MoD Ignored Warnings On Nimrod...

#1
Daily Telegraph

MoD 'ignored' safety warnings over crash jet:-

The Ministry of Defence ignored warnings from the RAF and the defence industry to fit extra safety systems to a Nimrod aircraft which later exploded, killing 14 servicemen, an official inquiry will disclose today.

A long-awaited Board of Inquiry into the destruction of Flight XV230 in Afghanistan in September 2006 will put the Government under intense pressure over defence spending by highlighting the deteriorating condition of the ageing Nimrod spy planes.
 
#2
Comrade Brown will just say that 'lessons have to be learnt' and he now needs to 'steer the course' through these troubled times, whilst he has 'nothing but praise' for our armed forces...........cnut

im not cynical!!!! :D
 
#4
tramp_on_chips said:
Comrade Brown will just say that 'lessons have to be learnt' and he now needs to 'steer the course' through these troubled times, whilst he has 'nothing but praise' for our armed forces...........cnut
One I haven't heard: "We have been spending the smallest percentage of our GDP on Defence since the 1930s." (And we all know what happened at the end of that decade, don't we children?)
 
#5
"However, key details of the tragedy may remain secret because the MoD will only publish an edited summary of the BOI's findings.

Graham Knight, whose son Ben was killed in the Nimrod crash, said relatives of the crew had been told to expect only a "redacted summary".

He said: "We've been told we're only getting 10 pages. It's not even a page for each man lost."


So we must presume the full report is a real stinker. One of the posts on the Nimrod thread over at PPRuNe suggests one reason why:

"The evidence is overwhelming that the MoD’s “robust airworthiness regulatory framework” isn’t actually implemented. Good processes and procedures, but then……… Part of this process is Risk Management. It’s treated the same way. You create a Risk Register, develop mitigation plans, but…….. The same attitude seeps throughout MoD. As long as you have a robust process, it’s tick tick tick in the box. There is absolutely nothing to gain from being able to actually implement the process, even if you are granted resources in the first place. Those who can do it are cast aside and are, in the words of one aircraft Director, “an embarrassment to the Department”.


http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=274149&page=91
 
#8
Not unlike the the guys running Pirbright ignoring warnings on leaky pipes transporting biohazardous material (thus causing the foot & mouth outbreak), the government apparatchiks ignoring warnings about Data Protection and thus losing personal data (again and again...), etc.

What muppets running the show.
 
#9
Latest coverage here;

http://news.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,70131-1295525,00.html

By all accounts the most telling part of the entire statement in the House was;

"failings for which the Ministry of Defence must take responsibility"

This, by all accounts is an admission of mistakes and allows the door to open for litigation.

Browne now wriggling out of showing responsibility by announcing a "review" of the Nimrod - 10 years overdue replacement - 40 incidents a year, its a bit fcuking late now isn't it.

I hope the review that SoS Def (PT) has ordered, find that this government is culpable for the lack of safety improvements in the aircraft at the time of the reports and receive a jail term for this criminal act.

Apologies to the gimp and anyone else it gave a heart attack to for resurrecting the original condolance thread
 
#10
stinker said:
Latest coverage here;

http://news.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,70131-1295525,00.html

By all accounts the most telling part of the entire statement in the House was;

"failings for which the Ministry of Defence must take responsibility"

This, by all accounts is an admission of mistakes and allows the door to open for litigation.

Browne now wriggling out of showing responsibility by announcing a "review" of the Nimrod - 10 years overdue replacement - 40 incidents a year, its a bit fcuking late now isn't it.

I hope the review that SoS Def (PT) has ordered, find that this government is culpable for the lack of safety improvements in the aircraft at the time of the reports and receive a jail term for this criminal act.

Apologies to the gimp and anyone else it gave a heart attack to for resurrecting the original condolance thread
Browne should be made to fly in Nimrod once a week, every week and see how it must feel for the brave lads who have to fly in it each day.
 
#11
All Ive heard today is people talking about

a. how crap the Nimrod is and:

b how crap the mainteinance of said Nimrod is.

All I've got to say is:

a. I've got a computer - it's crap at what it is doing now - but it's doing far more than it was built to do and:

b. THE ROYAL AIR FORCE DOES NOT DO CRAP MAINTENANCE. Who is doing it???

ps talk about No. 7 fuel tank and the hot air system is cheap - is that why the BBC can only find "library pictures"?

pps does anyone have access to the Nimrod Vol/Topic 1 Aircraft Servicing Manual? specifically fuel and air system schematics?
 

ugly

LE
Moderator
#12
What worries me is the replacement for this a/c is late, what worries me more is that its another Nimrod! Why cant we buy a decent a/c off the shelf instead of squeezing more elint and comms into a 50 plus year old airframe.
Yes I know I'm no flyboy but if they were keen to slag off the A10 as on old A/C and not fit for use then why arent they speaking up about this old crate?
 
#14
The BOI put forward 33 recommendations most of which are being put into place, for better or worse. But you cannot get away from a recurring theme:


RECOMMENDATION 5. A life for the FRS4 Series 1 fuel seal be determined, based on the designer’s recommendation that fitted seals are replaced after 25 years.

