HMS Queen Elizabeth. 3 years, no jets then scrapped.

Must be a bunch of optimists then!
 

P.B.I.

Crow
So... the aid money the UK sends to India, a country with it's own space program, effectively helps them secure a maritime patrol capability to protect their naval assets while the MOD has to compromise it's own combat effectiveness.... will we never be allowed to learn from past experience
 

P.B.I.

Crow
And the next instalment.... Britain is selling more RN ships possibly to Chile or Brazil... this time up to 5 type 23 destroyers and and helicopter assault ship (Bulwark). Weren't the 23's built to track Russian subs...
 
B

benjaminw1

Guest
The book was written by General Sir Alexander Richard David Shirreff, KCB, CBE who is a retired senior British Army officer. From March 2011 to March 2014 he served as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, he seems to have had an insight into the subject from a different level to the rest of us.

'You fail to read this book at your peril' - Admiral James G Stavridis, US Navy, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Closely modelled on his NATO experience of war gaming future conflicts, 2017 War With Russia is a chilling account of where we are heading if we fail to recognise the threat posed by the Russian president.
Unfortunatlely it is embarrassing badly researched and written crap; especially when describing Putin and the Russians as panto villians. It is somewhat worrying that someone could reach this rank with this low level of intellect. General Sir John Hackett he aint.
 
And the next instalment.... Britain is selling more RN ships possibly to Chile or Brazil... this time up to 5 type 23 destroyers and and helicopter assault ship (Bulwark). Weren't the 23's built to track Russian subs...
good thing there are no submarines in South America then...
 

aardvark64

Old-Salt
Unfortunatlely it is embarrassing badly researched and written crap; especially when describing Putin and the Russians as panto villians. It is somewhat worrying that someone could reach this rank with this low level of intellect. General Sir John Hackett he aint.
IMHO, Tom Clancy's 'Red Storm Rising' was more believable...
 
...Thing is, Nimrod (and Astute) were caused by the post Cold War cuts removing expertise from all three players - industry, DE&S and the forces. Those failures were very much a joint effort. You cannot single one out as dominant.

Industry lost the ability to do the job as the work dried up and they had to make mass redundancies to survive. That meant they were desperate for work so as not to close more factories - after all BAE had a stark choice, win Nimrod or close Woodford...
I'd certainly agree the failure was collectively down to industry, DE&S and the military although I'd argue that there was plenty of MPA experience still invested in the Programme throughout its life. The PT were particularly poor but the smoke and mirrors adopted by BAeS in a bid to hide issues meant that we viewed them as 'the opposition'; never helpful!

This even extended to Warton's flying regulations being amended to require a crash wagon attending all engine starts. That would then be delayed up to 4 hours late for sorties the Company didn't want us to fly!

...The RAF cut savagely, broke military airworthiness as documented by Haddon Cave, and while that meant they weren't an intelligent customer any more they were unfortunately arrogant enough not to realise this...
I agree to an extent but would suggest we didn't evolve anything like quickly enough during a period when more and more pressure was being placed on the 'risk averse' RAF to deliver ISR on ops. The result was XV230.

...Astute of course only survived as it was vital for the deterrent and so UK plc was prepared to fund importing expertise from EB. Nimrod wasn't.
I would disagree and suggest that events since 2010 have more than proved that MPA are essential to Op RELENTLESS.

Regards,
MM
 

Yokel

LE
@One_of_the_strange both SSN and MPA do far more that support CASD.

No Astute = no SSNs post Trafalgar class = the end of the UK as a naval player. The lack of MPA has made all sorts of things more difficult, including recent operations like Ellemy and ongoing ones like Kipion, as well as contributing to NATO.
 
I'd certainly agree the failure was collectively down to industry, DE&S and the military although I'd argue that there was plenty of MPA experience still invested in the Programme throughout its life. The PT were particularly poor but the smoke and mirrors adopted by BAeS in a bid to hide issues meant that we viewed them as 'the opposition'; never helpful!

This even extended to Warton's flying regulations being amended to require a crash wagon attending all engine starts. That would then be delayed up to 4 hours late for sorties the Company didn't want us to fly!



