Post Conflict Afghanistan

Afghanistan after 2014: Why zero is not an option | The Economist

Both sides are taking up positions that risk damaging what should be their real objectives. From Afghanistan’s point of view, the bilateral pact with America and a related “status of forces agreement” with NATO are essential for stability, as they would define the role and legal standing of international troops after 2014. Afghan National Security Forces are now leading the fight against insurgents in all parts of the country, and they are acquitting themselves well. However, they still need assistance with logistics, air support, intelligence, medical evacuation and dealing with improvised explosive devices (see article). Denying Afghan soldiers this help would damage their morale, while encouraging the Taliban to believe that time is on their side

Having invested so much and lost so much, what should be the involvement of not only American forces but NATO forces in Afghanistan post withdrawal?
 

FEASG

LE
Post conflict Afghanistan is a misnomer, our departure will just mark the next phase of conflict. Afghanistan has the unhappy role, of venue for the regional bar brawl. Just as Belgium had in Europe in the twentieth century.
 
C

CivPlod

Guest
I can see our involvement being about 1200 pax, from a residual NATO force of 15,000, roughly each nation will contribute about 1/6th of what they have just now.

We will lead on the Officer academy and Der Speigal intimates that that yanks will withdraw their MERT capability. http://m.spiegel.de/international/world/a-884836.html
Leaving us to provide MERT for Helmand, possibly leading training on field hospitals and medical evacuation.
Those 1200 pax still need real time life support, especially given that SF and airframes are rumoured to be remaining and anyone who thinks an AQ insurgency is just going to disappear on 01/01/15, needs their heads examined.

I know the yanks are moving into(taking over) bastion in Oct 14 from leatherneck, Helmand will
continue to be a busy place for us and them for the foreseeable.


Posted from the ARRSE Mobile app (iOS or Android)
 
My prediction of post conflict Afghanistan is that the yanks will hang around Afghanistan for a few years after the "pull-out" (read losing the war), try to influence (bully) the politics (as they are in Iraq), but largely be ignored by Afghans. In the meantime, Afghanistan will slowly (over a year or two) descend into civil war with the outcome of the Taliban taking over again. What happens after that is anybody's guess.

Whatever happens in Afghanistan after we "pull-out", there will be a lot of families wondering why they lost loved ones in Afghanistan.
 

alib

LE
Realistically Kabul will be on its own as Congress will eventually pull the plug. The next question is how big a bribe/tribute payment is Barry going to offer Pindi to make nice? And will they? That may be more relevant than any force deployments.
 

Dwarf

LE
My prediction of post conflict Afghanistan is that the yanks will hang around Afghanistan for a few years after the "pull-out" (read losing the war), try to influence (bully) the politics (as they are in Iraq), but largely be ignored by Afghans. In the meantime, Afghanistan will slowly (over a year or two) descend into civil war with the outcome of the Taliban taking over again. What happens after that is anybody's guess.

Whatever happens in Afghanistan after we "pull-out", there will be a lot of families wondering why they lost loved ones in Afghanistan.

Pretty much how I see it, token forces that we leave will have no practical effect on what's happening and the Afghan security forces will eventually collapse as the energies of corruption, lack of motivation, and the descent into warlordism and banditry combine with the resurgence of Taliban to return the country to square one. The real problems of the country have not been adressed and no reforms that would make the vital difference have been implemented.

I see alot of parrallels between Vietnam and now, the turning of an unwinnable war over to the locals, waiting for a few years before Congress gets tired of paying for it and then pulling the plug. Watching 'horrified' as the baddies win but blaming it on the corruption and incompetence of the locals whilst being secretly relieved that they can stop sending bagloads of swag into a bottomless pit.
US went into Nam convinced they would sort it out in jig time and didn't. Afghan they actually could have done had they wanted to and had they not gone into Iraq before completing the job in hand. In both cases once they realised they couldn't win the trick was to appear to have stabilised the country and made it secure while bailing out and claiming a conditional win to retain face. However the reality will be seen by the other players and limits of power will be noted.
The UK now, I imagine will be seen as a spent force, and Europe still seen as a divided grouping that is quite ineffective unless it is on the US side taken along to give legitimacy to actions and to fill in a few files.

A lot of good lads died there and again for what?
 
I sincerely hope someone rub Blair's face in his 'History will be my judge' misnomer in a few years time when his Afghan. legacy has fully emerged.
 
I see alot of parrallels between Vietnam and now, the turning of an unwinnable war over to the locals,
It was different in many ways, as so were those that did the fighting.
In World War II the average age of the combat soldier was 26...
In Vietnam he was 19.
In Vietnam he was 19. nnnnnnnnnn 19.
 
