Kraft' War Diary of the battle is littered with exaggerations of what he and his men are supposed to have done. Middlebrooke points it out in his book as does Bergström.Ref para 1, there was no time for thorough research and the 20/20 hindsight referred to by Pterandon shows there was no real need. MG was viable, as shown by how close they came to pulling it off, and most of the blame for its failure can be justifiably and provably laid at the door of various British commanders, and excluding Montgomery.
Ref para 2, sorry but this is an enduring myth based on the self-serving AAR by Krafft, commander of the SS Panzergrenadier replacement training battalion quartered near Oosterbeek; this was the only training unit in the Oosterbeek area, and the only German unit between the 1st Airborne Division's landing area and the Arnhem bridges on 17 September. I have carefully cross-referenced Krafft's account with the War Diaries of all the 1st Airborne Division units involved and none of the SS claims to stopping or even slowing the 1st Parachute Brigade's advance stand up to scrutiny. Also, IIRC the presence of Germans in that area was mentioned in the int reports used in the MG planning and briefings and was, quite rightly with historical hindsight, considered insufficiently important to merit special measures.