Most Pakistanis View U.S. as Enemy

On Bloomberg Most Pakistanis View U.S. as Enemy, Want War Over, Survey Finds By Nicole Gaouette
July 29 (Bloomberg) -- Two-thirds of Pakistanis oppose the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan and roughly six in 10 think the U.S. is an enemy, according to a new survey.

The data, released today by the nonpartisan Pew Research Center in Washington, underscores the challenges facing the Obama administration, which has made Pakistan a key ally in its fight to rout Afghanistan-based Taliban and al-Qaeda militants.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Pakistan this month to announce aid of $1.5 billion a year for five years that is meant to build Pakistani support for the U.S. war strategy. By the end of fiscal 2010, the U.S. will have given Pakistan about $6 billion in development and humanitarian aid since 2001, according to the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service.

“You cannot succeed in Afghanistan without Pakistan’s involvement,” Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan told senators who question the level and effectiveness of that aid on July 13. “There’s a direct correlation between Afghanistan, Pakistan and our homeland security.”

The Pew survey found that only 11 percent of Pakistanis see the U.S. as a partner and just 8 percent have confidence that President Barack Obama will make good decisions on global affairs.

Resisting Terrorists

Clinton said June 25 that the U.S. is determined to “strengthen Afghanistan and Pakistan to be able to withstand the pressures from these extremist terrorist networks.”

Yet the percentage of Pakistanis who support U.S. involvement in the fight against extremists has dropped to 19 percent this year from 24 percent in 2009.

And fewer Pakistanis see the militants as a threat. In 2009, 57 percent of Pakistanis saw the Taliban as a “very serious threat” to their country. This year, the number fell to 34 percent. Last year, 41 percent said al-Qaeda posed a very serious threat to Pakistan. This year, 21 percent of respondents felt that way.

In contrast, 52 percent said India posed the greatest threat to their country.

“Pakistan has a long history of feeling like the U.S. has abandoned it, favored India, has not been a consistent ally,” said Anthony Cordesman, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a nonpartisan research group in Washington.

“Many Pakistanis associate the violence in Pakistan with the U.S. presence and the Afghan war,” Cordesman said. Those attitudes are reinforced by nationalistic media and hard-line religious groups and because Pakistanis have yet to feel the effects of U.S. aid, Cordesman said.

‘Legacy of Suspicion’

Clinton, during her visit to Pakistan, acknowledged a “legacy of suspicion” among Pakistanis. It is “not going to disappear overnight,” she said.

The U.S. is “committed for the long haul” to working with Pakistanis “as you pursue this very difficult struggle,” she said July 19 after talks with Pakistani officials.

The Pakistani survey is part of the larger Pew Global Attitudes project conducted in 22 nations.

Pew said its survey was based on face-to-face interviews with 2,000 Pakistanis conducted from April 13 to April 28 in all four provinces of the country. Areas of instability, accounting for roughly 16 percent of the population, were not polled. The margin of error was plus or minus three percentage points.

The falling concerns about the talibans are telling. This at a time when we've had a great deal of attacks within Pakistan and signs of splits with in the Pak military. Barry's Drone war infuriates the Punjab more than FATA where it takes place. This is a country that's shifting in a dark direction towards the loony bearded right that Pindi has always backed.
I would have thought Bloomberg would be rather more even-handed in their reporting. They paint a very negative picture, whereas the full results have a great deal more positives from our point of view.


