Now Sadar is Big Time and I do beleive that the intent of the Iraq government is eventually to be part of Iran, somehow.
    Georgei Boy has opened a box of tricks not seen since the mythical Pandora and just how anyone will get out of it is beyond me.
  3. I have always called this the "war of lost opportunites." The failure to secure Baghdad when it was doable, the failure to secure Iraq's borders, the failure to neutralize al Sadr, the failure to make Sadaam's death a unifying event....

    You name it, you are probably right.
  4. To paraphrase an old saying, you don't buy off a warlord- you can rent them for a while.
  5. Wasn't sadr our fault though and not the spams, I seem to recall they (the US) wanted him rid of and we pursuaded them not to.

    Please correct me if I'm wrong.
  6. If we had any sense we'd ditch the current lame duck Iraqi Govt and let Sadr run the place as Saddam Mk2. He commands genuine popular support, is an Iraqi nationalist rather than an Iranian puppet - that's the best deal in town so far.

    We could kill him of course - but the movement he leads won't disappear, and may very well get a new more militant boss out for revenge.
  7. I think initially Washington favoured Sistani but he turned out to be more of an Iranian puppet than al-Sadr. Wouldn't surprise me if the Iraqi government and the US had come to some sort of arrangement with Sadr.
  8. The Iraqi govt are playing both sides, Maliki is a US stooge whilst those under him are closer to Iran.

    They cant keep this balancing act up forever and when it all falls down it'll be interesting to see what happens.

    As for Al-Sadr, hes pretty much untouchable with at least 100000 men under arms.