After Soviet invasion, Pakistans involvement with Afghanistan was limited to training, equipping and planning of operations for the resistance fighters to tie down Soviet Union in Afghanistan as no one expected that Soviets will leave. Later, when it became clear that Soviets may leave, Pakistan became more ambitious and worked to have a government in Afghanistan which is friendly to Islamabad. In 1988, when the Soviet withdrawal was imminent, ISI and CIA predicted that after Soviet withdrawal, the Najibullah regime will crumble quickly. In May 1988, Zia promised Congressman Charles Wilson that I will give you Jalalabad as a Christmas present, with Hikmatyar in charge.17 In 1989, during Prime Minister Benazir Bhuttos first term in office, ISI embarked on the Jalalabad offensive to take the city as a base for interim government. At that time, both United States and Pakistan agreed on this plan but for different reasons. It was the wish of some hawkish Americans to see the outright bloody assault on major cities and seeing the humiliation of Soviets clinging to their helicopters as this would be the befitting revenge of Vietnam. On Pakistani side, some born again holy warriors of defence establishment were dreaming of heading the victory parade and entering Kabul as modern day Saladin and to earn the lofty title of Victors of Kabul. ISI Chief, Lt. General Hamid Gul told the Afghan Cell (the meetings were attended by Prime Minister Benazir, her National Security Advisor, Iqbal Akhund, Chief of ISI and US ambassador) that the city could be taken in a week if the government was prepared to allow for a certain degree of bloodshed.18 Pakistanis were not too much concerned with the nuisance of bloodshed as it was mainly Afghan. Some astute Afghan commanders on the field were furious about ISIs decision of frontal attack of the city. One commander considered it a dumb idea as it was dumb to lose ten thousand lives.19 In one commentators words, a major Afghan war decision was taken by the Pakistanis with no Afghans present, but with the US ambassador looking on.20 Many Afghans resented this blatant interference and several commanders were alienated. In October 1990 meeting of national commanders shura in Kunar, Afghans blocked the participation of ISI Chief Asad Durrani and opposed the ISI plan of direct attack on Kabul.21 By 1994, Pakistan was disgusted by the civil war and disappointed due to constant failures of their main ally, Hikmatyar and started to look for new potential Pushtun proxies in Afghanistan.22 Initially Benazir Bhuttos Pushtun interior minister, Major General (r) Naseerullah Khan Babar did the ground breaking work. Later, ISI took the charge of providing logistic support and broker alliances of General Dostum, General Shahnawaz Tanai and former commander Jalaluddin Haqqani with Taliban. These alliances were vital and provided Taliban with necessary material and technical edge to defeat their rivals. In addition, the close alliance of Taliban with religious seminaries in Pakistan provided them with enough foot soldiers to fight at different fronts in Afghanistan. ISI instructed provincial governments of Balochistan and North West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.) not to allow any political activities of Afghans who were against Taliban. Many anti-Taliban individuals were asked to leave Pakistan thus preventing any organized opposition to the Taliban. REFERENCES : Afghanistan not so great games Columnist Hamid Hussain does a detailed analysis of the present situation. Afghanistan not so great games A F G H A N I S T A N 1 9 7 3 - 1 9 9 0 Afghanistan,1973-1990 General Hamid Gul supported Pervez Musharraf on 12 Oct 1999 URL: ‪General Hamid Gul supported Pervez Musharraf on 12 Oct 1999‬‏ - YouTube Hamid Gul, a retired general, accuses Mr Sharif of having presided over an administration which had failed to deliver the goods. "Sharif turned out to be a great destroyer of national institutions," he told the BBC. "Look at what he did to the judiciary. "He stripped them of power, put a set of judges against the chief justice, did the same to the press. "He gagged the parliament and finally he wanted to do the same to the army." REFERENCE: World: South Asia Pakistan's coup: Why the army acted Wednesday, October 13, 1999 Published at 23:20 GMT 00:20 UK BBC News | South Asia | Pakistan's coup: Why the army acted My sources say a blitz against Nawaz is coming in the media by ex-military experts, who are still in touch with Rawalpindi. Musharraf may also jump at him. But Maulana Fazlur Rehman, Ch Shujaat, Altaf Hussain, Imran Khan and all others, except Nawaz Sharif, now believe the Zardari freight train has to be stopped. Only Nawaz has to be convinced and I was surprised when an informed person recently said Nawaz had been approached by the right quarters numerous times but he was stuck with the Musharraf phobia. These quarters see a falling out between the Sharif brothers, Shahbaz and Nawaz, on many issues but they are clear that if Nawaz does not come around and leaves no political option to stop the Zardari train, he would be the one to blame if non-political actors make a definite move. Shahbaz would then be the good boy for the next set-up and both Zardari and Nawaz would be treated alike. Some food for thought for both of them! And us all. REFERENCE: Why Zardari became a red rag for the president; Altaf