Pew Global Attitudes Project said:
More than four-in-ten Pakistanis see a struggle taking place between Islamic fundamentalists and groups that want to modernize the country; and the vast majority of those who do see a struggle identify with the modernizers.
I'd also disagree with your interpretation of the last of the graphs - that they are less worried is likely to be linked to the fact that the Taliban have been pushed back over the last 18 months rather than an indication of support. There were some very sweaty brows in Islamabad in early 2009 when it looked like the Taliban would soon be at the gate, but that isn't the case now.
Since the survey sample is "disproportionately urban" and urbanites are least supportive of the Islamists, I'd agree PP.
I would have thought Bloomberg would be rather more even-handed in their reporting. They paint a very negative picture, whereas the full results have a great deal more positives from our point of view.
I said "shifting", read the whole report, support for the religious parties in Pakistan has always been low, it would be almost extinct without the Pak Army vigorous support for the hard right. The chapter on society has this:
A majority (61%) of Muslims who say there is a struggle between those who want to modernize Pakistan and Islamic fundamentalists also say they identify with the modernizers. Still, fewer say that is the case than did so a year ago, when 73% of those who saw a struggle said they sided with the modernizers. The drop in the percentage identifying with groups who want to modernize Pakistan is especially notable among men in that country. In 2009, nearly eight-in-ten (78%) Muslim men who saw a struggle said they identified with the modernizers, compared with 56% who say the same today. By comparison, the percentage of women who see a struggle and identify with the modernizers is virtually unchanged from last year (67% in 2009 vs. 68% today).
That's a 22 point shift amongst men.

These are worryingly high numbers in the Punjab, more than one in four are favorable to AQ who started to brief against Pindi this year:
Consistently, militant groups receive more positive ratings in Punjab than in other regions. While 27% in Punjab offer a favorable opinion of al Qaeda and 22% express a favorable view of the Taliban, support for these groups is only in the single digits in Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Baluchistan. Lashkar-e-Taiba also gets its most positive ratings in Punjab, where equal numbers express a positive (34%) and negative (34%) view of the organization.

Militant organizations also receive somewhat more positive assessments from lower-income respondents.[2] For instance, 26% of those with low household incomes have a favorable view of the Taliban, compared with 13% of middle income respondents and 10% of those with higher incomes. Views of al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, TTP, and the Afghan Taliban are also generally more positive among the lower-income group.
It's in the Punjab that the talibans have been trying there best to start a class/sectarian war lately. I don't like the look of it at all. These are levels of support comparable with what PIRA's armed campaign had from its host population.

You are right though there are many positives in this report, support for suicide bombing has totally evaporated for instance:
I'd also disagree with your interpretation of the last of the graphs - that they are less worried is likely to be linked to the fact that the Taliban have been pushed back over the last 18 months rather than an indication of support. There were some very sweaty brows in Islamabad in early 2009 when it looked like the Taliban would soon be at the gate, but that isn't the case now.
Fair point. The take over of Swat just up the road from Islamabad probably was more terrifying than the brutal terrorist war we now have in Pakistan's cities.
In FP Pakistan in polling vs. Pakistan in practice by Kalsoom Lakhani
Yesterday, the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, which conducts public opinion surveys around the world, released a new poll on Pakistani perceptions based on face-to-face interviews conducted from April 13 to April 28, 2010. However, the sample size is relatively small -- 2,000 Pakistani adults out of a population of 180 million -- and admittedly "disproportionately urban." Moreover, while Pew polled people in Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (formerly NWFP), portions of Balochistan and K-P were not included because of instability. Pakistan's tribal areas (FATA), Gilgit-Baltistan, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir were also not included in the survey, leading me to question how reflective Pew's poll results are of Pakistan's entire population.

The results were, for the most part, unsurprising, and paint a grim picture of Pakistani attitudes in the wake of militancy, military operations, a worsening economy, and political instability. For example, an overwhelming number of Pakistanis polled continue to have a negative view of the United States (68 percent), and a majority of Pakistanis (53 percent) see India as the greatest threat to the country, over the Taliban (23 percent) and al-Qaeda (3 percent). Much like last year's Pew survey, the majority of Pakistanis polled say they are dissatisfied with the way things are going in the country, citing terrorism, crime, and a lack of jobs as very big issues.

Some of the most interesting results relate to attitudes toward religion, law, and society. According to the findings, "Pakistani Muslims overwhelmingly welcome Islamic influence over their country's politics. Nearly nine-in-ten (88 percent) of those who see Islam playing a large role say that is a good thing." Moreover, many Muslims in Pakistan say there is a struggle between groups that want to modernize their country and Islamic fundamentalists (44 percent), and of those who see a struggle, most identify with the modernizers (61 percent). At the same time though, a solid majority of Pakistanis polled said they would favor making gender segregation in the workplace a law in the country (85 percent), as well as punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery (82 percent), and stoning people who commit adultery (82 percent).

