MoD Ignored Warnings On Nimrod...

Discussion in 'Current Affairs, News and Analysis' started by Ritch, Dec 4, 2007.

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  1. Daily Telegraph

    MoD 'ignored' safety warnings over crash jet:-

    The Ministry of Defence ignored warnings from the RAF and the defence industry to fit extra safety systems to a Nimrod aircraft which later exploded, killing 14 servicemen, an official inquiry will disclose today.

    A long-awaited Board of Inquiry into the destruction of Flight XV230 in Afghanistan in September 2006 will put the Government under intense pressure over defence spending by highlighting the deteriorating condition of the ageing Nimrod spy planes.
     
  2. Comrade Brown will just say that 'lessons have to be learnt' and he now needs to 'steer the course' through these troubled times, whilst he has 'nothing but praise' for our armed forces...........cnut

    im not cynical!!!! :D
     
  3. No...not at all are you? :D
     
  4. One I haven't heard: "We have been spending the smallest percentage of our GDP on Defence since the 1930s." (And we all know what happened at the end of that decade, don't we children?)
     
  5. "However, key details of the tragedy may remain secret because the MoD will only publish an edited summary of the BOI's findings.

    Graham Knight, whose son Ben was killed in the Nimrod crash, said relatives of the crew had been told to expect only a "redacted summary".

    He said: "We've been told we're only getting 10 pages. It's not even a page for each man lost."


    So we must presume the full report is a real stinker. One of the posts on the Nimrod thread over at PPRuNe suggests one reason why:

    "The evidence is overwhelming that the MoD’s “robust airworthiness regulatory framework” isn’t actually implemented. Good processes and procedures, but then……… Part of this process is Risk Management. It’s treated the same way. You create a Risk Register, develop mitigation plans, but…….. The same attitude seeps throughout MoD. As long as you have a robust process, it’s tick tick tick in the box. There is absolutely nothing to gain from being able to actually implement the process, even if you are granted resources in the first place. Those who can do it are cast aside and are, in the words of one aircraft Director, “an embarrassment to the Department”.


    http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=274149&page=91
     
  6. And it looks very much like that poster on pprune was right. Unprecedented groveling from Browne won't, I hope, save his job.
     
  7. Not unlike the the guys running Pirbright ignoring warnings on leaky pipes transporting biohazardous material (thus causing the foot & mouth outbreak), the government apparatchiks ignoring warnings about Data Protection and thus losing personal data (again and again...), etc.

    What muppets running the show.
     
  8. Latest coverage here;

    http://news.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,70131-1295525,00.html

    By all accounts the most telling part of the entire statement in the House was;

    "failings for which the Ministry of Defence must take responsibility"

    This, by all accounts is an admission of mistakes and allows the door to open for litigation.

    Browne now wriggling out of showing responsibility by announcing a "review" of the Nimrod - 10 years overdue replacement - 40 incidents a year, its a bit fcuking late now isn't it.

    I hope the review that SoS Def (PT) has ordered, find that this government is culpable for the lack of safety improvements in the aircraft at the time of the reports and receive a jail term for this criminal act.

    Apologies to the gimp and anyone else it gave a heart attack to for resurrecting the original condolance thread
     
  9. Browne should be made to fly in Nimrod once a week, every week and see how it must feel for the brave lads who have to fly in it each day.
     
  10. All Ive heard today is people talking about

    a. how crap the Nimrod is and:

    b how crap the mainteinance of said Nimrod is.

    All I've got to say is:

    a. I've got a computer - it's crap at what it is doing now - but it's doing far more than it was built to do and:

    b. THE ROYAL AIR FORCE DOES NOT DO CRAP MAINTENANCE. Who is doing it???

    ps talk about No. 7 fuel tank and the hot air system is cheap - is that why the BBC can only find "library pictures"?

    pps does anyone have access to the Nimrod Vol/Topic 1 Aircraft Servicing Manual? specifically fuel and air system schematics?
     
  11. ugly

    ugly LE Moderator

    What worries me is the replacement for this a/c is late, what worries me more is that its another Nimrod! Why cant we buy a decent a/c off the shelf instead of squeezing more elint and comms into a 50 plus year old airframe.
    Yes I know I'm no flyboy but if they were keen to slag off the A10 as on old A/C and not fit for use then why arent they speaking up about this old crate?
     
  12. EVEN MORE SCARY - It's not ANOTHER Nimrod - it's the SAME Nimrod cut to pieces and some new bits nailed on - the main bit left is the fuselage INCUDING the Air-to Air Refueling Probe, pipework and the weapons bay.

    Forgive me if' I'm wrong, but weren't all three of them cited in the XV230 "Accident" Report?

    Check out this Google Image link:

    http://www.spyflight.co.uk/images/JPGS%5Cbae%20nimrod%20mk4%5Cnimrod-jan-d8.jpg
     
  13. The BOI put forward 33 recommendations most of which are being put into place, for better or worse. But you cannot get away from a recurring theme:


    RECOMMENDATION 5. A life for the FRS4 Series 1 fuel seal be determined, based on the designer’s recommendation that fitted seals are replaced after 25 years.

    Response: The recommendation that FRS fuel seals be given a specific life has not been accepted because experts advise the life of seals will vary considerably, according to the conditions of their installation in the aircraft. Further studies have yet to identify any predictable ageing mechanism and it has therefore been impossible to define a common finite life to the 400 plus seals fitted to the Nimrod aircraft. Experience shows that replacing fuel seals may actually introduce more problems than it solves, thereby having a detrimental effect on safety.


    Translation. Thanks to the long running Nimrod replacement fiasco and general funding issues we have no option but to continue to fly aircraft for excessive hours that are way too old even though the fuel seals are breaking down and trying to fix them will knacker everything

    RECOMMENDATION 6 A maximum installed life for fuel seals of other material types is determined.

    Response: This recommendation is under consideration. A review is being conducted to determine whether the regulations for the lifing of seals are adequate.


    Translation. Thanks to the long running Nimrod replacement fiasco and general funding issues we have no option but to continue to fly aircraft for excessive hours that are way too old even though these seals might also be in danger of breaking down

    RECOMMENDATION 23 The drainage of the lower panel in the No 7 tank dry bay be improved to prevent any accumulation of fuel.

    Response: The feasibility of the recommendation is being examined and a technical proposal on how this could be implemented has been requested. In the meantime the likelihood of a hazard arising from fuel pooling in this area has been significantly reduced by suspending the use of the Supplementary Conditioning Pack and Cross-feed pipe system and introducing the enhanced inspection regime
    .

    Translation: Thanks to the long running Nimrod replacement fiasco and general funding issues we have no option but to continue to fly aircraft for excessive hours that are way too old even though they will continue to leak. We are still trying to work out how to drain the leaking fuel but in the meantime not to worry because we will no longer be running the system that feeds hot air at 400C through badly insulated pipes near said leaked fuel.

    RECOMMENDATION 29: Body bag fluid proof liners should be stored within the outer ruggedised bags in crash kits to ensure that they always arrive on scene together.

    Response: This recommendation has been accepted


    Translation:
    :x

    http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/BoardsOfInquiry/BoiNimrodMr2Xv230.htm
     
  14. Haven't had a chance to read the full report yet - am downloading it now (TVM for the link)