...much as the IRA did in NI. Those in it for the long game inevitably triumph - politicians invariably aren't.
Did PIRA really win ? They started off wanting a Marxist Ireland united by the gun .... and ended up as Members of the Westminster Parliament. They have become what they once fought. That's not what I'd call a victory.
 

recaprevenge

War Hero
Did PIRA really win ? They started off wanting a Marxist Ireland united by the gun .... and ended up as Members of the Westminster Parliament. They have become what they once fought. That's not what I'd call a victory.
Off topic slightly perhaps,but I agree, NI was mainly sorted through a combination of political and military (and legal) measures that really forced peace as the only option. But that took a long time and lots of commitment! Even whilst Maggie was shouting no negotiation with terrorists the government was in secret negotiations a bit like afghan now! The main difference there is of course culture corruption religion and history! Other than that its the same deal! Best we just reframe the way we look at winning and the **** off from the place and leave it to implode on itself!


Posted from the ARRSE Mobile app (iOS or Android)
 

alib

LE
Did PIRA really win ? They started off wanting a Marxist Ireland united by the gun .... and ended up as Members of the Westminster Parliament. They have become what they once fought. That's not what I'd call a victory.
Indeed a 32 county socialist Ireland, a doomed to fail cause if there ever was one. It's now probably permanently divided and the South is the most rightwing country in Western Europe.

However there was a clear victor. The downfall of the old Unionist establishment and the rise of the DUP to dominate Six Counties politics as engineered by Dr Ian Paisley was a considerable political achievement. That sleekit old bugger on reflection is one of the few successful 60s revolutionaries.
 

Dwarf

LE
It was different in many ways, as so were those that did the fighting.
In World War II the average age of the combat soldier was 26...
In Vietnam he was 19.
In Vietnam he was 19. nnnnnnnnnn 19.
Don't disagree from that side. It's more the political side that I see parallels.
As a digression what's the average age of the Brit there today? Surely not nnnnnnnnnnineteen.
 
Indeed a 32 county socialist Ireland, a doomed to fail cause if there ever was one. It's now probably permanently divided and the South is the most rightwing country in Western Europe.

However there was a clear victor. The downfall of the old Unionist establishment and the rise of the DUP to dominate Six Counties politics as engineered by Dr Ian Paisley was a considerable political achievement. That sleekit old bugger on reflection is one of the few successful 60s revolutionaries.
Mr paisley engineered nothing. It was all the British government with some help from the Irish government. The entire ' peace process' was engineered from its inception to bring the two extremes in Northern Ireland right smack bang into the middle of it. It was easy for Sinn Fein and the DUP when they where on the side lines all the had to do was be all shouty and make the odd threats of doom, now they are the two ' ruling party's' the daily grind of the 'real politik' has taken over and effectively castrated them and are now morphing into the UUP and SDLP, the real UUP and SDLP having been sacrificed in the early days of the peace process on the alter of political expediency to achieve the above objectives


Posted from the ARRSE Mobile app (iOS or Android)
 

fu2

LE
Having invested so much and lost so much said:
Nothing, null, zero, fcuk all. Too many young men and women have lost thier lives for that patch of dirt. As I have said before Kaszi will fcuk off to switzerland with his ill gotten gains followed by quite few of his cronies (ministers). The afghan armed forces will split themselves up between local warlords (drugs) and the taliban who will occupy respective areas of that pile of dirt. I just feel sorry for those young women who had a brief taste of freedom but in two generations that will all be forgotten.
 

Goatman

ADC
Book Reviewer
The Taliban will win in the end and when that day comes a single fcuk won't be given by my good self.
Concur.
However I will give at least a single fack.

Not least on behalf of Garth Banks,Michael Swain,Tom Neathway, Mark Ormrod and others too numerous to mention for the price they paid ,on behalf of grandstanding Tony 'look at my wad' Blair and Gordon ' commanders on the ground have everything they want' Brown.

Useful and reflective article in The Economist:

Security in Afghanistan: Holding their ground | The Economist
(by kind permission Miss Rita Chevrolet)
Security in Afghanistan

Holding their ground The security forces are just strong enough to contain the Taliban
Jul 20th 2013 | GHAZNI |From the print edition



THE roar of artillery goes on and on: every few minutes cannons fire illumination rounds into the air, lighting up the night sky beyond the checkpoints of the fledgling Afghan army. Only a few kilometres from the main highway, it is still Taliban territory.

Ghazni is a crucial province, south-west of Kabul, that carries the highway from the capital to Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second city. Ghazni is mired in the insurgency. Here, as almost everywhere in Afghanistan, NATO forces have largely stopped fighting the Taliban, having handed over security to the Afghan army and police. How the Afghan forces perform without America and its allies will largely determine the future of the country once international combat forces withdraw in 2014.


