Poland 1939 Was Hitler Right

[stacker1]

Slightly off topic, but something I find bloody amazing.

The IWM has some Black bread in its collection that is over 100 years old at this point.

What makes it all the more remarkable is they have a full providence for the object, and they've made no attempt at preserving it. Yet it still looks as fresh as the day it was issued!

bread, piece of

thick slice of black bread which has (over time) crumbled into three pieces.

www.iwm.org.uk

Dwarf bread obviously

 

[Gravelbelly]

Dwarf bread obviously

Has the cat pissed on it?

 

[LeoRoverman]

Well, let's regard an imaginary scenario that Satalin might consider. Suppose he rejects proposal to sign the not aggression pact with Germany or/and the secret protocol to it.
What Berlin and Warsaw could do?
They could conclude secret agreement. Taking into account their cooperation to divide Czechia, it looks from Stalin's point of view as not absolutely impossible.
1. Pre WW1 Polish German border is restored of course including Danzig.
2. As a compensation Poland receives 2 fold larger lands in Ukraine and Belorussia that were for centuries parts of Poland.
3. Germany and Poland stage joint aggression against the Soviet union.
4. Germany gets Crimea, lands near to it, including Donbass, Kuban, Caucasus, Russian lands.
Germany used Romania as an ally. So why it could not use Poland in the same way?
Taking into account power of German armed forces and 1 million strong Polish army, such a joint aggression that could and likely would be supported by Western powers, would be a mortal threat to the Soviet union. Of course, Stalin preferred to stimulate a war between capitalist countries and prepare to future inevitable war.

1 is not conceivable , it would be contrary to Versailles, whilst Russia isn’t bound Germany is.
2 not possible either without the agreement of the powers, example Munich 38.
3. highly unlikely Poland could stop Germany but she really has no hope of surviving Russia. Given the dispute over Danzig it’s unlikely the Poles would ever have come to an agreement.
4 whoa neddy we’re no where near there yet. Russia wouldn’t even concede UKraine . You’re talking about setting up an exclave. You’re also making a fundamental mistake. Had Russia Lost, I don’t think we’re talking all Russia. There’s no way of occupying it. Mineral concessions from Siberia perhaps, But that’s already gained in the pact. No gain.
I think you’re making an allusion to western interference in the Russian civil war by saying the Western powers might support it. What you’re forgetting is that France preferred a Russian trade deal whilst Britain preferred Germany. That impasse was the cause of the pact. We go back to square the circle. It’s ideological in two forms of socialism driven by mistrust.

 

[Condottiere]

Well, let's regard an imaginary scenario that Satalin might consider. Suppose he rejects proposal to sign the not aggression pact with Germany or/and the secret protocol to it.
What Berlin and Warsaw could do?
They could conclude secret agreement. Taking into account their cooperation to divide Czechia, it looks from Stalin's point of view as not absolutely impossible.
1. Pre WW1 Polish German border is restored of course including Danzig.
2. As a compensation Poland receives 2 fold larger lands in Ukraine and Belorussia that were for centuries parts of Poland.
3. Germany and Poland stage joint aggression against the Soviet union.
4. Germany gets Crimea, lands near to it, including Donbass, Kuban, Caucasus, Russian lands.
Germany used Romania as an ally. So why it could not use Poland in the same way?
Taking into account power of German armed forces and 1 million strong Polish army, such a joint aggression that could and likely would be supported by Western powers, would be a mortal threat to the Soviet union. Of course, Stalin preferred to stimulate a war between capitalist countries and prepare to future inevitable war.

All your putative (Putinative?) points have already been covered and consistently debunked in this thread. They are a prime example of one of the principles of the Muscovite Mindset. namely: "Everyone is out to destroy us, therefore we have to destroy them first".

Moscow appproached Berlin with an offer for what became the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, not the other way around. Stalin did not consider the proposal, he initiated it.

No secret agreement between Poland and Germany was possible as there were mutually non-negotiable overlaps. Therefore no joint aggression. At no stage in the run-up to WW2 did Poland repudiate its non-aggression treaty with the USSR or even accede to Berlin's wishes and join in various defensive agreements with Germany alongside other central and eastern european states.

Berlin wanted Belarus and Ukraine for itself

Poland did not cooperate with Germany to divide the Czech Lands. There was no joint operation. The Polish Government took advantage of the German operation and annexed a small sliver of territory it had claimed since the end of WW1. Not a noble action by any means, but not the active collusion with Germany as depicted in Moscow.

The Western Powers would never have supported a further aggrandizement of German Power eastwards. The Munich debacle had been the final straw. Hence the French and British security guarantees to Poland.

