It is my scatological analysis, but I suspect the commanders of the Guards Armoured Division made the decision not to overly risk their division after capturing the Nijmegen Bridge. A fellow battlefield guide told me that he took Adair's driver to Nijmegen and he claimed that Adair, Gwatkin and Vandeleur discussed the matter while looking at the assault river crossing. Another guide told me that one of their clients, an American Paratroop officer, claimed to have confronted Peter Carrington and theatened to shoot him. Carrington., the short peer wrote to say there was no truth in the story but would not comment further. The same guides say that Frost claimed that the main problem with Market Garden was that airforces refused to fly more than one mission a day.The one thing I would raise though is that when the Grenadier Guards tanks reached the north end of the Nijmegen road bridge at 19:15 on Wednesday 20 September 1944 reportedly the only thing between them and Arnhem to implement the DS solution was an SS Kampfgruppe HQ in Bemmel and an SS artillery battery at Oosterhout according to Harmel, although I think he may have been underplaying things a little. Whether or not, by the time the advance was resumed by the Irish Guards at 13:30 on 21 September eighteen hours had passed and the Germans had erected a blocking line that brought the attack to a close after just twenty minutes. I don't think it would have been an uneventful night drive up to Arnhem on the night of 20-21 September, but just sitting place condemned the Guards Armoured to days of fierce house-to-house fighting around two miles north of the Nijmegen road bridge.