scores in the heart of Sindh over PPP; Nawaz unable to see coming freight train Sunday, December 26, 2010 By Shaheen Sehbai Why Zardari became a red rag for the president; Altaf scores in the heart of Sindh over PPP; Nawaz unable to see coming freight train Shaheen Shebai, Ansar Abbasi and their "Alleged Sources" KARACHI: Former ISI chief Hameed Gul wanted to become prime minister, said former president Pervez Musharraf in an exclusive interview to Geo News. Hameed Gul not only aspired to become prime minister of Pakistan but also army chief of the country, Musharraf told Geo News anchor Salim Safi in an exclusive interview. REFERENCE: H Gul aspired to become PM: Musharraf Updated at 010 PST Sunday, December 19, 2010 H Gul aspired to become PM: Musharraf Now, we come to the second generation of officers who were in key decision-making positions during 80s. Former Director General (DG) of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Lieutenant General (Retd) Hameed Guls anti-American rhetoric in post-retirement phase makes headlines off and on in national news media. It is interesting that when he was DGISI, US ambassador attended the meetings of Afghan Cell of Benazir government. In fact the major decision of Jalalabad offensive in 1989 was made in one of those fateful meetings. To date there has been no evidence (no statement by any other participants of those meetings or by General Hameed Gul himself) that Mr. Gul made any objection to the presence of US ambassador in these meetings, which had wide ranging impact on national security. It is probable that Mr. Gul was at that time a top contender for the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) race, therefore he didnt wanted to be on the wrong side of the civil government. When he was sacked, then he found the gospel truth that US was not sincere. Another example is of former Chief of Afghan Cell of ISI, Brigadier (Retd) Muhammad Yusuf. For five long years, he was a major participant in a joint CIA-ISI venture of unprecedented scale in Afghanistan. During this time period, he worked with several different level US officials and visited CIA headquarters in Langley. In his post-retirement memoirs, he tried his best to distance himself from the Americans. His statements like, Relations between the CIA and ourselves were always strained, I resorted to trying to avoid contact with the local CIA staff, I never visited the US embassy and vehement denial of any direct contact between CIA and Mujahideen shows his uncomfortability of being seen as close with the Americans.5 Pakistans former foreign minister Agha Shahi in a conversation with Robert Wirsing said that in 1981 during negotiations with US, he gave a talk to a group of Pakistani generals on the objectives of Pakistans policy toward US. He stressed the importance of non-alignment and avoidance of over dependence on superpowers. Few days later one of the generals who attended Shahis briefing met him and told him that Americans should be given bases in return for the aid.6 The officer would not dare to make that statement public in view of the prevailing sentiments of the public. The hawkish generals of Zia reassured US about the full Pakistani support. John Reagan, the CIA station chief in Islamabad stated, Their attitude was that Agha Shahi was doing his own thing, that we neednt be concerned about it.7 General Zia and DGISI Akhtar Abdur Rahman had very cordial relations with CIA director William Casey. To offset that uncomfortable closeness with Americans, Zia and Akhtar were portrayed as holy warriors of Islam and modern day Saladins. According to one close associate of Akhtar, They (Casey and Akhtar) worked together in harmony, and in an atmosphere of mutual trust.8 The most interesting remarks about the death of CIA Director, William Casey were made by Brigadier Yusuf. He states that, It was a great blow to the Jehad when Casey died.9 He did not elaborate whether by this definition one should count Casey as Shaheed (warrior who dies in battle in the cause of Islam). It will quite be amusing for Americans to know that one of their former CIA director is actually a martyr of Islam. In fifty-five years, we have come full circle, and in 2002, a retired Major General laments about the US and gives a long list of grievances. He states, Discarding General Ziaul Haq when no more needed must never be forgotten. The treatment meted out to Pakistan after the victory in Afghanistan in late eighties cannot be forgiven ... It can be safely presumed that before mobilizing its armed forces on the borders of Pakistan, the US has (take it for sure) given a nod to India... Remember the visit of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to the USA and getting a silent approval from there before attacking East Pakistan in 1971. And the Pakistanis kept waiting for the seventh fleet to come to our rescue... They have already done a great damage to Pakistan by imposing an anti-Pakistan government in Afghanistan.10 Very limited knowledge, paranoia, disregard of the facts, total lack of perception and extreme simplicity is quite evident from the statement and not a very good sign of the intellectual level of senior officers at highest decision making process. REFERENCES: Tale of a love affair that never was: United States-Pakistan Defence Relations Columnist Hamid Hussain analyses an ON and OFF affair. Tale of a love