Military Doctrines

#1
Been fossicking around looking at ways other countries try to regularise committing their armed forces to warfare. Something better that just some Blair-type thinking it would be a good idea and forcing it through with lies and deceit.
Have been looking at the Weinberger Doctrine. For those who do not 'do' links it is:
The United States should not commit forces to combat unless the vital national interests of the United States or its allies are involved.
U.S. troops should only be committed wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. Otherwise, troops should not be committed.
U.S. combat troops should be committed only with clearly defined political and military objectives and with the capacity to accomplish those objectives.
The relationship between the objectives and the size and composition of the forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
U.S. troops should not be committed to battle without a "reasonable assurance" of the support of U.S. public opinion and Congress.
The commitment of U.S. troops should be considered only as a last resort.

Whilst there is still room for weasel wording to answer these conditions, it seems a good foundation. Colin Powell added to it with his additional criteria

1 Is a vital national security interest threatened?
2 Do we have a clear attainable objective?
3 Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
4 Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
5 Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
6 Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
7 Is the action supported by the American people?
8 Do we have genuine broad international support?

With regard to Afghanistan, we seem to have ignored pretty well all of these considerations.(1,3,4,5, 6 and 7) I can think of other recent wars where these would have been good things to ask before we rushed into action.
I realise we are not American but what benefits - if any - would be obtained if we drew up our own formal conditions for sending troops to battle? What other questions would have to be ticked up?
 
#2
Anything that is too dogmatic or adhered to in a strict manner isn't flexible enough for politics or military.

Have you read any UK doctrine recently?
 
#3
And there is the Abu Bakr Abdallah ibn Abi Quhafa As-Siddiq Doctrine. Not a bad one really.
 
#5
1. Have the Americans asked us to help?
2. Do we need the money to spend on baling out the banks / paying media consultants / subsidising the farmers and roadbuilders of Spain and Greece / redecorating the Speaker's flat?
3. Do we have any troops left from the last time we helped out the Americans?
4. Can we get by with just sending the bare-assed minimum, and rely on the professionalism and courage of people who will, in any case, never vote Labour?

As the answers to these are nearly always Yes, Yes, Not many, and Yes, it should be relatively easy do develop a policy on this issue.
 
#6
Mr_C_Hinecap said:
Anything that is too dogmatic or adhered to in a strict manner isn't flexible enough for politics or military.

Have you read any UK doctrine recently?
This is an extract from a RUSI link

"Changing course from the crudely kinetic procedures of counter-terrorism to a genuine, politically-led counterinsurgent campaign raises problems. British doctrines are still based on the Malayan experience of Maoist insurgency. They are ill-suited vacuums of governance, a globalized world, and to countering the ‘propaganda of the deed’. It remains to be seen whether efforts to update COIN doctrine will successfully adapt it to the new post-9/11 security environment.

I did not go further down that road. Any better leads then?

I've found this comment on COIN as seen by UK
 
#8
Jelly_Fish said:
You could try
http://www.da.mod.uk/jscta/preparation/adp_land_ops.pdf

Hope I'm not out of date on that one.

Had read only the Intro which includes this " ADP Land Operations describes how the British Army operates and fights. It provides the philosophy
and principles for land operations. It is intrinsically linked to high-level joint doctrine. It provides the authoritative guidance and framework for practices and procedures described in other Army doctrinal publications. It concentrates on land tactical operations, since strategic and operational doctrine are described in Joint publications. It is intended to be read as a single, continuous narrative.
From this, I came to opinion it was how combat was conducted. What I wanted was more of a political document that governed the march to, or away from, combat. I'll go back to it. Thanks
For a non official discussion of doctorine, you could alternatively try Rupert Smith's The utility of war:
http://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/014102044X/?tag=armrumser-21
It was Smith's book that started me down this path. I have already recommended it in the books forum. Thanks anyway
 
#9
When I played Rugby a while back, the principle "Get your retaliation in first" always seemed to work well.
 
#10
This might have been considered a little better in recent times:

"Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain."

"Rebellions can be made by 2 percent active in striking force and 98 percent passively sympathetic."
 
#11
And a particular favourite of mine:

Fight, fight, fight...



...I'll hold the coats! :D
 

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