Most Ugly Aircraft

These damn things are programmed to fly on into 2040....next time POTUS wants to send someone a signal that they really mean business, SAC will show up.

Given the fact that the Russians and their clients around the world have been able to shoot them down for the last fifty years it's a pretty remarkable survival.
Well we could argue about ECM fits.. agility...survivability and all..

but:



That's a frickin lot of hammer to be arriving all at once....
 

Goatman

ADC
Book Reviewer
The B-52 Stratofortress first flew in 1952 and ended its production run in 1962, so the 76 B-52Hs in Air Force service are older than nearly anyone flying them. Trump is literally accurate in stating that “your grandfather” may have flown the plane, in that there is at least one family with three generations of B-52 crew members

Interesting stuff - it's still a BUFF :)
 

Fang_Farrier

LE
Kit Reviewer
Book Reviewer
There's a good story behind that shot - what is it?

I'm guessing it is one of the 17 B-52s that got whacked by NVA Sam SA-2/SA-75 's ?

By the conclusion of the Linebacker II campaign, the shootdown rate of the S-75 against the B-52s was 7.52% (15 B-52s were shot down, 5 B-52s were heavily damaged for 266 missile[14]).
Was bomber command's losses not around 5% per raid?
 
Was bomber command's losses not around 5% per raid?

At a quick look:

8325 Aircraft failed to return from 364,514 sorties for an overall loss rate of 2.28%

worst loss rate on a large raid was the Nuremburg Attack 30/31 March 1944 with 96 aircraft failing to return and another 10 written off after landing from 795 sorties. loss rate of 13.3% More aircrew killed (545) than Fighter command losses in the Battle of Britain (537).

Lowest loss rates were with the Mosquito 193 FTR from 28,000 sorties i.e 0.7 % loss rate.
 
Was bomber command's losses not around 5% per raid?
RAF studies suggested that loss rates of 5% over a period of 3 months reduced the effectiveness of a bomber force to unacceptable levels, whilst losses of 7% made a force ineffective. However, the actual stats varied enormously between the period of the War, types involved and a number of other factors such as weather, EW systems available and target.

For instance, the introduction of WINDOW over Hamburg on 25 Jul 43 saw losses fall to 1.5% from the 7.2% sustained during a comparable raid almost exactly 12 months earlier. However, subsequent raids over the city saw losses rise to 2.2%, 3.6% and 4.1% as the Luftwaffe worked out how to reduce the impact of jamming.

Over the long winter of 43/44, 8.7% failed to return from Berlin on 2/3 Dec 43 and 8.8% of bombers were lost during a raid on Magdeburg on 21/22 Janu 44. However, of this latter figure, 15.6% of the Halifax force employed was destroyed, while Mosquito losses remained well below 1% (as they did until the Me262 nightfighter was introduced in 1945).

In contrast, on 24/25 March 1944 extremely strong winds dispersed both Window and the bomber stream itself. Without their usual Window and other EW protection, 50 of the 72 bombers lost that night were attributed to radar guided Flak. The success of diversionary raids was also important. Ignoring diversionary mine-laying operations in the Heligoland area, the Luftwaffe took advantage of a clear night and enemy contrails to destroy 95 out of 795 bombers targeting Nuremburg on 30/31 Mar 44. This 11.9% attrition was the single highest loss for Bomber Command during the entire war.

Regards,
MM
 
Surely any plane flown by an RAF Pilot......:eek:
 
I winced just reading that. I bet there were some bloody quiet crew rooms after that. Respect to all.

C_C

This is a famous picture of 51 Sqn aircrew being briefed in the Operations Room at RAF Snaith, Yorkshire on 30 Mar 44 by Sqn Ldr Peter Hill prior to the infamous Nuremberg raid.

That night, 35 of the men in this picture died (including Sqn Ldr Hill) and a further 7 became PoWs when 6 Halifax bombers of 51 Sqn were lost.

RIP.

Regards,
MM
 

Maalox

On ROPS
On ROPs
The loss to the British nation's gene pool was incalculable. It had barely started to recover from the loss of 1 million of the cream of its manhood in WW1, when once again its healthiest, best looking, bravest and most intelligent, the 55,000 slain of Bomber Command, were scythed down:

"The Germans started WW1. The Germans started WWII. Mark my words: the Germans are going to start WWIII!" (British astronomer Sir Patrick Moore, 2012, himself of Bomber Command, below)



 
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Fang_Farrier

LE
Kit Reviewer
Book Reviewer
RAF studies suggested that loss rates of 5% over a period of 3 months reduced the effectiveness of a bomber force to unacceptable levels, whilst losses of 7% made a force ineffective. However, the actual stats varied enormously between the period of the War, types involved and a number of other factors such as weather, EW systems available and target.

For instance, the introduction of WINDOW over Hamburg on 25 Jul 43 saw losses fall to 1.5% from the 7.2% sustained during a comparable raid almost exactly 12 months earlier. However, subsequent raids over the city saw losses rise to 2.2%, 3.6% and 4.1% as the Luftwaffe worked out how to reduce the impact of jamming.

Over the long winter of 43/44, 8.7% failed to return from Berlin on 2/3 Dec 43 and 8.8% of bombers were lost during a raid on Magdeburg on 21/22 Janu 44. However, of this latter figure, 15.6% of the Halifax force employed was destroyed, while Mosquito losses remained well below 1% (as they did until the Me262 nightfighter was introduced in 1945).

In contrast, on 24/25 March 1944 extremely strong winds dispersed both Window and the bomber stream itself. Without their usual Window and other EW protection, 50 of the 72 bombers lost that night were attributed to radar guided Flak. The success of diversionary raids was also important. Ignoring diversionary mine-laying operations in the Heligoland area, the Luftwaffe took advantage of a clear night and enemy contrails to destroy 95 out of 795 bombers targeting Nuremburg on 30/31 Mar 44. This 11.9% attrition was the single highest loss for Bomber Command during the entire war.

Regards,
MM
IIRC it was statistically highly improbable, if not impossible, that one would survive a Tour of 30 Ops.

And yet we had multitude of aircrew who did just that. Went off to be instructors for a while and then returned for a second tour.
And possible a 3rd.

Leonard Cheshire for instance had 2 tours under his belt by May 1942! Finished the war with 103 ops, not sure if his was the highest.
 
IIRC it was statistically highly improbable, if not impossible, that one would survive a Tour of 30 Ops.

And yet we had multitude of aircrew who did just that. Went off to be instructors for a while and then returned for a second tour.
And possible a 3rd.

Leonard Cheshire for instance had 2 tours under his belt by May 1942! Finished the war with 103 ops, not sure if his was the highest.
...which tells you that a large number of men were killed in no time at all (i.e. on their first missions and so on).
 
Most of the ugly aircraft here were failures. Not many crews had the ordeal of a night run to Berlin in them. Most went in Lancasters, Halifax's and Stirlings. All state of the art at the time (yes I know the Stirling and Halifax failings)and indeed beautiful aircraft. At twenty years old I would probably gone but now in my fifties I doubt if I could order twenty year olds to go.
 

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