affair that never was: The September 11th Sourcebooks AFGHANISTAN: THE MAKING OF U.S. POLICY, 1973-1990 by Steve Galster October 9, 2001 Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War Lie with General (R) Hamid Gul on ARY NEWS - 1 (Sawal Yeh Hai 3rd July 2011) URL: ‪Sawal Yeh Hai 3rd July 2011-1‬‏ - YouTube While revelations of Reagan's covert war in Nicaragua continue to dazzle the American public, a far bigger and more complex covert program has gone relatively unnoticed in Afghanistan. After nearly nine years of covert involvement, the U.S. has poured over $2 billion into the Afghan war, far more than the total amount that has gone to Nicaragua, Angola, and Kampuchea combined. In fact, the estimated amount of money "lost" in the Afghan pipeline by the CIA's own estimates easily exceeds the total amount of U.S. support that has gone to the contras. Congressmen who strongly opposed contra aid have not only supported Reagan's covert war in Afghanistan but have teamed up with Reagan Doctrine advocates to expand the administration's program. Whereas the war in Nicaragua is now the "bad" war, Afghanistan has from the start been viewed as the "good" war, and as the rebels call it, a "holy" war or jihad. Thus, with their broad base of support and their strategically placed war below the Soviet border, the Afghan rebels have earned the forefront position in President Reagan's global strategy of "rollback" and billions of dollars in CIA support. Officially, the Reagan administration's policy toward Afghanistan is to "seek the earliest possible negotiated political settlement there to effect the withdrawal of Soviet forces." This policy, which is a continuation of that set up under Jimmy Carter, is ostensibly pursued along two tracks: covert aid and negotiations. Carter believed that a "modest" amount of secret military aid would enhance the prospects for a negotiated settlement. The Reagan administration, on the other hand, has reasoned that the more aid the U.S. can provide to the rebels the better the chances are of bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table. Even with a Soviet withdrawal assured today, the administration has vowed to pursue this strategy "peace through strength" by continuing its support of the rebels. However, a closer look at the administration's seven year secret war in Afghanistan reveals that it has been little interested in peace there. In fact, the evidence strongly suggests that U.S. policy has been to sabotage attempts at a negotiated settlement until the Soviets have been, in the view of some, had been "sufficiently bled." REFERENCE: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 Never ending Flow: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster  Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Lie with General (R) Hamid Gul on ARY NEWS - 2 (Sawal Yeh Hai 3rd July 2011) ‪Sawal Yeh Hai 3rd July 2011-2‬‏ - YouTube Under Carter, the CIA had coordinated the Afghan weapons supply line with Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia provided the funds, Egypt and China provided the weapons, and Pakistan served as the conduit and sanctuary. Initially the U.S. and Saudi Arabia provided about $30 million each to purchase Soviet-style weapons manufactured in Egypt and China. Retired American military officers contracted out by the CIA along with Chinese and Pakistani officials, were on hand to the rebels. But the secrecy of foreign involvement was the important element of the program. "The Afghan struggle (was) an Islamic' struggle," President Carter told his aides, "and U.S. assistance should not disturb that impression. Much has changed in the CIA's Afghan war under Reagan. Most of the same countries are still involved, and the cultivation of the war's image as a fight between Islam and communism remains crucial to maintaining the rebels' broad support. But with the rapidly expanding political and financial support for the program, the U.S. Afghan policy and its covert aid pipeline have been significantly altered. After Casey's proposal to expand the Afghan program in March 1981, the U.S. looked directly to Saudi Arabia for more assistance. With the promise that Reagan would get Congress to approve the sale of AWACS to them, the Saudis immediately doled out $15 million to the resistance, mainly through private bank accounts in Oman and Pakistan. In October, when the U.S. delivered the first five AWACS to Saudi Arabia, King Fahd agreed to increase assistance to both the Afghan rebels and the Nicaraguan contras. The role of Pakistan, which worried about its vulnerable position vis a vis the Soviets, was also enhanced. To allay President Zia's concerns and to ensure further Pakistani cooperation, the Reagan administration secretly offered to station U.S. troops in Pakistan. REFERENCE: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 Never ending Flow: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster  Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 However, Zia stated that he preferred weapons to troops.The next month, in September, the U.S. agreed to a six year, $3.2 billion program of U.S. economic and military assistance.It was also agreed that Pakistan would continue its coordinating role in weapons supply. This agreement, which is still in effect today, went as follows: once in Pakistan, whether at the port of Karachi or the Peshawar