Op SEELOWE

I'd read somewhere (Fletcher perhaps?)there was a severe shortage of .50 Vickers in the BEF and North Africa so many of those vehicles only had a functioning .303 gun
The RN had most of them in the Anti-Aircraft role on Warships, also on our MTB and Gun Boats had them in powered twin mounts. Not surprising the Army couldn’t get enough!
 

diverman

LE
Book Reviewer
It's almost as if nobody had thought it all through, but just kinda winged it from the get-go, isn't it?

Criminal.
It's almost as if nobody had thought it all through, but just kinda winged it from the get-go, isn't it?

Criminal.
They expected a quick war in the west which is what they got, got embroiled in North Africa in part due to Mussolini and his armies wanting their bit of empire. Then finally into the Balkans and Greece, not forgetting Crete. That reduced available resources in men and material, when if he was pushing east he needed to husband his supplies.

His main problems were oil and rare metals and the lack of easy availability.
 
People like my Father. Apparently the Covid Pandemic was the result of Brexit and the Tories.
A. E Grayling Twitter feeds quite good if you want to step into an other universe.
IKEAs shortages that were down to brexit in the U.K., but global logistic problems elsewhere in Europe.
You do get what "quote" means?
Germans did Vote Hitler in. There was also a clear understanding by the population of ‘resettlement.’ However after the events nobody claimed to support him, though many still believed in the ideals.
You're getting the point I think.
 
A teacher once told me that you could always tell when someone didn't have a clue about the second world war because they believed things such as; "if it wasn't for the RAF, then Britain would have been invaded." Or that if "Hitler had invaded in the days following the Dunkirk withdrawal" blah blah blah. Without a shed load of what ifs, and other guestimate scenarios the germans wouldn't have been able to invade the south coast of england until 1941 at the earliest.
 
The fact is that Joe Public had not a scoobie about the extremity of Nazi anti-Semitism until Brit troops stumbled on the Belsen atrocity in 1945.

Only after the war was over did subsequent generations mistakenly conclude that their forebears were fighting explicitly because of it, and this conflation of ideas has rather muddled the national perception of our history, IMHO.
Wouldnt the Warsaw Ghetto uprising have made the news in 43?
 
Wouldnt the Warsaw Ghetto uprising have made the news in 43?
It did. It's nieve to think that the allies weren't aware of what the germans were doing to the jews of europe. They may not had grasped the true horrific scale of the holocaust but I don't believe for a second that they weren't aware of it.
 

diverman

LE
Book Reviewer
. . . rooted in winging it

You've just listed symptoms, not exposed root cause ^~
. . . rooted in winging it

You've just listed symptoms, not exposed root cause ^~
Well, outright stupidity comes to mind, but the Macmillan term 'events dear boy events.' As events happen he sometimes reacted correctly but the majority of the time foolishly.

Going into Russia halfway through 1941 when he should have waited until 1942 or 43, when he would have had a far more motorised force than at the time of Barbarossa, plus the lack of equipment rationalisation, too many variations of tanks vehicles and aircraft. Plus, there was Hitlers way of working by having two different groups of plenipotentiaries doing the safe job and fighting amongst themselves for control.
 
Well, outright stupidity comes to mind, but the Macmillan term 'events dear boy events.' As events happen he sometimes reacted correctly but the majority of the time foolishly.

Going into Russia halfway through 1941 when he should have waited until 1942 or 43, when he would have had a far more motorised force than at the time of Barbarossa, plus the lack of equipment rationalisation, too many variations of tanks vehicles and aircraft. Plus, there was Hitlers way of working by having two different groups of plenipotentiaries doing the safe job and fighting amongst themselves for control.
Uncle Joe also liked to play one off against the other with his generals. He deliberately set his two most capable commanders against each other in a race to take Berlin. Consequently the soviets suffered astronomical loses in manpower in their attack upon Berlin.
 
Well, outright stupidity comes to mind, but the Macmillan term 'events dear boy events.' As events happen he sometimes reacted correctly but the majority of the time foolishly.

Going into Russia halfway through 1941 when he should have waited until 1942 or 43, when he would have had a far more motorised force than at the time of Barbarossa, plus the lack of equipment rationalisation, too many variations of tanks vehicles and aircraft. Plus, there was Hitlers way of working by having two different groups of plenipotentiaries doing the safe job and fighting amongst themselves for control.
The clock was against the Germans. With Britain still in the war they couldn't import oil, minerals, and food from overseas, and the Soviets wouldn't (couldn't, even if they were willing) sell them enough to keep their stockpiles from running down. They had a finite window in which to capture the resources of the Soviet Union or face collapse.

Europe imported much of their food and raw materials from their colonial empires and exported manufactured goods to them. The Germans had captured the home countries of the colonial powers but they had no access to their overseas colonies so long as Britain was in the war. Yes the Germans had captured the factories and industrial labour forces of their opponents, but not the raw materials or food to supply them.

