No. If the KA-6 was out to be tanker king, they only had two radios and those were on the AW nets, not AX.I am particularly interested in Communications aspects - I presume that coordination would be less of an issue now? Just out of interest, did the KA-6 crew also act as communications relay for low flying ASW aircraft below the VHF/UHF horizon of their ships?
How have modern datalinks and modern, digitised, HF systems changed things?
No. If the KA-6 was out to be tanker king, they only had two radios and those were on the AW nets, not AX.
Have no idea but the EMS still obeys the laws of physics and is mostly bounded by curvature of the earth.
Why does the USN not put a Naval Flight Officer in ASW cabs?
The video mentions the ASW activity on 1 May 1982 during the Falklands War, and carrier based Sea Kings working with the frigates for a prolonged hunt, but as they stopped the Argentine SSK from getting into a position to fire is it fair to describe the ASW activity as a failure?
I have seen the same written about the other ASW activities in 1982. @jrwlynch would you consider them a failure for not sinking the enemy submarine, or a success for stopping submarine attacks against our ships? I guess it is like judging air defence solely by the number of bandits splashed.
It's an abiding issue with operational research (and one reason the US had such a bloodbath of merchant shipping off the Eastern Seaboard in 1942). What are you trying to achieve? Success in ASW is primarily about being able to go where you want to go and do what you need to do without intolerable losses; if you sink lots of enemy submarines, which join your ships on the seabed, you've probably failed to win.
The example oft used, was trying to allocate "not enough guns to too many ships" to arm merchantmen on the Malta run. One argument was to penny-packet weapons out, so every ship got at least a couple of Hotchkiss or Lewis MGs and an old twelve-pounder or two; another, was to concentrate weapons on a smaller number of "flak ships", with more firepower and the chance of some fire control, that would shoot down more enemy aircraft.
A check of the loss rates, produced the statistic that 25% of unarmed ships were being lost, but only 10% of those that had even rudimentary armament, and the decision was made to spread the weapons as widely as possible. Because is the mission at hand, to try to shoot down the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica? Or, was it to get ships to Grand Harbour? The DEMS gunners didn't "fail" by shooting down very few aircraft, they succeeded by giving enemy bomb-aimers a faceful of tracer and turning "bombs hit" into "bombs miss".
For ASW, the priority is keeping your ships afloat: again, sinking the enemy sub is a bonus (he can't come back tomorrow if he's dead) but, given that you can lose an armoured brigade's worth of kit per Strat RO-RO sunk, the enemy may decide that losing a SSK is worth the trade.
Good article from 1990 here and a longer monograph here.
Six of the 15 currently commissioned carriers are CVN’s. All 15 support antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations with at least one ASW helicopter squadron and a fixed wing ASW squadron aboard, as well as serving the more traditional roles of fleet air defense and attack missions (bombing). Most carrier air wings (CVW’s) are configured with nine squadrons and a detachment of photo reconnaissance aircraft. Carriers defend themselves with their speed (in excess of 28 knots), with missile batteries of surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles (point defense), and with the extended umbrella of carrier air wing fighters performing barrier or force combat air patrols (BARCAP and FORECAP) at some distance from the ship.
Configured as an attack ASW carrier, the various missions of the aircraft carrier become more apparent. Conceptually, the carrier encompasses both tactical and strategic defensive and offensive capabilities. Offensively, it can wage conventional or nuclear war or deter such warfare by its presence. It attracts military attention wherever it goes, thus diverting potential military offensive resources that could be employed elsewhere. It serves as an integrating vehicle for surface warships in company, aircraft deployed overhead, and attack submarines working below. Combining the advantages of each of the air, surface, and subsurface capabilities, threats can be neutralized quickly to both tactical and strategic advantage. This three-dimensional coverage for fleet offense and defense, coupled with modern electronic hardware and software technology, provides an unparalleled tactical and strategic capability.
From page 14-3 of the US Naval Flight Surgeon's Manal - Third edition - 1991.
But all the USN rotary ASW capability is delivered by SH-60’s, a helicopter you relentlessly claim is rubbish at ASW.
When exactly did I say that? Can you find a single post where I said that? The only things I have mentioned are that RN ASW doctrine and tactics make an aircraft with more endurance desirable, and that the USN do not put an NFO in it, and miss an opportunity to make the most of the aircraft.
By the way, in polite circles it is now called the MH-60R.