I presume the plan was to deploy it in the North Atlantic then?
George or not, would you like to spend 36 hours in the pilots seat? and then flying back for a landing? and if it's carrying fuel for 36 hours, it's probably unable to carry any meaningful warload for dealing with U-boats.
Airborne radar as well.It probably didnt need to - the presence of an aircraft is going to force them to remain submerged - thats going to stop them surfacing and racing to an intercept point / chasing to close up for another attack at night.
You may not be sinking Uboats - but denying them oppertunity to attack is probably 90% as good.
Even if you know 30% of aircraft cant shoot at you and no Wellesleys can
1) All have radios and so theres possibly a hunter group being vectored in
2) How much faith are you going to put in your observers aircraft recognition skills - to determine if its an unarmed type.
IIRC the value of the Swordfish on the escort carriers / converted merchantmen wasnt their ability to attack Uboats but in forcing them to stay submerged and reporting sightings allowing the convoy to avoid them.
which was one of the reasons the Snorkel was developed. A U-boat just under the surface could charge it's batteries and make 6 knots. Not much but enough to creep away unseen. One U-boat skipper stated that if he saw an aircraft, he immediately turned West, as, in the days of the "Atlantic Gap", he knew that if he headed West, the aircraft would be reluctant to follow. He could always pick up his original course later. This advantage evaporated when longer ranged aircraft came into service and closed the gap and better ASV radar was able to pick out a U-boat conning tower at night and even an extended Snorkel.
Another POW caused further chaos by claiming that Coastal Command planes could 'home in' on emissions from Metox.They had the Metox radar detector but they also made the constant mistake of talking or transmitting on their radios to other boats and to home. Allied ships and aircraft were able to home in on their transmissions and sink them, or at least force them to dive. In one sequence of attacks, Allied aircraft and ships sank all but one of a wolf pack and that one survived because it turned out that his transmitter was broken and he had been assumed by his base to be sunk. He sailed for home and managed to repair his transmitter when he got nearer base and made contact. When they analysed the losses, the Germans figured out that transmitting was getting people killed, but some people refused to believe that the enemy aircraft could find the U-boats purely by tracking their transmissions, until a PoW was heard talking about "Huff-Duff" and a signals guy twigged what it meant, so random transmitting was clamped down upon and signallers were warned to not to be so voluble when in contact. I've always been of the opinion that the different Services in Germany were not sharing technology or information as well as they should have, as the Luftwaffe were able to intercept the Allied bombers by night by homing in on H2S. If the U-boat arm had been able to do that, they'd surely have been more aware of Allied ships and aircraft instead of wandering about looking for targets.