airport, the weapons would be handed over to the National Logistics Cell (NLC) of the Pakistani Interservice Intelligence Directorate (ISID), the equivalent of the CIA and FBI combined. CIA station officers in Karachi and Peshawar would examine the receipts for the weapons but would not even check the crates to see if they were accurate. The NLC officials would then drive the weapons to either Quetta in the West or Peshawar in the East. Once there, the ISID, under CIA supervision, would distribute the arms to the seven rebel groups recognized by the Pakistani government. These groups would then drive the weapons to either their arms depots along the border or to the local arms bazaar where they could make a healthy profit selling their new AK 47s and RPG 7s to drug dealers and local tribesmen. In this early period the CIA looked largely to Egypt and China for supplies. Both countries handed over weapons from their own stocks while CIA supervised factories outside Cairo turned out Soviet style arms to add to the flow. Hughes Aircraft Company was contracted out to upgrade some of Egypt's weapons, particularly the SAM 7 anti aircraft guns. The Egyptian arms stock was replenished with new American weapons and China earned much needed hard currency, in addition to fulfilling one of its own foreign policy goals of containing the Soviets. A fair amount of the rebels' weapons were also captured from and sometimes even sold by Afghan government troops. Still, getting outside weapons to the rebels in Pakistan remained an important task. Eventually China made some use of the newly opened Karokaram highway and continued to load CIA run planes and ships destined for Peshawar and Karachi. Egyptian weapons continued to be flown directly to Pakistan but were sometimes landed in Oman, from where they were shipped to Karachi to avoid being traced. The Reagan administration was quite impressed with the rebels' surprising show of force during this first year. Members of the 208 Committee (the restricted inter agency committee that handled covert operations) suddenly saw tremendous prospects in Afghanistan for gaining a global strategic edge on the Soviets. This elite group included Vincent Cannistraro, an ex CIA official who served as White House head of covert operations; Morton Abramowitz, State Department head of intelligence; Bert Dunn, Chief of the CIA's Near East and South Asia Division; Oliver North, and alternating members from the Defense Department including Elie Krakowski, head of Regional Defense, and Richard Armitage. REFERENCE: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 Never ending Flow: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster  Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Lie with General (R) Hamid Gul on ARY NEWS - 3 (Sawal Yeh Hai 3rd July 2011) ‪Sawal Yeh Hai 3rd July 2011-3‬‏ - YouTube These and other administration officials thought that by tying down and "bleeding" the Soviets in Afghanistan the U.S. could divert Soviet attention away from other Third World hot spots like Nicaragua and Angola, making room for the U.S. to maneuver. If the Afghan rebels could keep up their fight for several years (if not decades), the Soviets would eventually incur serious financial, military, and political problems. Little danger was seen in the Soviets expanding their war out of frustration into Iran or Pakistan because of Iran's intransigence and Pakistan's beefed up military, not to mention its mutual defense pact with the U.S. It began to appear, as one Congressman put it, that "the U.S. [had] a real chance to make Afghanistan the Soviets' Vietnam." REFERENCE: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 Never ending Flow: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster  Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Sabotaging a Settlement The only thing standing in the way of creating a morass for the Soviets in Afghanistan was the near term prospect for peace. Although some U.S. officials have, since the beginning of the war, wanted to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the evidence suggests that they were not very influential. Following the first formal U.N. sponsored peace talks in the summer of 1982, U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez announced that the negotiating parties, Pakistan and the Afghan government, had made important concessions and that he planned to present a broad outline of an agreement that fall. However, just before Cordovez was to unveil his peace plan, President Reagan ordered the CIA to increase the quantity and quality of weapons to the rebels. The "bleeders" had been at work. Several months later, in December, Yuri Andropov told President Zia at Leonid Brezhnev's funeral that the Soviet Union would leave Afghanistan "quickly" if Pakistan ceased its support of the resistance. Subsequently the White House ordered the CIA to immediately provide the rebels with increased amounts of bazookas, mortars, grenade launchers, mines, recoilless rifles, and shoulder fired anti-aircraft guns. It appears that this trend of sabotaging peace negotiations as long as the resistance was willing and able to fight became the unofficial Afghan policy in the White House. Proof of this policy manifested itself in 1983 when an end to the Soviet occupation seemed as certain as it does today. In late April of that year, the negotiating parties