• This is a stand-to for an incoming competition, one of our most expensive yet.
    Later this week we're going to be offering the opportunity to Win £270 Rab Neutrino Pro military down jacket
    Visit the thread at that link above and Watch it to be notified as soon as the competition goes live

Next Financial Crisis - what Crisis

#41
Just after the crash the Mrs told me of customers on $30K - $40K getting million $ mortgages.

There are now some controls but, still not as many as over in europe.
It would appear not, and yes we were making about 70K a year combined at that time, and 930 bucks was pretty stiff for a mortgage payment.
 
#42
I have an acquaintance who I see every few months for a couple of days. He was a SNCO, 20 year Ranger, retired a couple of years after 9/11 and has been front end contracting ever since. He is phuqing loaded, doesn't need to work anymore but, would be bored shitless if he didn't.
I'm far too lazy for "front end contracting", I prefer management. I currently look after around 1,500 people, if I put in five hours work each week I'd be surprised - I'd also try and put in for a pay rise.
 
#43
This coming from the man who was largely responsible for the last global meltdown is saying something.
How do you work that out? I have never voted Labour, but blaming Gordon Brown for problems caused the the instability, lack of integrity, and short term decision making by the global financial sector seems a bit strong, and could stop us from learning the right lessons?
I usually blame Obama. Sorted.
 
#44
I'm far too lazy for "front end contracting", I prefer management. I currently look after around 1,500 people, if I put in five hours work each week I'd be surprised - I'd also try and put in for a pay rise.
He did the whole management thing but hated the paperwork and admin so went back down to being a team leader. Last 'front end' salary for top blokes I heard of here was from a mate who is ex-USMC scout sniper SSGT he was offered $250K for pointy end stuff with a brandname employer. It wasn't him bigging it up, the bloke who told me was the bloke who offered him the job whilst B was there with us.
 
#45
He did the whole management thing but hated the paperwork and admin so went back down to being a team leader.
I don't enjoy either admin or paperwork, but the ability to type at 50+wpm (thanks Royal School of Signals) and knowing our corporate processes like the back of my hand, allows me to make admin/paperwork tasks go away very quickly.
 
#47
Given you seem not to believe I'm currently involved in wiping out about £100m of APNs, @BiscuitsAB is going to tell you something that will probably annoy you.

Rgr, that, I can confirm that you and I are working on over £100M of APNs and that it's an area that we specialise in. I can also confirm that our team has the ex-head of hmrc's Special Operations Dept on it.
Further more you handed me a potential case yesterday where the APN was in excess of £1.7M ( thanks very much for that by the way bloke)


Since I'm here already anyone who has an APN or who has clients with them or any other tax issues then drop me a PM.

On an aside if you're not happy with your levels of IT, CT or CGT we can reduce that as well.
 
#48
Given you seem not to believe I'm currently involved in wiping out about £100m of APNs, @BiscuitsAB is going to tell you something that will probably annoy you.
Wot? That both of my ex-Mother-in-Laws aren't dead and, even now, walk the twilight world of the Nearly Dead, doomed forever to belong to neither this world nor the next?

. . . then again, they did that when drawing breath.
 
#52
One of the causes of the collapse was the bundling up of sub-prime mortgages into complex financial instruments with other investments and then being traded (sold on and then re-bundled and sold on again) so that the security of the underlying investments was unclear. These packages were marketed as low-risk investments and purchased by various banks and financial institutions.

The banks the fared best were the ones which had least of the sub-prime stuff. Remember also that the sub-prime mortgages were sold by people who were on commission for selling. It didn't matter that the products they sold were unsuitable for the customer, the sales team were being paid on commission by the sale.

The matter was compounded by the stupidity of the banks trading these bunded instruments without doing due diligence.

The banking industry needs a degree of regulation to save it from itself and to save us from them. Gordon was by no means great chancellor but he wasn't totally to blame. That said, I believe that he should take a large chunk of the blame for the UK financial crisis which meant that he then had to raid UK pension schemes for a partial bail-out.

Let it be said that I have no love for Brown
 
#53
Err, no.

Just amused that an IT bloke feels he's in a position to a) pontificate as to the reasons behind the collapse of Lehman Bros, and b) that you doubted I'm involved in wiping out APNs, and you've been told you're wrong.

Ha ha.
 
#54
Err, no.

Just amused that an IT bloke feels he's in a position to a) pontificate as to the reasons behind the collapse of Lehman Bros, and b) that you doubted I'm involved in wiping out APNs, and you've been told you're wrong.

Ha ha.
What I do find telling is that you felt the urge to pursue a 5-day old cyber spat so that you could post a . . . . well . . . I'm not exactly sure what it was: rebuttal? evidence? Because (and this may come as something of a shock to you) I truly do not care.
 