So what explains this obvious paradox between people who side with modernization but simultaneously support punishments like stoning and flogging? According to Peter Mandaville, professor of Government and Islamic Studies at George Mason University and author of Global Political Islam, this reflects "a mistaken tendency to conflate modernization with the adoption of liberal social and religious values. When many Pakistanis think of "modernizing" their country, they think primarily in terms of economic development and technology -- both of which can comfortably coexist alongside conservative religious attitudes."

Although Pakistan has drifted right of center over the last three decades, the aforementioned findings seem to be contradicted by the reality on the ground. Cyril Almeida, an assistant editor and columnist at Dawn, noted that though Pakistani Muslims overwhelmingly welcome an Islamic influence over the country's politics, citizens continue to "consistently reject religious parties at the polls." The alliance of Islamist parties in Pakistan, the MMA, was trounced at the 2008 polls, managing to win only a miserable 2.2 percent of the vote. Moreover, a rise in public opinion against militancy in 2008 was in part due to a video showing the Taliban flogging a girl in Swat Valley, images that generated outrage in Pakistan. Almeida emphasized, "Pakistanis have certain fairly rigid conceptions of what is religiously permissible and what isn't. This isn't to say they will always do what they believe is required of them -- but when a survey puts certain questions, they're more likely to respond to what ought to be than what they do."

The framing of survey questions can help explain contradictory quantitative data. In the case of the results generated in Pew's Religion, Law, and Society section of the survey, respondents were asked black-and-white questions, like, "Do you favor or oppose making stoning people who commit adultery the law in Pakistan?" According to Moeed Yusuf, a South Asia Advisor at the U.S. Institute of Peace, much of the so-called "Muslim World" find it difficult to go against anything seen as ordained by Islam. He added, "At an abstract level, Islam remains important to even the most secular of Muslims -- remember Islam is very candid about state and religion being an integrated whole (at least in the classic narrative) and so such questions would elicit such responses."

When faced with a choice between what they are supposed to say and what they actually practice, respondents tend to match abstract questions with equally abstract answers. However, Yusuf noted, "Do they want to be flogged or stoned for the same sin? No way. What about their own family members? Most probably not."

But issues related to such punishments continue unabated in Pakistan (Just last week, media outlets reported that a couple was sentenced to stoning to death for alleged adultery in a tribal court in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa). This suggests that quantitative data cannot capture the nuances and complexities of identity and society. In the case of the Pew opinion survey, the data provides an important snapshot of some Pakistani attitudes, but it is by no means the whole picture.

Kalsoom Lakhani is director of Social Vision, the strategic philanthropy arm of ML Resources in Washington, D.C. She is from Islamabad, Pakistan, and blogs at CHUP, or Changing Up Pakistan.
In FP Pakistan's Game
Of all the players in the Afghan game, Pakistan is running up the highest score. For several decades, Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan has remained largely unchanged, regardless of who was running the country. That policy is to support Afghanistan's Pashtuns in their seemingly genetic resistance to outside control (outside in this case extends to any government located in Kabul). By supporting Pashtun autonomy, Pakistan establishes for itself a security buffer zone on its northwest frontier, which comes with a friendly auxiliary army -- the Afghan Taliban -- as a bonus.

For nearly nine years, U.S. officials have pleaded with Pakistan to suspend support for the Afghan Taliban and allow Afghanistan to unite under a central government. Pakistani officials have provided a variety of verbal responses to these entreaties but have not changed their policies toward the Afghan Taliban, whose military capability inside Afghanistan only seems to grow.

The United States cannot achieve its goals in Afghanistan while the Afghan Taliban's sanctuaries in Pakistan remain open. The Pakistani government refuses to close or even isolate those sanctuaries. Yet the massive U.S. foreign-assistance pipeline to Pakistan remains open. Why?