gathered in Geneva to map out another plan for a Soviet withdrawal. To enhance the prospects for a settlement, the Soviets secretly told the Pakistani government in late March that they would begin to withdraw by September if the Pakistanis ceased their support for the resistance. The Pakistanis took the Soviet pledge seriously and several weeks later issued a directive to the rebels to move their headquarters from Peshawar and to disperse their groups. The resistance alliance, which has been dominated by the radical fundamentalist factions, was furious. The withdrawal of Soviet troops was only one of their goals; the militant fundamentalists also intended to purge the country of everything that smacked of communism, including anyone who had served the government in any way. For them the war was far from over. These groups had even stated their intention to carry their jihad into the Soviet Union. Meanwhile U.N. officials Diego Cordovez and Javier Perez de Cuellar shuttled to the Soviet Union and China where they received guarantees for a possible settlement. By late April, the Pakistani and Afghan governments had "virtually settled" the simultaneous withdrawal of outside support which would begin in September. But one week later, the White House for the first time leaked to the press the fact that it was covertly aiding the resistance and would continue to do so until the political aims of the resistance alliance were met. Needless to say the talks came to a screeching halt. Embarrassed, but still hopeful about salvaging a settlement that June, Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan scurried to Washington in May to enlist the Reagan administration's cooperation. Khan told Vice President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz that the Soviets wanted to withdraw from Afghanistan but with minimal humiliation. Bush and Shultz apparently convinced Khan that the U.S. was not interested in facilitating a graceful Soviet withdrawal. The following next month the U.N. sponsored talks broke down immediately when Khan wanted to re open discussion on clauses concerning non interference.Two weeks later Shultz visited Pakistan to reassure both the resistance and the Pakistani government that the U.S. would not abandon them "in their fight against Soviet aggression. REFERENCE: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 Never ending Flow: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster  Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Congress and the Jihad With Pakistan now cemented into the "bleeders" camp, the U.S. was well positioned to turn up the heat on the Soviets. Starting in 1984 and continuing to the present, the administration has received continual boosts to pursue this strategy from Congress. Congressman Charles Wilson, (Dem. Calif) a high ranking member of the Defense Appropriations Committee who claims "we owe the Soviets one for Vietnam," visited President Zia in late 1983 to see what the U.S. could do to strengthen the rebels. In the spring of 1984 he and his colleagues summoned Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McMahon to explain why the CIA wasn't doing more for the rebels. McMahon, who was neither interested in providing the rebels with sophisticated weaponry nor in expanding the already large paramilitary operation below the Soviet border, claimed that the rebels were being adequately supplied. The Congressmen, realizing that they had allies in the State Department (Abramowitz), the White House (Cannistraro) and the Defense Department (Krakowski and Armitage), and that CIA Director Casey was supportive of their cause, proceeded to draft legislation that would force high level bureaucrats like McMahon to cooperate in expanding the Afghan program. REFERENCE: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 Never ending Flow: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster  Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 In the Fall of 1984 Congress passed a resolution calling for "effective" aid for the Afghan rebels and immediately doubled the administration's request for aid. To handle the growing amount of funds, the CIA established a joint bank account with the Saudis in Switzerland. The Saudis promised to match the U.S. funds dollar for dollar and both governments began by pledging $250 million each. The CIA began to upgrade the quality of weapons for the rebels. In January 1985 it purchased 40 Oerlikon anti aircraft guns from the Swiss firm Oerlikon Buhrle at a cost of $50 million. Also, many of the Chinese weapons destined for the rebels were being upgraded. Some were sent to Egypt while many were flown to a CIA weapons plant somewhere in the midwestern United States. In addition, a New Jersey company was contracted to make explosives for the rebels.As the CIA upgraded the covert pipeline, the Soviets again began to hint that they wanted out of Afghanistan. In March 1985, new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev told Pakistani President Zia at Konstantine Chernenko's funeral that the war could end as soon as Pakistan ceased its support of the rebels. But in keeping with U.S. policy, President Reagan several weeks later signed National Security Decision Directive 166 cafling for efforts to drive Soviet forces from Afghanistan "by all means available. One of the "bleeders," Morton Abramowitz, succeeded in inserting