But when the RAF engages in a bombing campaign with zero phase IV planning and the clearly insane idea that rebel ground forces would be able to maintain a stable country afterwards, it's nothing to do with their VSOs because all they were asked to do was bomb stuff. By that logic, both Afghanistan and Iraq were successes from the army point of view...
The Army was expected to have a presence on the ground in Iraq after MCO, as a part of an occupation force (as duly mandated by the UN). As Tim Cross, amongst others, noted Jay Garner was thrown under a bus with that one by Rumsfeld, and British protestations (from within MoD and government) about Phase IV were stiffly ignored. However - as Chilcot observes on some occasions - within the construct of Phase IV planning and execution, there were instances where the politicians took the advice of senior Army officers and were rather surprised when things proved more complicated/tricky than they'd been led to believe.
The fighting of the war (i.e. the MCO) by British forces in both Libya and Iraq delivered pretty much what was expected of the forces involved.
The difficulty for the equivalence contention you're presenting is that the planned post-war effort in Libya didn't involve or require the RAF, whereas that for Iraq - flawed though it was thanks to Uncle Don Rumsfeld and his ilk - did require the Army, and it did require VSOs to plan, and on occasion, unfortunately, that planning was lacking, with optimism and press-on-it is and other factors getting in the way in a fashion that simply didn't apply in Libya.
Again, I concur about the VSO bashing for the Army getting a bit facile - I can't quite see how an Oxbridge and/or private education was to blame for many problems, for instance - but the circumstances between the campaigns were different in the responsibility and involvement expected in Phase IV, and thus can't be used to equate light blue leadership failings with those of the Army's VSOs in the manner you're attempting, I fear.