U.S. policymakers have seemingly concluded that they have more options and less risk by engaging Pakistan. They tried isolating Pakistan and found that course was neither wise nor sustainable. As a result, the Washington has opted to shower Pakistan with aid and hope that persistent persuasion will eventually result in greater Pakistani action against the Afghan Taliban.

The result has been a spectacular strategic success for Pakistan. Development aid from the United States has never been greater. The United States will deliver long-embargoed F-16 fighters to Pakistan and is providing other upgrades to Pakistan's armed forces. Along with this has come a de facto U.S. security guarantee against the perceived threat from India. Pakistan's diplomatic leverage over the United States has given it a free hand to work with China to upgrade its nuclear complex. Meanwhile, Pakistan's proxy forces in southeast Afghanistan are successfully defending the security buffer zone. Pakistan's dominant position has forced Afghan President Hamid Karzai to virtually sue for peace. This could result in an ethnic partition of Afghanistan that would secure Pakistan's main objective in the conflict.

With its winning position, Pakistan's current task is to arrange a stable end-state that avoids a backlash from the losers. Pakistan and the United States are in a largely zero-sum relationship over Afghanistan. Pakistan's leaders must fashion a settlement (however temporary) that allows the United States to save face, that maintains the U.S. aid pipeline, and that keeps the de facto security guarantee in place. U.S. officials should hope that Pakistan manages the endgame as well as it has managed the rest of the match.
In FP With Friends Like These... by Sumit Ganguly,
It’s time to wake up, Washington. Pakistan’s military is running the show in Islamabad, and the WikiLeaks revelations have only confirmed that supporting jihadi terrorist groups aren’t the actions of a few, rogue generals -- it’s government strategy.

Until recently, the relationship between Islamabad and New Delhi seemed to be going relatively well. Tempers had calmed in the wake of the November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, substantive discussions at the bureaucratic level were well under way, and the highest levels of government had given their blessing to joint diplomatic talks held on July 16. But things have turned sour -- as they often do on the subcontinent -- with a remarkable quickness.

Two seemingly unrelated events of the past two weeks have illustrated a fundamental problem with the nature of the Indo-Pakistani relationship. The first was the breakdown of the talks in Islamabad. At their press conference following the closed-door meeting, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi excoriated the Indian home secretary for publicly announcing that David Coleman Headley, a Pakistani-American charged with involvement in the Mumbai attacks, had worked closely with Pakistani intelligence. The outburst brought an acrimonious end to the carefully planned talks.

The second was the decision of three news organizations to simultaneously publish significant excerpts from a trove of classified documents made available by WikiLeaks, the self-described global whistleblower website. The documents alleged that over the past several years, despite public professions of close cooperation with the United States on the antiterrorism front, Pakistan's powerful Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate had actually abetted and aided the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Afghan insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Beyond these startling revelations, the documents also charged that the ISI had provided information to insurgents about U.S. troop movements, their likely operations, and military capabilities.

Both developments highlight the disturbing dominance of Pakistan's permanent military establishment and their ongoing ties to jihadi groups. Even though a civilian regime assumed office in Pakistan in September 2008, the country's military has experienced little or no change. Gen. Pervez Musharraf's hand-picked successor, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, though nominally subservient to the civilian regime, remains primus inter pares. And the security establishment that he presides over has not lost sight of its two cardinal and related principles: unremitting hostility toward India and the need for a pliable regime in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's military has long cultivated ties with a host of religious militants, but the notion that it might be convinced to abandon its use of asymmetric war strategies in Afghanistan and Indian-controlled Kashmir seems increasingly unlikely. Contrary to popular belief, the security establishment's links with these groups is not of recent vintage. Pakistan has used jihadi proxies to varying effect against India since the first war following partition in 1947. They were also the basis for another assault against India in 1965.

Of course, the use of jihadis reached its peak under the leadership of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. After the Soviets departed, the ISI played a decisive role in the Afghan civil war that brought the Taliban to power. By installing that regime in Kabul, Pakistan's security establishment realized its long-sought goal of "strategic depth" against India.

