Question about AP 3000

I wasn’t sure if I should put this here or under Aviation. Since the question concerns doctrine, decided on here. If wrong, MODs, please move.

The recently issued version of AP3000 (4th Edition) has a brief discussion on Organic Air Power? in Chapter 4 “Air and Space Command and Control.” It reads:

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has its own organic air power, providing a very high assurance of support from airmen with a comprehensive understanding of ground combat operations. However, this did not prove to be a particularly effective model for the application of air power in the 2003 Iraq War; flexing high-value USMC assets to service higher priority tasks elsewhere in the theatre was very difficult, and the perception that organic capabilities were always available to the Marines sometimes inhibited a reciprocal flow of air support when it was urgently required.
Almost every account I've read of the 2003 invasion said that the CAS and killbox ops were extremely well conducted in the MEF AO compared to the handling of air support in the V Corps AO. This extended to the point that aircraft in the Army sector would check-out with gas in reserve, check in the Marines, because the Marines had the reputation of either using you or sending you on your way, no messing about. Additionally, the Marines only kept their helicopters and KC-130’s as purely organic assets. Everything else was offered up to the CFACC, who did the job of scheduling CAS and killbox sorties into both sectors. But the CFACC did put Marine aircraft back into the Marine sector via the ATO, per an agreement reached between Lt. Gen. Moseley and the Marines.

Is it just me, or is the RAF bending the facts slightly to come up with the desired answer ‘That organic air, not under the control of the air force, is a bad thing’?

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