However, you are quite accurate in your last sentence which absolutely confirms that Stalin through his proposal of of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its secret protocols (essentially amounting to a of a de facto alliance with Nazi Germany) which Hitler avidly and quickly accepted; enabled Nazi Germany to invade Poland and thus initiate WW2 by the trigger of the previously mentioned French and British security guarantees to that country issued after Hiter had reneged on the Munich Agreement.

Stalin assessed that Germany would exhaust itself and its opponents in a war against France and Britain a la WW1 while maintaining its pact with Soviet Russia through the necessity of avoiding a two-front war. He would then be able to steamroller the Red Army to the Atlantic at the time of his choosing.

It didn't quite work out that way, but the Kremlin managed to claw back and partially achieve its war aims, partly due to the huge (and intentionally unacknowledged by Moscow) aid it received from the West post-Barbarossa and due to the naivety of the USA in taking Stalin's propaganda, lies and blandishments at face value.

Moscow was completely implicit in the outbreak of hostilities in WW2. It's dreams of conquest, territorial aggrandisement and world power mirrored Berlin's. Each of these despotic dictatorships believed it could use the other to achieve their aims. Poland was in the way. Therefore Poland had to be obliterated first.

 

[KGB_resident]

1 is not conceivable , it would be contrary to Versailles, whilst Russia isn’t bound Germany is.
2 not possible either without the agreement of the powers, example Munich 38.
3. highly unlikely Poland could stop Germany but she really has no hope of surviving Russia. Given the dispute over Danzig it’s unlikely the Poles would ever have come to an agreement.
4 whoa neddy we’re no where near there yet. Russia wouldn’t even concede UKraine . You’re talking about setting up an exclave. You’re also making a fundamental mistake. Had Russia Lost, I don’t think we’re talking all Russia. There’s no way of occupying it. Mineral concessions from Siberia perhaps, But that’s already gained in the pact. No gain.
I think you’re making an allusion to western interference in the Russian civil war by saying the Western powers might support it. What you’re forgetting is that France preferred a Russian trade deal whilst Britain preferred Germany. That impasse was the cause of the pact. We go back to square the circle. It’s ideological in two forms of socialism driven by mistrust.

Probably you don't understand my point.
Stalin suspected and feared that capitalist countries (at least some of them) could stage joint invasion in the Soviet union.
He regarded many scenarios. There was border dispute between Poland (old enemy of Russia) and Germany (enemy of Russia during WW1). These countries could (from Stalin's point of view) resolve their border dispute at expence of the Soviet union. They could restore pre-war border between Poland and Germany after joint invasion in the Soviet union and compensation for lost lands given to Poland.
You regard these scenario impossible but Stalin was not so sure. So he has two alternatives
- to agree to sign not aggression pact with Germany and the secret protocol to it.
- to reject the offer from Berlin and be attacked by German/Polish forces.

 

[Condottiere]

Probably you don't understand my point.
Stalin suspected and feared that capitalist countries (at least some of them) could stage joint invasion in the Soviet union.
He regarded many scenarios. There was border dispute between Poland (old enemy of Russia) and Germany (enemy of Russia during WW1). These countries could (from Stalin's point of view) resolve their border dispute at expence of the Soviet union. They could restore pre-war border between Poland and Germany after joint invasion in the Soviet union and compensation for lost lands given to Poland.
You regard these scenario impossible but Stalin was not so sure. So he has two alternatives
- to agree to sign not aggression pact with Germany and the secret protocol to it.
- to reject the offer from Berlin and be attacked by German/Polish forces.

Wibble, fairy tales and untruths.
Stalin had a plan. The aim was the expansion of Soviet Russian hegemony across Europe. He reckoned he could use Hitler to help achieve it. So he carried it out by enabling/facilitating/provoking the German invasion of Poland and thus the start of WW2. Swiftly followed by the Soviet Russian invasion of Poland, once the little item of the still ongoing war with Japan had been settled in the Far East with Zhukov's crushing of the Japs at Khalkin Gol and their acceptance of Moscow's terms.

 

[LeoRoverman]

Probably you don't understand my point.
Stalin suspected and feared that capitalist countries (at least some of them) could stage joint invasion in the Soviet union.

That’s quite irrational. Moreover it’s conflating the civil war with the accession of Hitler. In fact once it had been accepted that the Monarchy wouldn’t be restored, there was little point. Russia was quite keen to expand into China taking advantage of Japan and the Chinese civil war.

 

[terminal]

I would like to add a bit of statistics.

Food and agriculture in Nazi Germany - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

So from strategical point of view occupied Soviet territories as a source of food for Germany were not so productive.