Meanwhile, thanks to India's ineptitude in the handling of political demands in its Muslim-majority state of Kashmir, an insurgency there erupted in 1989. Almost immediately, the Pakistani security establishment sent in its militant surrogates, transforming a domestic rebellion into a well-funded, externally supported, and religiously oriented extortion racket.

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, General Musharraf was coerced by the United States to cut his ties to the Taliban and a plethora of other jihadi organizations. Musharraf, however, didn't want to lose Pakistan's strategic assets in Afghanistan and Kashmir. So even as he delivered a handful of key al Qaeda leaders including Abu Farraj al-Libi, reputedly the group's third in command, he did little or nothing to curb the activities of other jihadi organizations, most notably Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, two of the largest and most active Islamist terrorist organizations in South Asia. Instead, they were allowed to operate with considerable impunity from a number of encampments within Pakistan.

Even in the wake of the Lashkar-organized Mumbai attacks, the Pakistani security establishment chose to coddle its leader, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed. Under substantial American and Indian pressure, he was briefly placed under house arrest. Shortly thereafter, though, two Pakistani courts declared that there was insufficient evidence linking him to the Mumbai attacks and he was allowed free to resume peddling venomous anti-Indian and anti-Jewish propaganda.

Just weeks before the WikiLeaks episode, stories had started to surface in the American press about Lashkar attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan. Fearful that growing evidence of the group's involvement in Afghanistan could hurt relations with Pakistan, the Pentagon chose to play down the significance of the attacks. But in the aftermath of the WikiLeaks allegations, it is hard to see how these concerns can now be swept under a rug.

The American and the Pakistani political establishments are now scrambling to contain the diplomatic damage from this week's revelations -- stressing that the evidence is dated and that U.S. policy and Pakistani behavior have changed significantly since the Obama administration entered office.

Don't bet on it. In its quest to establish a firm political foothold in Afghanistan after the American military drawdown in July 2011, Pakistan's security establishment will soon insist that Hamid Karzai's government in Kabul make peace with two of its most reliable proxies, the forces loyal to Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Taliban network of Sirajuddin Haqqani. Not only will Pakistan have managed to reinstall a pliant regime in Afghanistan, but will also have dramatically limited what Islamabad sees as a dagger pointed at its heart -- India's growing influence to the northwest.

Simply put, the military establishment simply does not want peace with India. Meaningful progress on contentious bilateral issues would inevitably call into question its extraordinary privileges and its lavish existence. Likewise, it has little or no interest in full-fledged counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. A swift and decisive end to the swarm of jihadis operating within Pakistan and along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border would mean an end to the seemingly unending flow of American largesse. The time has now arrived for the Obama administration to undertake a policy review that explores alternative logistics supply routes into Afghanistan and one that will lower the boom on Pakistan -- unless it shows tangible and immediate progress on the counterterrorism cooperation front. A policy that falls short on these two counts is an invitation for the continued loss of blood and treasure to no viable end.
Back in the day Hekmatyar was Pindi's man but lately he seems to have gone off reservation and has been making independent approaches to Karzai.
I view Pakistan as the enemy.

Maybe I'm just overly suspicious, but I find it notable that nearly all the johhnies that keep blowing themselves up in the UK or get caught trying to do same seem to have a rather large tendency to be Pakistanis.
I hail from the North West. There are a lot of Pakistanis there. Many of the new generation openly state they hate the west - even though they are unable to state exactly why. It's fashionable for them I think.
They would gain kudos amongst their peers for desecrating any symbol of western power.

Anybody disagree with me then try taking a walk down a few areas of Burnley or Nelson.

They don't know why the hate us - from what I gather its just fashionable and an easy way to be seen as "more islamic" - which is fashionable also. If you ask them you get a stock answer about Iraq, Afghan, Israel etc. Dig a little further and ask why then they are unable to answer.
The older generation are more wise and genarally OK.
I hail from the North West. There are a lot of Pakistanis there. Many of the new generation openly state they hate the west - even though they are unable to state exactly why. It's fashionable for them I think.
They would gain kudos amongst their peers for desecrating any symbol of western power.

