Nimrod review reveals failures

Discussion in 'Current Affairs, News and Analysis' started by ABrighter2006, Oct 28, 2009.

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  1. From the BBC webpage and no doubt of interest here:

  2. Just listening to the conference being given by the investigating QC on the radio; boy is he sticking it to MOD,RAF,BAE and Qinetiq, I think every other word is 'failure' :( Even Hawker Siddeley decisions from the 1960's got a mention

    .......and the RAF have moved those responsible to other duties according to Aintworth. :x
  3. Just saw a bit of that on the news,seems to be very strongly worded in its condemnation....which is very unusual for a government initiated review.

    More to the point it identifies 10 individuals as being respsonsible to a greater or lesser degree with incompetence through to bloody nice to see some actual heads roll from this.
  4. The biggest failure is that of the Chancellor at the time, who forced cuts on the MOD which were the initiator for the lax maintenance regime.
  5. "Failures"?? That is a very generous term to cover a total cluster fcuk that seems to have come about came about primarily because:

    "The MOD suffered a sustained period of deep organisational trauma between 1998 and 2006, beginning with the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. Financial pressures and cuts drove a cascade of multifarious organisational changes, which led to a dilution of the airworthiness regime and culture within the MOD, and distraction from safety and airworthiness issues as the top priority.

    There was a shift in culture and priorities in the MOD towards ‘business’ and financial targets, at the expense of functional values such as safety and airworthiness. The Defence Logistics Organisation, in particular, came under huge pressure. Its primary focus became delivering ‘change’ and the ‘change programme’ and achieving the ‘Strategic Goal’ of a 20% reduction in output costs in five years and other financial savings. Airworthiness was a victim of the process started by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review."


    "the Nimrod Safety Case was a lamentable job from start to finish. It was riddled with errors. It missed the key dangers. Its production is a story of incompetence, complacency, and cynicism."

    "The Nimrod Safety Case process was fatally undermined by a general malaise: a widespread assumption by those involved that the Nimrod was ‘safe anyway’ (because it had successfully flown for 30 years) and the task of drawing up the Safety Case became essentially a paperwork and ‘tickbox’ exercise."

    "The shortcomings in the current airworthiness system in the MOD are manifold and include

    (1) a failure to adhere to basic Principles;
    (2) a Military Airworthiness System that is not fit for purpose;
    (3) a Safety Case regime which is ineffective and wasteful;
    (4) an inadequate appreciation of the needs of Aged Aircraft;
    (5) a series of weaknesses in the area of Personnel;
    (6) an unsatisfactory relationship between the MOD and Industry;
    (7) an unacceptable Procurement process leading to serial delays and cost-overruns; and
    (8) a Safety Culture that has allowed ‘business’ to eclipse Airworthiness"

    "In this Report, I specifically name, and criticise, key organisations and individuals who bear a share of responsibility for the loss of XV230.

    I name individuals whose conduct, in my view, fell well below the standards which might reasonably have been expected of them at the time, given their rank, roles and responsibilities, such that, in my view, they should be held personally to account."

    We shall see if that gets to be a witch hunt to produce some headlines that distract from the real problem
  6. Quite. Brown ranted at PMQ's earlier that Defence was being adequately funded and minutes later at the QC's press conference he clearly states the issue is penny pinching and underfunding!

    The man lies like a cheap Turkish watch and this should hopefully make for some interesting articles tomorrow. "Selling" Defence cuts is looking more and more difficult for Labour.

    Ainsworth did look genuinely humble when he apologised in the House. He might be thick as mince but I'm starting to think he's not fundamentally a bad bloke.
  7. :roll: 500+ pages. I'm flicking through it, impression so far is that the document strikes me as thorough and fearless. See how far up the CoC the mud sticks...

    Edited to add...

    Ouch! 8O Kick in the b@lls of the government downwards.

    But it can never hurt anywhere near as much as the pain endured by the Nimrod families and all those who have suffered bereavement or injury through cutbacks and inadequacies.

    This is a long overdue wake up call, and a terminal blow to the government's argument that defence is adequatley supported.
  8. If it wasn't for cost saving measures - do we really think that we'd be flying a fleet that is over 50 years old

    The Nimrod is based on the Comet airframe that the commercial airlines stopped using in the 1960's ffs
  9. spike7451

    spike7451 RIP

    I remember when I was first posted to Kinloss around 85,the's a small panel at head height in front of the Port wing which houses the controls for the bomb bay doors.
    This panel is about the size of a video tape.Anyway,when one of the jets was about to take off & spooling up the engines,thundering down the runway,the panel came off & went down the intake,wrecking the engine.The pilot declared a State 1 energency & flew round & landed again.
    It turned out that one of the Dzues fastners that holds the panel closed had failed.
  10. Straight jacket, have a little look at this and it may explain why Bob was looking "umble"
    "....“Bob Ainsworth, the new defence secretary, told MPs and the families of 14 men killed in an RAF Nimrod spy plane that the aircraft had been made safe despite being warned it was impossible to be sure this was true.

    Ainsworth repeatedly said defence consultants QinetiQ agreed the aircraft was safe to fly, despite the company warning that “no statement can, or has been made” to this effect.......”

  11. That dates back decades…

    The Comet, and that's what the Nimrod really is, is a museum piece, the fact we're still flying these antiques from the very dawn of the jet age sixty years after they first flew is symptomatic of a deep malaise at the very heart of Britain's defence.

    It's as bad as if we'd still had Sopwith Camels in service during the Falklands War
  12. Ainsworth has just "acknowledged a catalogue of catastrophic failure" on BBC News and announced that he was not "surprised" by the report's findings.

    On the issue of Labour's management of the whole subject of defence, he said: "The defence budget has grown and we are currently putting £3bn - what the report exposes in not just an issue of money - the pursuit of efficiency, which everyone needs to do - has managed to overtake the need for airworthiness. That is clearly wrong and unaccepatble"

    When asked if people would vote Labour after considering their record on this, he said:

    "Our record is a steady growth in funds - but management processes at the MOD are far, far from ideal" adding that "we knew there were substantial issues regarding procurement".

    I suppose we should applaud his 'honesty' but I can't remember a bigger admission of utter, disastrous failure ever.

    It's beyond disastrous for the government, who were responsible for the funding cuts that led to this.

    Ainsworth looked like a defeated man, longing to get away from the limelight on this. This report will help him on his way, Inshallah.
  13. So why does the report specifically quote the date of 1998 as the onset of the financial constraints which led to the crash?
  14. Thanks for that O 'n F, I withdraw my previous comment.

    If the press have got anything at all about them then tomorrow should be a good day for the cause of Defence.
  15. OldSnowy

    OldSnowy LE Moderator Book Reviewer

    Back to the two RAF Officers named in the report, and subsequenlty "moved on" according to Mr Ainsworth.

    Yes - both were moved - one on promotion! He is now a 1* Air Commodore.

    You couldn't make it up, you really couldn't.