Much still seems grim in Ghazni, years after NATO sensed that the war was being lost and sent extra troops to Afghanistan. A “secure zone” extends at most a few kilometres from the Kabul-Kandahar highway. The insurgents seem often to act with impunity, hitting convoys on the highway two or three times a day and even maintaining checkpoints on it in broad daylight. They have unimpeded access to sanctuaries and supplies in Pakistan. NATO bases come under frequent, if mostly ineffective, fire. In many areas the Taliban rule openly. The government’s writ is patchy outside the provincial capital.

In Ghazni Afghan soldiers up their game

Since NATO ceased combat operations early this year, violence in Ghazni has fallen. “Many people see us as occupiers, and now it’s harder for the Taliban to say they’re fighting infidels,” says Colonel Stephen Michael, the American commander. On the other hand, casualties among Afghan security forces are up by half compared with a year earlier, reflecting their increased role. They still receive some coalition help, including artillery support, but most of the assistance comes in the form of advice.

The Americans insist that the Afghans are ready, pointing out the lead locals have taken for half a year. It has helped that Afghans have received much-needed heavy weaponry and better vehicles. But they struggle to supply fuel and ammunition, maintain equipment, provide air support, evacuate the injured, and detect and deal with improvised explosive devices. Co-ordination among various arms and services is in its infancy. Afghan security forces are also hobbled by ethnic tensions. The local police will not employ Hazaras, although they make up nearly half the province’s population. Elite police units have no Pushtuns, the majority group (and the ethnic base of the Taliban).



It would be a mistake to write off the Afghan security forces. They are keen to fight, and if they have little time for training, it is because they are always out on operations. In the past few months, they have actually widened Ghazni’s secure zone. They are undermanned, however. As a result they rely increasingly on local police units to man checkpoints and gather intelligence. Some of these fighters are former insurgents who have switched sides. Some are commanded by petty warlords with as little love for the government as for the insurgents. The so-called Muqur movement, in the south-west of the province, is at its core a thuggish group, involved in the opium trade, who happen to share an enemy with the government. But many in Ghazni just want a better life. Last year an uprising in Andar, in the east of the province, dislodged insurgents from villages after leaders got fed up with the Taliban closing schools and killing people.

The insurgents are hardly strong—probably no more than a few hundred fighters altogether in Ghazni province—and more a nuisance than a mortal threat to the central government—mostly attacking checkpoints and rarely inflicting serious damage. They appear to have little genuine support among the population. And if anything, NATO’s withdrawal next year seems likely to sharpen the Afghan security forces’ game.

Provided, then, that the West keeps paying for Afghanistan’s army, the government’s survival is not really at stake. Still, the insurgents are resilient, and they are unlikely to disappear. It may never be possible to end the insurgency without a political deal.
 

alib

LE
Mr paisley engineered nothing. It was all the British government with some help from the Irish government. The entire ' peace process' was engineered from its inception to bring the two extremes in Northern Ireland right smack bang into the middle of it. It was easy for Sinn Fein and the DUP when they where on the side lines all the had to do was be all shouty and make the odd threats of doom, now they are the two ' ruling party's' the daily grind of the 'real politik' has taken over and effectively castrated them and are now morphing into the UUP and SDLP, the real UUP and SDLP having been sacrificed in the early days of the peace process on the alter of political expediency to achieve the above objectives


Posted from the ARRSE Mobile app (iOS or Android)
You are focused on the protracted endgame of what for Big Ian was a very successful revolutionary process. It's the "war process" that shaped the conditions for what was to come that was important not the "peace process". After all it was Sunningdale for slow learners for a reason. This has been somewhat distorted by the vainglorious preening of the Clintons, Ahern and Blair.

Folk miss the big struggle here was really for control of Unionism and the shape of Government in N.I. It was hints of concessions from the Unionist establishments to the Civil Rights movement that brought Big Ian and his flock out into the streets in the first place. In retrospect he was on a clear path to victory by the 80s. His career was opportunistic culminating in the humiliation of David Trimble and the arrival of the chuckle brothers. He picked his moment to finally compromise well. Together with SF he'd gutted the center ground of Six Counties politics to the losers went Nobel prizes. The resulting sectarian institutions that a very constrained London and Dublin set up were just the only possible political solution.

Big Ian left office with Garden center Unionism in disarray. The DUP as the dominant Protestant party nose firmly in a trough filled by English tax payer. With the border secured by historic levels of opposition to a United Ireland even amongst Catholics. Amazingly the old rogues exit from politics even had a tinge of honor about it.

His unwary auxiliaries in all this SF found themselves behind big desks in Stormont with the less clumsy DUP often running rings round them. They had both been paid off from London and 6C politics would mostly be about where that pork went. SF ended up betraying the sacred causes of direct force Republicanism as limbs of the British state. Once downtrodden Catholics in N.I achieved near equality with Prods but this was not what the IRA had ever fought for indeed they had viewed the Civil Rights movement with great suspicion precisely because it would lessen potential for armed revolt.
 

Latest Threads

Top