Regardless of whether or not Germany's plans worked out well for them, your point is irrelevant since the Germans could not have known that in advance. They thought that when they invaded the Soviet Union it would collapse quickly, and they based their plans round that. They would then have the food and the oil, and there would be no need to take a round about route to get them.

 

[Condottiere]

Regardless of whether or not Germany's plans worked out well for them, your point is irrelevant since the Germans could not have known that in advance. They thought that when they invaded the Soviet Union it would collapse quickly, and they based their plans round that. They would then have the food and the oil, and there would be no need to take a round about route to get them.

Reasoning (or unreasoning) influenced by a long-present superiority complex inflated by Nazi hubris. The “Herrenvolk” asserting their rightful place in an ideologically skewed and fundamentally unsound imaginary universe.

 

[LeoRoverman]

Reasoning (or unreasoning) influenced by a long-present superiority complex inflated by Nazi hubris. The “Herrenvolk” asserting their rightful place in an ideologically skewed and fundamentally unsound imaginary universe.

I take it we're talking about the general politics of the period, it's fairly accurate

 

[Condottiere]

I take it we're talking about the general politics of the period, it's fairly accurate

Yes, similar trends were seen throughout the European mindset (with national differences from local historic events and political. religious and other cultural influences). There was a spectrum from well-meaning, paternalistic (but essentially condescending) at one end, to barbarously and cruelly exploitative at the other, with considerable overlap across the whole range. Although there were ideological counter-arguments to various degrees, especially in historically more liberal leaning nations; this thinking still led to the excesses of European colonialism enabled by Europe's scientific, technological and industrial advances. Unfortunately in Germany in the early 20th century, the background setting enabled the Nazis to push these trends to their most extreme apotheosis.

 

[LeoRoverman]

Unfortunately in Germany in the early 20th century, the background setting enabled the Nazis to push these trends to their most extreme apotheosis.

Oh yes, point well made- just amazing how quickly the allies decided it was pointless wasting the by product. Still an Ill wind, etc...

 

[KGB_resident]

Regardless of whether or not Germany's plans worked out well for them, your point is irrelevant since the Germans could not have known that in advance. They thought that when they invaded the Soviet Union it would collapse quickly, and they based their plans round that. They would then have the food and the oil, and there would be no need to take a round about route to get them.

And again we return to the biggest Hitler's mistake - poor planning, absence of plan B in many important issues.
Hitler invaded the Soviet union 22 June 1941. Scorched land policy was easily predictable and the new harvest could happen only in the second half of 1942.
From my point of view Germany was not ready to full scale war with the Soviet union in June 1941. Hitler had to prepare to it more carefully and anyway had to seek sources of oil and food outside the Soviet union.
But Germany was quite prepared to invasion of Turkey and to capture the ME instead of risky Barbarossa plan.
As the German army was sufficiently powerful in 1942 then so called 'food problem' was not so severe to affect military operations.

 

[Condottiere]

And again we return to the biggest Hitler's mistake - poor planning, absence of plan B in many important issues.
Hitler invaded the Soviet union 22 June 1941. Scorched land policy was easily predictable and the new harvest could happen only in the second half of 1942.
From my point of view Germany was not ready to full scale war with the Soviet union in June 1941. Hitler had to prepare to it more carefully and anyway had to seek sources of oil and food outside the Soviet union.
But Germany was quite prepared to invasion of Turkey and to capture the ME instead of risky Barbarossa plan.
As the German army was sufficiently powerful in 1942 then so called 'food problem' was not so severe to affect military operations.

Despite all the evidence to the contrary.
Wibble. Again.
Yawn.

Moscow drove the initiation of WW2 with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its de facto alliance with Berlin.
This is why Hitler invaded Poland when he did,
And the answer to the OP's question remains: No.

Mods:
Is there any point to continue this thread? One poster insists on going around in ever decreasing and more irrelevant circles promoting a completely unrealistic viewpoint that has nothing to do with the original thread title.

 

[KGB_resident]

Despite all the evidence to the contrary.
Wibble. Again.
Yawn.

Moscow drove the initiation of WW2 with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its de facto alliance with Berlin.
This is why Hitler invaded Poland when he did,
And the answer to the OP's question remains: No.

Mods:
Is there any point to continue this thread? One poster insists on going around in ever decreasing and more irrelevant circles promoting a completely unrealistic viewpoint that has nothing to do with the original thread title.

As for the question in the title then my answer is complex.
1. Hitler was fundamentally wrong to unleash WW2 and the invasion of Poland was his great mistake.
2. In the context of Hitler's aggressive policy, Hitler had chosen right moment to occupy Poland and prepared to it properly, including the deal with Stalin.
So, in short, strategically Hitler was wrong but tactically he was right.