Europe was under blockade and would collapse if something wasn't done about it. Barbarrosa was predicated on rapidly capturing the resources of the Soviet Union and exterminating much of the population in a matter of months in order to create a surplus to ship back to Germany to sustain them. It was a part of the plan.

Delaying another year or two would only be possible if Britain bowed out of the war and reopened access to overseas colonial supplies and markets. If Britain were to maintain the blockade then Germany had a very limited time frame in which to execute their plans for the east.
 

diverman

LE
Book Reviewer
Barbarrosa was predicated on rapidly capturing the resources of the Soviet Union and exterminating much of the population in a matter of months in order to create a surplus to ship back to Germany to sustain them. It was a part of the plan.
And the extermination by starvation plan was very much embraced by the Wehrmacht as an operational concept.

For oil in particular, whilst they had control of the Hungarian oilfields, they could not actually get down towards what is now Iranian and Saudi oil areas. This forced them to use the chemical process of extracting fuels from coal, industrially intensive and costly. Then there was the production of synthetic rubber as well. IG Farben and the SS at Monowitz.
Wollheim Memorial
 
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And the extermination by starvation plan was very much embraced by the Wehrmacht as an operational concept.

For oil in particular, whilst they had control of the Hungarian oilfields, they could not actually get down towards what is now Iranian and Saudi oil areas. This forced them to use the chemical process of extracting fuels from coal, industrially intensive and costly. Then there was the production of synthetic rubber as well. IG Farben and the SS at Monowitz.
Wollheim Memorial
I believe you are thinking of Romania, not Hungary.

Also, oil was not discovered in significant quantities in Saudi Arabia until after the war. The main Middle East suppliers would have been Persia (Iran) and Iraq. Getting oil from there to Germany would not have been very practical within a useful time frame.

Synthetic oil was very expensive and in limited supply.

One of Germany's main targets in the war was to reach the Caucasus oil fields in the Soviet Union, which was the second largest producing region after the US. This was one of the major reasons why there was such a big effort put into going through southern Ukraine and Russia. The battle for Stalingrad was intended to secure the flank before making a major thrust south to the oil fields around Baku.
 

goodoldboy

MIA
Book Reviewer
I believe you are thinking of Romania, not Hungary.

Also, oil was not discovered in significant quantities in Saudi Arabia until after the war. The main Middle East suppliers would have been Persia (Iran) and Iraq. Getting oil from there to Germany would not have been very practical within a useful time frame.

Synthetic oil was very expensive and in limited supply.

One of Germany's main targets in the war was to reach the Caucasus oil fields in the Soviet Union, which was the second largest producing region after the US. This was one of the major reasons why there was such a big effort put into going through southern Ukraine and Russia. The battle for Stalingrad was intended to secure the flank before making a major thrust south to the oil fields around Baku.
It's worth repeating that reliance on transport horses and plentiful supplies of fodder hampered the Germans and Romanians in the Caucasus. Would that have hindered them had they attempted Sea Lion?
 

4(T)

LE
It's worth repeating that reliance on transport horses and plentiful supplies of fodder hampered the Germans and Romanians in the Caucasus. Would that have hindered them had they attempted Sea Lion?


There is a rather tongue-in-cheek thesis that the animal loving British would be loathe to bombard an invading force that included 100,000 dewy-eyed horses and ponies.
 
One thing that has to be borne in mind is Hitler's mindset throughout, and before, the second world war.

He had a bizarre view of history, it's something he's not alone in, and not just Germans. He held a very Wagneresque image of Germany's place in the world, more folklore than actual history. He genuinely believed in the German master race, and he viewed certain other nations as sharing a similar mindset, those nations he considered Germanic/Aryan, such as Austria, Czechoslovakia, Britain, Holland, Belgium partly. Anyone else who wasn't of the Aryan set were just grist to the mill; 'lesser' peoples such as the Slavs, Mediterranean nations, Africans, Arabs, etc, etc.

He believed that Britain would be on Germany's side and was genuinely shocked and surprised by this nation's reaction to Poland, France, etc. His half-hearted preparations for Seelowe were a weak attempt to drive Britain to join forces to defeat the Bolsheviks, or at least not interfere in his coming campaign(s). This belief continued right to the end, even in April '45 he was convinced he could persuade the British establishment to get the western Allies to change sides to defeat the Soviet Union.

All along he hoped to bring the resources of the British Empire alongside to help him achieve his aims.

And this is where his lack of real historical knowledge, lack of worldliness, his lack of depth and education let him down. He had the drive and passion of his beliefs, but not the experience of other nations, more importantly other peoples, and the feeling of how those other nations would react. He seriously misjudged the British people, but at least he knew that Britain was 'the most dangerous enemy', he just didn't want us to be an enemy.
 

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