Discussion in 'Current Affairs, News and Analysis' started by whitecity, Jan 30, 2008.
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This is not my normal style, but deserves a a special effort...
... TOLD YOU SO!!!!
Surprise, surprise its not conventional warfare in the 1970's anymore.
Welcome to the 21st century Israel....
You'd think they'd have planned an effective campaign too, or was Hezbollah fighting uncommon well not factored in?
Maybe next time they select a half-section to bimble up and down till they get bumped, they'll have a proper plan.
I've no doubt PTP that the Israelis will learn from that fiasco and IMO their next 'engagement' will be an entirely different kettle of fish.
Winograd war report? Really the main problem in Jerusalem is heavy snowfalls.
Mount Scopus, where a veteran (I saw it in October) told IDF soldiers (girls were in sandals) about capture of Jerusalem.
Near Western Wall. Unbelievable.
I don't think they'll let Olmhert have another bash at it Exile
But I think you're right. Anyway the Lebanese tourist industry won't be rebuilt for another 3 years , so I can't see them kicking off again until the TV ads for ski-ing in the Cedar mountains and sunbathing start re-appearing
I thought it wasn't going to well for the Israelis at the time, but alib did post some good links on the arabs thread in the multinational forum, which are quite critical of how Israel fought the war and certainly make it sound a lot worse than what I was hearing on CNN.
And here they are, shamelessly copied from alib's posts:
From the Washington institute:Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment
It pretty much says that Israel were not expecting Hezbollah to be as good as they were.
and from Asia Times online:How Hezbollah won the ground war
From these accounts, it seems that Hezbollah's fighting ability was very unexpected, and a lot more effective than what Israel has been facing for a while. Of course Olmert didn't exactly help things on the International scheme of things. His reaction to the troops getting kidnapped was very knee-jerk and his allowance of the vast air campaign that turned the clock back on Lebanese development a good 20 years was quite damning. (Then again George and Tony's peculiar silence on the matter didn't help us either).
I suspect that the majority of the surprise for the IDF was the complete difference to what they had rather got used to: this being a rather low intensity intifada, with the odd grenade chucked in. They weren't mentally (planning) geared up for something rather different.
I think, even for us, it appeared to be a few rockets lobbed around, and maybe a few gunmen on the streets.
The surprise was that it was carefully coordinated, a long time in the planning, consisted of a lot more than 'a few rockets', and certainly a good deal more than 'a few lone gunmen'.
What it actually was, much to everyone's surprise, was a medium intensity, and very well executed attack on Israel.
Had Israel prior knowledge of what was about to happen, I'm sure they would have gone in much quicker, with much more forces, and a great deal more aircraft.
No clear exit strategy !
Sounds like us in Iraq.
I know I started this thread with an, 'I told you so', but I actually have one major disagreement with the summary of the report so far made public:
I think there was indeed a clear strategy, and that failed hopelessly on both the miltary and the political level. Having failed, they then resorted to the ground effort that was hopelessly inadequate, ill-prepared and ill-conceived.
The strategy? Strategic bombing against civilian targets to either:
1) coerce Lebanese Gvt (via public opinion??) to sort out Hezbollah themselves,
2) coerce Lebanese Gvt to sue for peace on Israel's terms - which of course would stipulate sorting out Hezbollah as a pre-condition.
Just like all the aerial bombing gurus from Douhet onwards, they got it wrong!
Maybe once the Iran 'problem' is sorted they will change tactics
That is the most important thing.
The failures by and large were up the food chain in terms of politics and exit strategies etc.
The on the ground fighting was more successful, the issue was late entry of ground forces and political interference. There was not enough main effort inintially in trying to get to the Katyushas which involved boots on the ground in numbers, that only came later and a little too late due to Olmert & co.
Hezb preparations were known to be detailed, the actual raid/kidnapping itself was a surprise but there had been tell-tell signs.
Other lesson learnt: dont put an air force guy as CGS!!
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