#55
One of the causes of the collapse was the bundling up of sub-prime mortgages into complex financial instruments with other investments and then being traded (sold on and then re-bundled and sold on again) so that the security of the underlying investments was unclear. These packages were marketed as low-risk investments and purchased by various banks and financial institutions.

The banks the fared best were the ones which had least of the sub-prime stuff. Remember also that the sub-prime mortgages were sold by people who were on commission for selling. It didn't matter that the products they sold were unsuitable for the customer, the sales team were being paid on commission by the sale.

The matter was compounded by the stupidity of the banks trading these bunded instruments without doing due diligence.

The banking industry needs a degree of regulation to save it from itself and to save us from them. Gordon was by no means great chancellor but he wasn't totally to blame. That said, I believe that he should take a large chunk of the blame for the UK financial crisis which meant that he then had to raid UK pension schemes for a partial bail-out.

Let it be said that I have no love for Brown

All of which can be summarised as "living beyond your means". Which is where the reference to the Great Financial Genius/One-eyed Jockinese pillock does come in. Because HMG at his behest were busily spending billions more than they recovered in tax. A situation that is only just coming to an (unfortunately temporary) end.
 
#56
What I do find telling is that you felt the urge to pursue a 5-day old cyber spat so that you could post a . . . . well . . . I'm not exactly sure what it was: rebuttal? evidence? Because (and this may come as something of a shock to you) I truly do not care.
Of course.

Thats why you didn't reply.

Twice.
 
#58
Is this the £5 argument or the £10 argument?

With apologies to Monty Python
 
#59
To properly understand the "crash" you need to look at the macroeconomic envionment at the time. It had little to do with sub-prime, which was a symptom rather than a cause.

Real interest rates were at an all time low, both sovereign and corporate. At the peak, large corporates were paying negative interest rate on debts, whereby the investor recieved back less than they paid for the debt asset. That's a very difficult situation for "real money" investors (i.e pension funds and insurers that match long term assets to long term liabilities...i.e. those that invest your money). Their response was to seek out excess returns through increased complexity, willingly aided by investment banks. This increased complexity in debt structuring (of which mortgages were but one source of "product") created assets with nominally higher yields through the application of a series of assumptions that, while based on historical data, did not stand up to an extremely stressed market environment.

Lehman was failing long before things went "bang". Banks require two things to "live"....first is liquidity from capital markets, second is "margin free" arrangements from counterparties. For some time, Lehman's counterparty banks had been reducing their amount of unsecured exposure by reducing "credit lines". This is internal to the bank in question, so not visible to the market. As time progressed and word spread, the capital markets took their turn and liquidity for Lehman dried up (no buyers for their public debt).

Lehman's response was to seek to post assets as collateral to third party banks. This is where the circle turns back to those strucutred debt assets. Whan a structured debt instrument was issued, it was commonplace for the issuing bank to retain some exposure, generally the lowest grade tranche or "equity piece". Come the hour, a very large slug of this paper came to market via Lehman, with the ineveitable consequence that prices tanked. Leahamn was the first to lose this game of pass-the-parcel. Providers of liquidity wouldn't accept the only assets they had to offer up as collateral. Endedx.

There were numerous exacerbating matters, one of which was that US mortgages, of which Lehman held disproportionate positions, are not underwritten by the individual as they are in the UK. In the US, you literally just mail back the keys.....and the mortgage issuer is left with the asset. Another was the rating agencies, under pressure from both banks and real money investors, believed the maths applied to structured debt products. The lesson is that even the most robust portfolio theory breaks down when correlations tend to 1.

Today's regulatory environment is far more robust than it was a decade ago. Moreover, the interest rate envionment is very different. Not necessarily better, but very different.

Anyway, in a nutshell, that's why Lehman went bang.
 
#60
One of the causes of the collapse was the bundling up of sub-prime mortgages into complex financial instruments with other investments and then being traded (sold on and then re-bundled and sold on again) so that the security of the underlying investments was unclear. These packages were marketed as low-risk investments and purchased by various banks and financial institutions.

The banks the fared best were the ones which had least of the sub-prime stuff. Remember also that the sub-prime mortgages were sold by people who were on commission for selling. It didn't matter that the products they sold were unsuitable for the customer, the sales team were being paid on commission by the sale.

The matter was compounded by the stupidity of the banks trading these bunded instruments without doing due diligence.

The banking industry needs a degree of regulation to save it from itself and to save us from them. Gordon was by no means great chancellor but he wasn't totally to blame. That said, I believe that he should take a large chunk of the blame for the UK financial crisis which meant that he then had to raid UK pension schemes for a partial bail-out.

Let it be said that I have no love for Brown
I do like following politics and economics from a purely 'amateur on the sidelines' point of view and I always recommend peopel watch The Big Short if they want an easy to digest overview of what led up to the events of 2008.


Weirdly I quit my job and started my own company in 2009 and did very well.
 
Last edited:

Latest Threads

Top