Anybody disagree with me then try taking a walk down a few areas of Burnley or Nelson.

They don't know why the hate us - from what I gather its just fashionable and an easy way to be seen as "more islamic" - which is fashionable also. If you ask them you get a stock answer about Iraq, Afghan, Israel etc. Dig a little further and ask why then they are unable to answer.
The older generation are more wise and genarally OK.

Oderint Dum Metuant

Lucuis Accius. 170-86 BC
On Jamestown Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Growing International Focus and Its Links with al-Qaeda By: Peter Chalk
Other jihadis allegedly trained by the LeT include Australian David Hicks, who was held in Guantanamo Bay until 2007; Omar Khayyam, who spearheaded a 2004 fertilizer bomb plot in the UK; Dhiren Barot, who masterminded a 2004 failed gas cylinder bombing plot in London and David Headley, who conducted surveillance for the Mumbai attacks and was also apparently dispatched to murder the chief editor and cartoonist for the Danish newspaper Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten (which in 2005 published depictions of the Prophet Muhammad that many Muslims found highly offensive) (, December 10, 2008; Guardian, November 7, 2006). [10] All of these cases have been taken as evidence that the LeT is now at the forefront of indoctrinating, training and deploying militants with so-called “clean skins” to carry out terrorist attacks in the West and/or their country of origin.

Apart from inspiring and inculcating would-be jihadists around the world, the LeT has been implicated in attacks that strongly suggest an extension of its operational and ideological focus. On March 2, 2009, members of the Sri Lankan cricket team, together with officials, umpires and their police escort, were viciously attacked in Lahore, leaving eight dead (The News [Islamabad], March 3). Speculation is rife that the commando-style operation was the work of the LeT, which if confirmed would be the first time that the group carried out a dedicated attack on Pakistani soil (Times of India, March 6, 2009). U.S. officials have periodically claimed that the LeT has been instrumental in recruiting Islamists to fight against allied troops in Iraq, while in 2008 a Pentagon report to Congress claimed that the group is now active in six to eight provinces of Afghanistan – a significant leap from hardly any presence five years ago (Kashmir Herald, May 2004). [11] The LeT has also been directly tied to the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, which, although clearly aimed at India, involved venues that appear to have been deliberately chosen on account of their affiliation with American, European and Israeli interests. Notably, these included the Taj and Oberoi hotels (luxury five star facilities that specifically cater for wealthy international visitors) and the Chabad House (a Jewish cultural center). Finally in November 2009 four suspected LeT operatives were arrested in Bangladesh for plotting to lead a fidayeen assault against the Indian and United States diplomatic missions in Dhaka, reputedly to coincide with the anniversary of 2008’s attacks in Mumbai (Press Trust of India News, November 6, 2009; The Hindu, November 25, 2009;, December 2, 2009). The suspected LeT operatives were Tadiyantavide Nasir (the alleged fidayeen commander and mastermind behind a string of blasts in Banglaore during July 2008 ), Mohammad Munwar, Mohammad Ashraf Ali Zahid and Syed Abdul Qayyum. According to Indian intelligence sources, funds for the attack were dispatched by Abdul Reham Saaed, a Pakistani-based Lashkar commander responsible for managing the group’s networks in Bangladesh.


Currently there is no definitive evidence of an established logistical or operational link between LeT and al-Qaeda. However, the existence of at least residual ties cannot be discounted. LeT’s ideological focus has certainly taken on a much more explicit anti-Western tenor in recent years, reflecting aspirations that, at least rhetorically, closely accord with the aims of the broader al-Qaeda jihadist network. Although the LeT has always promoted an international agenda (promising, for instance, to plant the Islamic flag in the capitals of the United States, Russia and Israel), it has mostly focused its activities on local and regional theaters. Today, there is as much emphasis given to fighting Washington and allied governments supportive of the global war on terror as on staging attacks in India and J&K. [12] This shift in focus is arguably supported by LeT’s alleged involvement in the aforementioned attacks and other plots in the UK, Australia and Bangladesh.

