JC De Menezes - We did Nothing Wrong Part 2

Discussion in 'The NAAFI Bar' started by Airfix, Dec 16, 2008.

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  1. I feel there is a lot more to discuss, particularly in connection with 'where do we go from here' in trusting the Met' as an institution and how potential suicide bombers should be dealt with.

    Anyway, to continue, and in the spirt of 'debate the ball, not player' and seeing as me and whitecity have stumbled on some common ground (who'd have thoght it, eh :roll: )....

    Hell, something I also agree with you on!

    I've said all along, the incident as a whole was a clusterfcuk, and that's down to the bosses, not the boots on the ground in my opinion. If JC had been Osman, none of us would care if things wore done outside of the rules, because the end would justify the means, particularly if it was Osman and he was ready to blow.

    But now we are left with, in my opinion, right decission, wrong bloke and truely clusterfcuk face saving exercise by Scotland Yard which detracts from the more important issue of, there are in all likelyhood to be more suicide bomber attacks, how do we approach them and how do we stop them.

    My feeling on this that if you are a identified 'suspect' or unidentified 'suspect' from an op on the street you need to be incapacitated at the earliest opertunity. If that means Mr 9mm to the head with no warning, so be it. If 1 innocent person dies per 'wrong bloke'senario, so be it, because getting it wrong with a bombed up suicide bomber leads to many, many more innocent people dying.

    I don't see there is any other way unless tazzars can stop someone from detonating a bomb and not trigger it themselves.
  2. Collateral damage!!! Under immense pressure, these things will happen! Whether it be in Baghdad or London, Afghanistan or Glasgow. If we are under threat and action is required to eliminate the threat, at the end of the day innocent or guilty, you are going to die if believed to be the perpetrator.
    When multitudes of innocents are possibly going to die we can sleep easy in our beds knowing we have forces out there who are prepared to make on the spot decisions in the wake of terror to keep us safe.
    The forces that carried out the shooting did not wake up in the morning thinking I’m going to shoot someone today. They were given information that made them believe that hundreds of innocent people were under threat.
    Yes mistakes were made but I do not believe there was anyone involved who decided they were going to take an innocent man out that day. All were of the belief they were doing what needed to be done to make us safe!!!
    After months and months of looking for a scapegoat, a decision has been made that there is not one.
    People were carrying out a dangerous job and putting themselves at risk for us the people.
    However, there is one scapegoat and one alone, "Terrorism". Unfortunately on this occasion we scored an "own goal" but had it been a terrorist, the forces that carried out this operation would have been heroes. There is a fine line between the two.
    Look back at Gibraltar when an IRA ASU was taken out while walking the streets, no bomb was found. SAS troopers were dragged through the courts, made to look like criminals.
    Poor IRA ASU on their summer holidays, I think not.... In that instance hundreds of lives were saved with no thanks from the public or press. On this occasion death was in the air and a job was done. In this day and age, we need to support our forces whether it be Police, Security Forces, Special forces, Army etc, because they are the people protecting us and put their lives on the line each and every day!!!
  3. I mentioned in the other thread ref Sir Michael Wrights Summning Up and his direction on lies.

    I've encluded the bits he directs on other aspects of considering the evidence as I feel they may be relivent when others discuss the various transcripts and/or put forth their own opinions on things from them.

    From page 13 of 1st Day's summing up (02 Dec 08) transcript: (Linky http://www.stockwellinquest.org.uk/hearing_transcripts/dec_02.pdf

    Against that background, you will have to consider
    3 very carefully the possibility that individual witnesses
    4 may be mistaken, may be confused, may simply have failed
    5 to recollect events in the correct sequence, in the heat
    6 of the moment, including quite significant events. You
    7 may remember that many witnesses, particularly the
    8 bystander witnesses, many witnesses spoke of their
    9 recollection being of the snapshot variety, with gaps,
    10 and the evidence of the bystander witnesses, whether
    11 they were given orally from the witness box or in the
    12 statements that were read to you, you may think were
    13 eloquent testimony as to the extent to which individual
    14 recollections can vary when they are describing events
    15 of that kind.
    16 You also have to guard against being wise with
    17 hindsight. Everybody's agreed about that. Indeed, on
    18 occasions Mr Mansfield expressly said, when he was
    19 advancing particular criticisms, that it should have
    20 been obvious at the time that a particular approach or
    21 tactic was flawed; and you have to look, obviously, at
    22 what would be apparent from the circumstances existing
    23 at the time.
    24 Hindsight, they always say, is 20/20 vision in
    25 spades and you should be careful not to, as it were,
    1 apply it unfairly.
    2 You may also want to bear in mind that in human
    3 affairs, perfection is not really very often achievable,
    4 and frequently in these proceedings, we have been
    5 concerned with matters of judgment to which there may
    6 not have been any one right answer. Perfection is one
    7 thing; competence is another. Everyone, of course, is
    8 entitled to expect competence where a police firearms
    9 operation is concerned.
    10 Lies. More than one witness in the course of this
    11 inquest has been accused of lying. How should you
    12 approach this topic? First of all, of course, you must
    13 decide whether the person whose evidence you are
    14 considering has lied, rather than having simply made
    15 an honest mistake. If you think it is possible that it
    16 is the latter, honest mistake, rather than the former,
    17 a deliberate lie, you need consider it no further, and
    18 you can consider the evidence given in the light of the
    19 mistake as you think it to be.
    20 If you conclude that the witness has lied, then you
    21 should go on to bear this in mind: people tell lies for
    22 a variety of reasons, not necessarily to hide their own
    23 guilt. In the context of this case, it may be to
    24 mitigate the impact of what has become apparent was
    25 a tragic mistake; to support others in the explanations
    1 that they have -- they may have put forward. I will
    2 give you an example. Suppose you concluded, to take
    3 an issue which is at the forefront of your
    4 considerations, that Charlie 12 had not shouted "armed
    5 police" or that Mr de Menezes had not moved towards him;
    6 you would have to ask yourselves whether he was mistaken
    7 or whether he was telling a lie. Even if he was telling
    8 a lie, it would not automatically follow that Charlie 12
    9 could not still have been acting in lawful defence of
    10 himself and of others. That's merely an example. I am
    11 not expressing any view whatever about Charlie 12's
    12 evidence. That's for you to decide, not me.
    13 In addition, it doesn't follow that because you
    14 conclude that a witness has lied in one or some matters
    15 that nothing that he or she has told you can be relied
    16 upon. It doesn't necessarily follow that because you
    17 conclude that a witness has lied on one specific point
    18 that the whole of a witness's evidence can be regarded
    19 as demonstrably unreliable. It's for you to decide what
    20 you can accept and what you feel constrained to reject.