Is UK ISAF policy working?

Discussion in 'Current Affairs, News and Analysis' started by The-Goose, Aug 3, 2008.

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  1. Ok we all know why we are here and that it is better now than it was(?), but is the long term policy likely to work? If we succeed in taming Helmand all the way past Kajaki, what will Terry do? Find a softer target or simply change tack and take on the next best option?
  2. Goose seems like a bit too big a question for this forum, you need to staff a letter to Main Building!
  3. Where is the Goose?
  4. Unless we can field a division in Helmand I doubt we'll ever succeed.
  5. Give it 6 to 8 months :!:

    My main worry is what would be left even after we leave Iraq. 8-9 btns leaves only 12 of 39 free. That being said, 5 are already there - 8,200 troops is a big brigade, and we're at the limit of what we can do before we'd need to bring in another brigade HQ and presumably a division HQ on a perminent (as opposed to rotational) basis.
  6. Helps if you define "success" first. :wink:
  7. I don't think he'd envisaged rethinking our policy to that extent. :D

    I think we're failing in one crucial area. We're not convincing the ordinary Afghan that the Taliban, the warlords and their fellow-travellers are going to go away, ever. They're not going to be even passively on our side until we can convince them there's light at the end of the tunnel. It's simply too much of a risk for them.
  8. There is a policy? Gosh! Tell me more. :)

    I thought we were just drip-feeding ever increasing numbers of troops to the region as a default response to increasing insecurity.
  9. Success - yes that is the key and a definition that seems to be lacking in the policy!

    Given that despite the increase in boots on the ground since I was there (Oct 06 - Apr 07) there are still parts of Helmand we still haven't been to for any length of time (if at all) I'd say we're going to struggle with anything less than a Division.
  10. Not only does the ISAF policy leave alot for the imagination in terms of clarification but the main question i would have about it all is do the soldiers on the ground believe it is working....rising numbers of troops signing off and choosing to risk that old mcdonalds kitchen than the insecurity and ever rising demands of those siting behind desks. One task after another without any real sense of "job done" and lossing friends daily,,,gah
  11. Or split the AO with the Yanks.
  12. The real problem it seems is that Helmand itself is not the only issue and that whilst terry chooses to attack us there, we seem not to be working towards a single and united policy.

    Even when the ARRC was in charge the policy was poorly defined and left largely as a kind of grand scheme based on showing the people the errors of their ways by engaging in many cups of tea etc.

    There continues to be a need for hard operations because terry remains convinced that he can win simply by persisting in killing us (one at a time - bad press, national will etc) and terrfying the local population into supporting at best or not being against at worst the whole idea of a Taliban takeover.

    There are over 100, 000 Foreign Troops on the NATO operation. What we need is a unified, competent and aggresive policy that focusses all available resources on the main objective of destroying the fighting ability of terry whilst showing that their preferred form of government is abhorrent.
  13. I see some hooligan is spiling the beans?
  14. If the Euro Governments will not pay for the war let alone that the UK Government does not pay for the War which they have said will last 30 years just how is Tom supposed to do the task he has been given.
  15. msr

    msr LE

    Why? That's their system of government. It isn't ours and any attempt to force a more 'politically correct' system on them is going to fail.

    The locals don't want us there. That's why they are fighting us.