That said, the LeT has always been one of the more disciplined Kashmiri militant groups and there is presently little evidence to suggest that it is suffering from the type of anti-Pakistani splintering that has befallen groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HuM). While the group may well have had contact with al-Qaeda and possibly assisted the movement in Pakistan, it almost certainly continues to view itself as its own organization rather than an al-Qaeda affiliate. Moreover, investigations undertaken in the wake of the 2008 assaults in Mumbai also seem to suggest that LeT remains close to Pakistan and its ISI “parent,” which would cast doubt that it would actively engage in actions likely to directly threaten or bring added pressure on Islamabad – such as formalizing a working relationship with al-Qaeda.
I'd not fixate any LeT-AQ connection. The 'Army of the Pure' is ISI trained, Saudi funded. Their Punjabi HQ is in Muridke near Lahore. The Pew survey notes their relative popularity with its small urban sample of Pakistanis. Once focused on Kashmir they've bought the "Far Enemy" concept and now have international ambitions. LeT are probably a much bigger threat to Europe's cities than AQ.
I do enjoy irony:

US announces $10 Million for flood relief assistance
ISLAMABAD, Aug 1 (APP): The U.S. Sunday announced that it would make an initial contribution of $10 million in humanitarian assistance to Pakistan flood relief based on priorities identified by the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and is prepared to earmark additional funds for the effort, if requested. According to US Embassy, early on Sunday, U.S. air crew aboard a U.S. Air Force C-130 and a C-17 transport aircraft flew into Chaklala and delivered about 50,000 halal meals, in support of an NDMA request.

Approximately 62,000 more halal meals from U.S. supply depots in the region are scheduled for delivery to Pakistan later today via U.S. airlift, with more coming over the next few days.
U.S. assistance to Pakistan’s flood relief efforts have also included four Zodiac inflatable rescue boats, two water filtration units, and 12 pre-fabricated steel bridges that can temporarily replace highway bridges damaged by flooding in Peshawar and Kurram Agency.
In addition, U.S provided helicopters continue to support the Ministry of Interior’s rescue operations.
The MOI 50th Squadron has been able to rescue more than 550 people isolated by the flood waters including people in need of urgent medical care. Food and water also has been ferried to people still not able to leave the flood areas.
Additional assistance will be provided based on the Government of Pakistan’s assessments of humanitarian needs, said the US embassy.
I do enjoy irony:[/FONT]

It was the same a few years ago when Britain was one of the first countries to send relief & teams to help after a major earthquake, the British Born extremists were still preaching hatred of the UK and trying to plant bombs! :-(
It was the same a few years ago when Britain was one of the first countries to send relief & teams to help after a major earthquake, the British Born extremists were still preaching hatred of the UK and trying to plant bombs! :-(
Of course to many here and abroad, that is our respect national lots in life--to redistribute our ill-gotten (except of course when accumulated by the elite in power that defines what is the acceptable way to do it) "wealth" to the needy around the world even when they hate us for doing it.
I know there is a humanitarian argument but at the moment I am stamping on its head with my size 11 Kicker moccasins. If they can afford a fecking nuclear programme and a massive conventional arsenal, then really, they should whistle if they get themselves hit by a natural disaster. Surely they should have resources to deal with this kind of thing?

Anyway, the above posters are correct, give them aid and your average Paki in the street (why calling someone PURE is racist escapes me, as that is what "Paki" means in their language, pure), will still hate us and see no problems at all with our fighting men and women getting killed cross the border in Afghanistan, and bombs going off in London et al.

Maybe I'm just overly suspicious, but I find it notable that nearly all the johhnies that keep blowing themselves up in the UK or get caught trying to do same seem to have a rather large tendency to be Pakistanis.
Yes, representatives of other Muslim communities are underrepresented in that occupation; but never mind, this initiative will help to redress the balance: "International Burn a Quran Day"
Church plans Quran-burning event -

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