There are another issues that should be addressed. Was pre-war policy of Polish leadership right, voided any mistakes. You may enlighten us in this respect.
As for Soviet leadership than there were right and wrong decisions. The biggest mistake was the war with Finland.

 

[terminal]

Reasoning (or unreasoning) influenced by a long-present superiority complex inflated by Nazi hubris. The “Herrenvolk” asserting their rightful place in an ideologically skewed and fundamentally unsound imaginary universe.

I think that in Hitler's case it was largely driven by wishful thinking. He knew what his ultimate goal was - to acquire territory which would allow Germany to exist as a self-sufficient autarchical society. He identified "Russia" as the place which could provide that.

How to achieve that though was something he didn't have a clear set of ideas about. He knew that a war would be necessary, but he greatly underestimated the scope and scale of the war required to achieve it.

 

[Condottiere]

I think that in Hitler's case it was largely driven by wishful thinking. He knew what his ultimate goal was - to acquire territory which would allow Germany to exist as a self-sufficient autarchical society. He identified "Russia" as the place which could provide that.

How to achieve that though was something he didn't have a clear set of ideas about. He knew that a war would be necessary, but he greatly underestimated the scope and scale of the war required to achieve it.

The ultimate "strategic corporal" failure perheps?

 

[terminal]

And again we return to the biggest Hitler's mistake - poor planning, absence of plan B in many important issues.
Hitler invaded the Soviet union 22 June 1941. Scorched land policy was easily predictable and the new harvest could happen only in the second half of 1942.
From my point of view Germany was not ready to full scale war with the Soviet union in June 1941. Hitler had to prepare to it more carefully and anyway had to seek sources of oil and food outside the Soviet union.
But Germany was quite prepared to invasion of Turkey and to capture the ME instead of risky Barbarossa plan.
As the German army was sufficiently powerful in 1942 then so called 'food problem' was not so severe to affect military operations.

Realistically, in order to achieve what Hitler wanted (the conquest of "Russia", the extermination of the Slavic population, and it's replacement with "Aryans"), Germany needed to defeat Poland and incorporate it into the new expanded German state.

Hitler didn't really describe the ultimate fate of Poland in Mein Kampf, other than to describe it as an obstacle that must be destroyed before achieving his ultimate objective of the conquest of "Russia". But I don't think that Hitler really differentiated between Poland and Russia with respect to their ultimate fates. I suspect he simply thought in broader terms of "the east", and geographic terms such as "Poland" or "Russia" would be relegated to the history books once the new German territories were conquered and settled. There had been no Poland for centuries before WWI, and there was to be no Poland after WWII.

What made German plans ultimately fail was that they didn't have the ability to conduct a protracted war. If they had built up large strategic stockpiles of food, oil, and other raw materials, they might have been in a much different position during the invasion of the Soviet Union. There were a lot of things they needed to do to prepare for the war, but hadn't had ready in 1939.

If I recall correctly, the German navy were told to prepare for a war which was to start in 1943, and their construction plan was based around that. If that reflects the real overall plan, then an additional four years of preparation might have helped the Germans somewhat, although their enemies would also have had more time to prepare.

There is a line of argument that the Germans were approaching bankruptcy by 1939 and so were forced into action prematurely. If this is true, then that might explain some of the lack of preparation, although I don't think the Germans realised just how unprepared they were.

 

[terminal]

The ultimate "strategic corporal" failure perheps?

In a war of that scale, economic factors count for more than battlefield leadership. Japan failed for similar reasons. Japan had a very large army which was still in the field at the time of their defeat, but it didn't really matter as they were being defeated through destruction of their merchant shipping, even without the atomic bombs being dropped. Without being able to make free use of the sea to bring the resources of the newly conquered territories back to Japan, those territories were more of a liability than an asset to Japan.

Italy were in an even worse position, as they had to import most of their coal as well.

When the world no longer needs oil to power itself and so oil no longer has to be transported by sea in large quantities, there will be a sudden and possibly very significant shift in the strategic situation in the world in general.

 

[Condottiere]

In a war of that scale, economic factors count for more than battlefield leadership. Japan failed for similar reasons. Japan had a very large army which was still in the field at the time of their defeat, but it didn't really matter as they were being defeated through destruction of their merchant shipping, even without the atomic bombs being dropped. Without being able to make free use of the sea to bring the resources of the newly conquered territories back to Japan, those territories were more of a liability than an asset to Japan.

Italy were in an even worse position, as they had to import most of their coal as well.

When the world no longer needs oil to power itself and so oil no longer has to be transported by sea in large quantities, there will be a sudden and possibly very significant shift in the strategic situation in the world in general.

But it was the jumped-up Corporal who decided that war was the answer and who made the strategic decisions.