I agree to an extent but would suggest we didn't evolve anything like quickly enough during a period when more and more pressure was being placed on the 'risk averse' RAF to deliver ISR on ops. The result was XV230.



I would disagree and suggest that events since 2010 have more than proved that MPA are essential to Op RELENTLESS.

Regards,
MM
I'm not trying to defend anyone; I'd also note that from personal experience the way the UK buys defence equipment bakes confrontation into the relationship. You either deal with reality - by training staff, civilian and uniformed, to deal with it - or sit back and moan when it fails. There are plenty of people out there with the experience to help you stitch BAE up if only you could work out a way of employing them. Or training them.

Besides, I'd argue one of the problems was too much "traditional" MPA experience. MRA4 was very clearly what we had last time plus bells and whistles - which was never, ever going to be certifiable to 21st century standards. Once that was missed a trajectory to failure was assured.

As to essential, we can buy a MPA from elsewhere; we cannot buy a nuclear submarine. That's what I was driving at.
 
I'm not trying to defend anyone; I'd also note that from personal experience the way the UK buys defence equipment bakes confrontation into the relationship. You either deal with reality - by training staff, civilian and uniformed, to deal with it - or sit back and moan when it fails. There are plenty of people out there with the experience to help you stitch BAE up if only you could work out a way of employing them. Or training them.

Besides, I'd argue one of the problems was too much "traditional" MPA experience. MRA4 was very clearly what we had last time plus bells and whistles - which was never, ever going to be certifiable to 21st century standards. Once that was missed a trajectory to failure was assured.

As to essential, we can buy a MPA from elsewhere; we cannot buy a nuclear submarine. That's what I was driving at.
I couldn't agree more.

The tragedy is that, had we built completely new build MRA4 airframes to modern airworthiness standards, it would have been - by a considerable margin - the finest MPA/MMA in the World. :(

I also get where you were coming from with Astute now; apologies for being slow!

Regards,
MM
 
I couldn't agree more.

The tragedy is that, had we built completely new build MRA4 airframes to modern airworthiness standards, it would have been - by a considerable margin - the finest MPA/MMA in the World. :(

I also get where you were coming from with Astute now; apologies for being slow!

Regards,
MM
Trouble is with that approach is that it would have costs nearing those for designing a commercial airliner of that size - that is, far more than the UK would be prepared to spend. I cannot overstate how expensive this is, the scale of the effort to design such things as the 787 and A350 is mind boggling. Mind you, that gives you something that will work flawlessly for decades or your money back but you do need to sell a lot to recover your costs. But I digress.

It is much, much cheaper to take an existing, mature commercial airframe and do what Boeing did, even if you have to pay for some new weapons or whatever to cope with a different flight profile.

Plus any modern design effort would conclude that wing root engines are a stupid idea unless you're worrried about low observability. of course, back in 1949 when the Comet first flew and the B-47 was in development it would have been a brave man who predicted which concept would come out on top decades later. But now we know.
 

Yokel

LE
With reference to Nimrod MRA4, you would have hoped lessons would have be learnt from the AEW3 saga.

BAe Nimrod AEW 3
 

P.B.I.

Crow
I like a critic and devil's advocate.... could you expand on your reasons for questioning the authors hypothetical scenario? Granted the ending could have been better, a little rushed in my view.
 
I'm rather worried that Resasi has been combing through my old posts for piffle, nonsense and outrage bugles.

Which oddly is nicely distracting at the moment.
Quite safe.

Purely done self defence against AnalPark's one man muslim outrage bus driven at full speed in my direction.

However, yes they have been paid for, our first jets are in production, 201 Sqn personnel are already arriving for training (to add to the Seedcorn crews we already have qualified on type), and the infra build starts soon.
Nine with the first arriving Lossie some time in 2019 ?

With UK personnel on the recent USS Wasp trials and pilots on the USS America’s DT3, estimates are UK 35B’s on QE 2018 hopefully.

QE and Dragon together for trials. Dragon on her way back.
 
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