language into the directive calling for an expansion of the program every year. REFERENCE: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 Never ending Flow: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster  Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Thus, with $250 million in newly appropriated funds, the CIA's mission was clearer than ever. The only problem was finding the weapons to spend all the new money on. Neither the Chinese nor the Egyptians could fill the increasing requests. So to quickly expend a large portion of the new money and to satisfy the constant demand for better anti aircraft guns, the CIA in late 1985 purchased 300 British made Blowpipe missiles from Short Brothers Company in Belfast, Northern Ireland. Since the United Kingdom has had no official policy to militarily support the rebels, the weapons were sold to a third country who then handed them over to the CIA for a profit. But the rebels were still in need of more AK 47 rifles and SAM 7s, among other types of unsophisticated weaponry. The problem was finding another supplier. Someone suggested Poland, and judging by documents from the Iran/contra hearings it was probably the ever present John Singlaub. Through the GeoMilitech Corporation, Singlaub and his associate Barbara Studley had arranged to get Polish weapons to the contras. And Studley had proposed a plan to DCI Casey in December 1985 for GeoMilitech to facilitate the supply of weapons to the rebels. By early 1986 weapons were being purchased in Poland and quietly shipped out of the northwest port of Stettin. To handle the increasing flow of weapons into Pakistan, the Pakistani government built a new network of roads from Peshawar and Quetta to the small border towns that act as arms depots. To transfer the weapons from these towns over the border into Pakistan, the Afghans initially had to rent mules and trucks. In order to cover the rebels' transportation expenses the CIA counterfeited and provided to the rebels millions of dollars worth of Afghan currency. REFERENCE: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 Never ending Flow: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster  Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Leaks in the Pipeline As the pipeline was expanded it began to spring big leaks. Problems with the pipeline had existed from the beginning, but by 1985 they were becoming more obvious. Twenty nine of the forty Oerlikon anti aircraft guns the CIA had purchased in Switzerland at over $1 million a piece never made it to Afghanistan. Somewhere along the line these and many other weapons were put to other uses by either the Afghans, the Pakistanis, or the CIA itself. A significant amount of the leaking was (as it stiff is) coming from within Pakistan, where corrupt government and rebel officials have suddenly become quite rich. Pakistani General Akhtar Abdul Rahman, head of the ISID up to 1987, and his successor, General Hamid Gul, are suspected to have been prime benefactors of the pipeline. They and their subordinates within the ISID's National Logistics Cell (NLC) could easily have made a fortune off CIA supplies. Since the genesis of the pipeline, the NLC has had the sole responsibility of transporting newly arrived weapons from Karachi to Quetta and Peshawar (weapons that come by plane, especially those that are American or British made, are flown directly to these cities). NLC trucks have special passes that allow them to travel unharassed by customs or police officials on their several hundred mile drive. Along the way it is very easy for the NLC officials to exchange the new weapons and other supplies for old ones from the government's stock. Widespread corruption also exists among the rebel leaders but has gone practically unnoticed in the U.S. thanks to CIA propaganda. The same kinds of things that tarnished the contra's image, such as killing civilians, drug smuggling and embezzlement are practiced by many Afghan rebels. Taking no prisoners, assassinating suspected government collaborators, destroying government built schools and hospitals, killing "unpious" civilians are just a few of the inhumane acts they have carried out. But the picture we receive of the rebels in the U.S. is of an uncorrupt, popular group of freedom loving people who aspire toward a democratic society. The CIA and the State Department have worked hard to project this image. In 1984 Walter Raymond, on loan to the NSC from the CIA, "suggested" to Senator Humphrey (RNH) that Congress finance a media project for the rebels that would shed favorable light on the rebels' side of the war. Humphrey got Congress to easily approve the new "Afghan Media Project" which was handed over to the United States Information Agency (USIA) and Boston University. AA Boston University the project was headed up by a man named Joachim Maitre, an East German defector who had close connections with International Business Communications and the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation (both of which served important roles in illegally raising funds for the Nicaraguan contras). He also had worked closely with Oliver North to make TN' commercials attacking Congressmen who had opposed aid to the contras. Maitre escaped criticism for his contra connections and proceeded to train Afghan rebels to report on and film the war. Since it is illegal for the USIA