Response: The recommendation that FRS fuel seals be given a specific life has not been accepted because experts advise the life of seals will vary considerably, according to the conditions of their installation in the aircraft. Further studies have yet to identify any predictable ageing mechanism and it has therefore been impossible to define a common finite life to the 400 plus seals fitted to the Nimrod aircraft. Experience shows that replacing fuel seals may actually introduce more problems than it solves, thereby having a detrimental effect on safety.


Translation. Thanks to the long running Nimrod replacement fiasco and general funding issues we have no option but to continue to fly aircraft for excessive hours that are way too old even though the fuel seals are breaking down and trying to fix them will knacker everything

RECOMMENDATION 6 A maximum installed life for fuel seals of other material types is determined.

Response: This recommendation is under consideration. A review is being conducted to determine whether the regulations for the lifing of seals are adequate.


Translation. Thanks to the long running Nimrod replacement fiasco and general funding issues we have no option but to continue to fly aircraft for excessive hours that are way too old even though these seals might also be in danger of breaking down

RECOMMENDATION 23 The drainage of the lower panel in the No 7 tank dry bay be improved to prevent any accumulation of fuel.

Response: The feasibility of the recommendation is being examined and a technical proposal on how this could be implemented has been requested. In the meantime the likelihood of a hazard arising from fuel pooling in this area has been significantly reduced by suspending the use of the Supplementary Conditioning Pack and Cross-feed pipe system and introducing the enhanced inspection regime
.

Translation: Thanks to the long running Nimrod replacement fiasco and general funding issues we have no option but to continue to fly aircraft for excessive hours that are way too old even though they will continue to leak. We are still trying to work out how to drain the leaking fuel but in the meantime not to worry because we will no longer be running the system that feeds hot air at 400C through badly insulated pipes near said leaked fuel.

RECOMMENDATION 29: Body bag fluid proof liners should be stored within the outer ruggedised bags in crash kits to ensure that they always arrive on scene together.

Response: This recommendation has been accepted


Translation:
:x

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/A...cations/BoardsOfInquiry/BoiNimrodMr2Xv230.htm
 
#16
How much arrogance does this government have to show towards those THEY have sent to war?

And there are some out there belive what Brown and Brown say about the Mod, as well as all those lazy suits in Whitehall who don't know what a good fight is.

Yet again, is this the Mod with slopey shoulders and don't give a damn attitude.

God rest the 14 and god be with thier families and friends.
 
#17
What are the Nimrods actually doing in Afghanistan - are we allowed to know? Presumably not the maritime/sub finding role for which they were built.

If they're just flying relay stations for comms. or taking photos, could this not be more safely done by other aircraft, or even unmanned drones?
 
#18
Ancient_Mariner said:
If they're just flying relay stations for comms. or taking photos, could this not be more safely done by other aircraft, or even unmanned drones?
"Nimrod Replacement" and "Fiasco" go together. Yes some of it could and UAV's have taken on some of the roles.

All goes back to some hugely bad decisions taken years ago to keep the old airframe, long, long delays in getting the "new" Nimrods up (2011 in service date) and the vast amounts of dosh already thrown at them.

What I found particularly appalling about the BOI report is that there is no crew escape mechanism on a Nimrod. RAF seem to have ruled out the use of crew parachutes because you would get sucked into an engine or hit the tail.
 

ugly

LE
Moderator
#19
My Grandfather was killed by a prop on his porpoising halifax in Jan 45 according to the survivors. at least some survived which is more than can be said for current large A/C crews.
 
#20
"They've" set up an inquiry with a QC. Presumably to do three things:

1. Deflect the blame from funding decisions to operational decisions.
2. Find some non-ministerial scalps.
3. Create the impression of action.

The Nimrod Safety Case appears to be first in the firing line.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7126172.stm

Announcing to MPs the results of a lengthy Board of Inquiry, Mr Browne said a senior QC would review the arrangements for ensuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2.
When will the inquest take place? Within the next decade?

What about the strategic funding decisions? Just who exactly cut the number of Nimrod airframes from 21 to 16 and the number of squadrons from 3 to 2 in 2004? Yes, that may have been in part a recognition of the reality in terms of airframe, personnel and parts shortfalls, but the UK had been in Afghanistan for 3 years and Iraq for 1 year - the ISTAR requirement would have been fully understood - hardly an obsolete capability (despite any spin about Cold War era anti-sub operations - that aircraft has some invaluable surveillance and comms capabilities). So why not bring 3 squadrons fully up to strength? It takes a number of years to train up multi-engine aircrew and air electronics operators, but "the war against terror" is not supposed to be a short one.

This is not to say that adequately resourcing the squadrons, crews and airframes would have prevented this tragedy or even been entirely feasible given the complex, unique and obsolete features of each airframe, but it may well have lessened the likelihood of the incident.

A clear case of funding cuts contributing to overstretch contributing to loss of life? The message that the MoD wants to bury?

As an afterthought, although the inquiry imay be looking in the first instance at the boffins who signed off the safety case (BAE, more likely DERA/Qinetiq or DPA?), then what about the uniformed "customer" staff officers involved, or the EngOs and staff/air officers taking decisions about their deployment? After all, the enemy were hardly at the shores of the UK and both ops are supposedly coalition ops, so was the intense deployment and AAR of these platforms actually required - on balance? Appreciated, they will surely be making an invaluable contribution to those risking their necks on the ground, but it is a risk decision after all and other platforms may have been able to make a similar contribution.
 

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