The Govt in latest attempts to evade Ganeral Pandora's threat of 40 more years has stressed that we only stay whilst ANA and ANP forces are trained and deployed. There would seem to be a number of questions about this outlook. I have found a Congress report - now slightly outdated but there cannot be much change ffrom passage of time into comments as to the natures, personalities and qualities of ANA/ANP personnel. There are also comments on strength level of both.
Taken from CRS Report for Congress. Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Updated August 23, 2006 Full report at http://fas.org/man/crs/RL30588.pdf Afghan National Police. Some Afghan officials believe that building up a credible and capable national police force is at least as important to combating the Taliban insurgency as building the ANA. Some Afghans do not believe the ANA should have a role in maintaining internal security, and that this should be the role of the police. The United States and Germany are training the Afghan National Police (ANP) force. The U.S. effort has been led by State Department/INL, primarily through a contract with DynCorp, but the Defense Department is beginning to play a role in that effort, particularly in âpolice reform.â About 62,000 ANP are on duty, of which 58,000 are trained and 37,000 are both trained and equipped, according to CSTC-A on July 13, 2006. To address equipment shortages, CSTC-A said on July 13, 2006, that the ANP will soon receive 8,000 new vehicles and thousands of new weapons of all types. Some governments criticized Karzai for setting back police reform in June 2006 when he approved a new list of senior police commanders that included 11 (out of 86 total) who had failed merit exams. His approval of the 11 were reportedly to satisfy faction leaders and went against the recommendations of a police reform committee. There are seven police training centers around Afghanistan, which includes training in human rights principles and democratic policing concepts. However, the ANP work in the communities they come from, often embroiling them in local factional or ethnic disputes. The Afghan National Army A total target strength of 70,000 that it is expected to reach by 2010. The target level was reiterated in the Afghanistan Compact adopted in London on February 1, 2006, although some observers believe the goal might be scaled back to 50,000 because of the sustainment costs to the Afghan government. Afghanistanâs Defense Minister says that even 70,000 is highly inadequate and believes that the target size should be at least 150,000. Gen. Bob Durbin is the commander of the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the entity that is building the ANA; he says that the ANA is growing by about 1,000 per month. The United States has built four regional bases for it (Herat, Gardez, Qandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif). The ANA now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistanâs 34 provinces, working with the PRTs and assisted by embedded U.S. trainers. Coalition officers are conducting heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the âKabul Corps,â based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul. Fully trained recruits are paid about $70 per month; generals receive about $530 per month. The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) contains a provision requiring that ANA recruits be vetted for past involvement in terrorism, human rights violations, and drug trafficking. The ANA is earning mixed reviews. Some U.S. and allied officers say that, with the help of its embedded U.S. trainers (ten to twenty U.S. embeds per battalion), the ANA is becoming a major force in stabilizing the country and a national symbol. The ANA deployed to Herat in March 2004 to help quell factional unrest there and to Meymaneh in April 2004 in response to Dostamâs militia movement into that city. It deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake. It is increasingly able to conduct its own battalion-strength operations, according to U.S. officers. Officers report continuing personnel (desertion, absentee) problems, ill discipline, and drug abuse, although some concerns have been addressed. At the time the United States first began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures reportedly weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this problem has been at least partly alleviated with better pay and more close involvement by U.S. forces, and that the force is ethnically integrated in each unit. The naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 also reduced desertions among Pashtuns (he remains in that position in the cabinet confirmed April 2006). The chief of staff is Gen. Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance commander; he visited the United States in October 2005. U.S. officers in Afghanistan add that some recruits take long trips to their home towns to remit funds to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence. Others, according to U.S. observers, often refuse to serve far from their home towns.
We have seen in the reports from Afg the drug taking in the front line and the style of discipline amongst ANA and reports of road checks as bribe/extortion scenario. I have read but been unable to find links reference ANA and ANP strength during Russian operation as 200,000 plus. Their inefficiency then may be attributed to 'patriotism' Note also the suggestion in the quote that Afghan govt will be pressed to pay for far less than 70,000. I wonder if these findings - updated - are known to 'arry Aintsworth and Brown when they whistle in the darkness about the 40 years on scenario? If know, do they care anyway' they will be long gone before their divide and misrule comes to fruition.