to disseminate information in the U.S., the Afghan Media Project's films and reports were to be sold only to foreign news agencies. However, American journalists who have a quick story to write or don't want to enter Afghanistan have often found the rebels' information too tempting to pass up. CBS, the station that has covered the Afghan war the most and in a very pro-rebel light, may have been one guilty party. CBS used footage provided by the rebels claiming that it was taken by its cameraman, Mike Hoover. Corruption surrounding the CIA's Afghan program has begun to surface during the last several years. For example, the fact that the rebels have been harvesting a large amount of opium was brought to light by the New York Times in 1986. REFERENCE: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 Never ending Flow: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster  Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 And DEA officials have privately admitted recently that the shipment of CIA weapons into Pakistan has allowed the trade in heroin three tons of which reaches the U.S. every year to flourish as never before. One DEA official noted that virtually no heroin was refined in Pakistan before 1979, but "now Pakistan produces and transships more heroin than the rest of the world combined." Neither U.S. nor Pakistani drug enforcement officials are any match for these heavily armed drug dealers. In spite of these problems, from 1986 to the present, the CIA has expanded the pipeline to handle over $1 billion in new monies. As part of this package the CIA is sending the rebels highly sophisticated American made weaponry. Ironically, the CIA particularly its former Deputy Director John McMahon originally opposed this idea and insisted on continuing the supply of average Soviet styled weapons. But by March 1986 the impasse was broken. On March 4, McMahon resigned from the CIA; one week later UN negotiator Diego Cordovez announced that he had "all the elements of a comprehensive settlement of the Afghan problem." With McMahon gone and the prospects for peace again on the horizon, members of the 208 Committee, with the President's approval, decided immediately to send the rebels several hundred of the world's most sophisticated anti aircraft gun, the American-made Stinger. Although the Stingers are delivered more carefully than other weapons (they are flown on U.S. airplanes through Germany en route to Pakistan), once in Pakistan they can easily fall into dangerous hands. Initially the Stingers were safeguarded by keeping them from the rebels. Although the media began in April 1986 to report on the rebels' immediate successes with the Stingers, the rebels hadn't even touched one yet. Ethnic Pushtuns in the Pakistani Special Forces, disguised as rebels, were the ones firing the Stingers then, and many probably still are today. REFERENCE: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 Never ending Flow: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster  Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Meanwhile, a group of "ex-Army specialists" hired by the CIA were training the rebels to use the new weapon. Once the rebels were adequately trained, the politics of the pipeline began to come into play. The ISID distributed a disproportionate amount of the Stingers to the more radical fundamentalist groups. ISID has skewed the distribution of weapons to favor the fundamentalists all along, but it took the Stinger issue to highlight this fact. These are the groups that were responsible for selling nearly a dozen Stingers to Iranian Revolutionary Guards in July 1987 and who are stockpiling their weapons to continue their jihad if and when the U.S. cuts off its supply. The CIA was aware of the Iran connection two months before it was revealed and before Congress approved sending more Stingers. It is also aware now that by arming these same groups, the U.S. is setting the scene for a major post withdrawal bloodbath. But today President Reagan is flaunting the covert operation in Afghanistan as the prize of the Reagan Doctrine. The Soviets are finally negotiating in "good faith," he claims, because U.S. aid allowed the "freedom fighters" to keep up their fight. Although the War has had its costs, the benefit of driving the Soviets out will make them worth it. The costs of intentionally prolonging the Afghan war have been a flourishing drug trade, an estimated one million dead, and the provisions for a bloody Islamic revolution. Unfortunately, in light of the administration's hardening stance in the current negotiations, we must wonder whether the "bleeders" are really ready to end it now. REFERENCE: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 Never ending Flow: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster  Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 References: Philadelphia Inquirer, February 28, 1988. Newsweek, March 23,1987 United States Department of State Special Report, no. 112, December 1983. See James Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Bantam: New York, 1982), pp. 473,475. Miami Herald, June 5, 1983. Boston Globe, January 5, 1980; Daily Telegraph (London), January 5, 1990. Wall Street Journal, April 19,1994. Washington Post, February 2, 1979; Maclean's (Toronto), April 30, 1979. ABC News, "20/20," June 18,1981. Sam Bamieh told of this deal during his sworn testimony before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs committee in July 1987; also see. Bruce Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986), p. 202; the information about the Omani and Pakistani bank accounts came from several confidential sources. See Bamieh testimony, ibid. Baltimore Sun, April 4,1982. Richard Cronin, "Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance Facts," Congressional Research Service, July 20,1987, p. 2. This inadequate accounting process was discovered in January 1986 when, at the request of Senators Humphrey (Rep. New Hamp.) and Chic Hecht (Rep. Nev.), a group of Senate intelligence staffers visited Pakistan (Confidential Source). Philadelphia Inquirer. February 29, 1988; The Nation (Pakistan), January 8, 1987. Philadelphia Inquirer, February 29,1988. Washington Post, September 25,1981. Classified State Department Cables, May 14 and August 9, 1979, Spynest Documents, op. cit., n. 9, vol. 29; Selig Harrison, "The Soviet Union in Afghanistan in Containment: Concept and Policy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1986), p. 464 New Republic, July 18,1981; Daily Telegraph, January 5,1980. Le Monde, in Joint Publication and Research Service (JPRS) (U.S. Gov.), October 9, 1981; Chicago Tribune, July 23, 1981. New York Times; May 4, 1983; Eight Days (London), in JPRS, October 31, 1981. Philadelphia Inquirer, March 1, 1988. New York Times, July 24,1982. New York Times, May 4,1983. Richard Cronin, "Afghanistan: United Nations Sponsored Negotiations," Congressional Research Service, July 23, 1986, p. 8. New York Times, May 4, 1983. Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1983. Some of the more radical fundamentalist groups have already succeeded in carrying out cross border attacks against the Soviets and have vowed to continue (Arab News, April 6,1987). For a more thorough discussion of the goals of the resistance see Olivier Roy, Islam and the Afghan Resistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) Washington Post, March 30, 1983. This news was leaked by the Soviets to the United News of India, cited in Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1983. New York Times, May 4,1983. New York Times, May 27,1983. Washington Post, December 29,1983. New York Times, July 4,1983. Washington Post January 13, 1985. This was the Tsongas resolution which was finally passed on October 4,1994. Washington Post, January 13, 1987. Afghan Update (published by the Federation for American Afghan Action), July 13,1985. Philadelphia Inquirer, February 29,1988. Confidential source who travelled with the resistance and showed the author photographs of explosives with the name of this company on them. FBIS, May 14,1985. New York Times, June 19,1986. Wall Street Journal, February 16,1988. Thames Television (London), "The Missile Trail" on This Week, September 17,1987. Rumor has it that Nigeria was the third country, but it could have been Chile who sold Blowpipes to the CIA for its operation in Nicaragua. Joint Senate Congressional Hearings on the Iran Contra Affair, May 20,1987; Exhibit JKS 6. The proposed plan would allow the CIA to acquire Soviet bloc weapons for the Afghan rebels, the contras, UNITA and other "freedom fighters" without Congressional appropriations or approval. The Wall Street Journal on February 16, 1988 revealed that weapons for the rebels had been purchased from Poland. A confidential source informed the author that Stettin was the port they were being shipped out of. The Nation (Pakistan), January 8, 1987. Jack Anderson in the Washington Post, May 12,1987. Washington Post, January 13,1987. Philadelphia Inquirer, February 28, 1988. The Nation (Pakistan), January 8, 1988. Columbia Journalism Review May/June, 1987; it is also worth noting that Maitre was a senior editor for CIA connected Axel Springer Publishing Company in Germany. He also, for no apparent reason, has military clearance. After the bombing of Libya, Maitre was one of the people who debriefed the American pilots. Announced at USIA conference on Afghanistan in Washington, D.C., May 5,1987. Los Angeles Times, January 13, 1988. CBS contract journalist Kurt Lohbeck also has strong ties to "Behind the Lines News Service," an operation set up by arch conservatives Hugh Newton and Antony Campaigne. New York Times, June 6,1986. Philadelphia Inquirer, February 28,1988. McMahon was the focus of attacks by rebel supporters on the CIA's Afghan program (especially by the Federation for American Afghan Action which claimed responsibility for McMahon's eventual resignation). Also see Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981 1997 (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1987). FBIS, March 18,1986. Warren Carroll, "The Freedom Fighter," (Heritage Foundation), cited in Afghan Update, May 27, 1986. Washington Post, February 8, 1987. Strategic Investment Newsletter, March 9, 1987; Philadelphia Inquirer, March 1, 1988. Independent (London), October 16, 1987. Philadelphia Inquirer, February 28,1988 REFERENCE: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 Never ending Flow: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster  Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 1 The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Chagatai Khan: The Afghan Pipeline By Steve Galster. - 2 Chagatai Khan: "LIE" with General (R) Hamid Gul on ARY NEWS.