HMS Queen Elizabeth. 3 years, no jets then scrapped.

Flight

LE
Book Reviewer
Quite.
 
According to the book '2017 at war with Russia' HMS Queen Elizabeth is going to be sunk because she has no credible anti-submarine screen ships and nothing like the old Nimrod which could coordinate assets into one cohesive network. I recommend you all read this book....
 

Flight

LE
Book Reviewer
Lol,

I'm rather worried that Resasi has been combing through my old posts for piffle, nonsense and outrage bugles.

Which oddly is nicely distracting at the moment.
 
Lol,

I'm rather worried that Resasi has been combing through my old posts for piffle, nonsense and outrage bugles.

Which oddly is nicely distracting at the moment.
Nice pair of norks, by the way.
 
According to the book '2017 at war with Russia' HMS Queen Elizabeth is going to be sunk because she has no credible anti-submarine screen ships and nothing like the old Nimrod which could coordinate assets into one cohesive network...
Apart from the E-3D, coalition MPA or from 2019 RAF P-8!

Regards,
MM
 
Plenthy of room on board , gather up all the illegals in this country and send the ship on a round the world cruise , throw off the illegals when passing neared to their country of origin
 
Chickens.....or have they already been paid for.
The BREXIT vote has not been ideal for the P-8.

However, yes they have been paid for, our first jets are in production, 201 Sqn personnel are already arriving for training (to add to the Seedcorn crews we already have qualified on type), and the infra build starts soon.

Regards,
MM
 
According to the book '2017 at war with Russia' HMS Queen Elizabeth is going to be sunk because she has no credible anti-submarine screen ships and nothing like the old Nimrod which could coordinate assets into one cohesive network. I recommend you all read this book....
Apart from the Type 23 - considered a world leaders in ASW, and having a SSN attached to the group. She will also have a squadron of ASW Merlins embarked - in fact providing long range ASW for a task group is a carrier role.

Who wrote the book?
 
The book was written by General Sir Alexander Richard David Shirreff, KCB, CBE who is a retired senior British Army officer. From March 2011 to March 2014 he served as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, he seems to have had an insight into the subject from a different level to the rest of us.

'You fail to read this book at your peril' - Admiral James G Stavridis, US Navy, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Closely modelled on his NATO experience of war gaming future conflicts, 2017 War With Russia is a chilling account of where we are heading if we fail to recognise the threat posed by the Russian president.
 
The P8 Poseidon does look like a very capable ac, I was surprised India have several in service but the UK were so slow to recognise the need to have such a capability. The fact that Boeing make it may also have had an effect on how the UK dealt with the Boeing/Bombardier problem recently.

It will also be the largest "bomber" the RAF have had since Nimrod was scrapped!
 
We could have built the P8 or "owned its design" if we hadn't decided to re-use nimrod airframes.

I heard that during MRA4 the Americans asked about new airframes for their P3 replacement and IIRC the Boeing smarts inside P8 are ex MRA4 anyway to some level.
 
The P8 Poseidon does look like a very capable ac, I was surprised India have several in service but the UK were so slow to recognise the need to have such a capability. The fact that Boeing make it may also have had an effect on how the UK dealt with the Boeing/Bombardier problem recently.

It will also be the largest "bomber" the RAF have had since Nimrod was scrapped!
The UK were not 'slow to recognise the need to have such a capability.'

The USN and RAF were originally going to replace their P-3Cs and Nimrod MR2s respectively with the P-7, a very heavily modified and new build variant of the Orion.

When the P-7 Programme was cancelled in 1990, the RAF ordered the Nimrod 2000 which was later redesignated MRA4. Had that aircraft been built to modern standards it would have been the finest MPA in the world. Unfortunately, a combination of funding constraints and BAeS/DE&S idiocy meant that the decision was taken to produce new build wings and attach them to refurbished MR2 fuselage.

Old and bold BAeS workers at Woodford who'd been involved with Nimrod production for decades told the fast jet centric BAeS leadership this was a VERY bad idea but were ignored. This decision was a key factor in the MRA4's subsequent failure.

When the MRA4 was cancelled in 2010, the RAF negotiated places for 30 MR2 and MRA4 aircrew to related posts flying P-8A, P-3Cs, MQ-4C and RQ-21 with the USN, RAAF AP-3Cs, RNZAF P-3K2s and RCAF CP-140s. These 'Seedcorn' personnel were used in the belief that MPA remained very much relevant to the UK despite widespread criticism from some in the RN that we didn't care about MPAs, and when the Army and HMG were questioning the relevance of anything that wasn't directly relevant to COIN ops in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Army were particularly critical of the Seedcorn programme.

Meanwhile, the RAF then started an influence campaign to justify the re-establishment of a UK MPA capability focused almost entirely on the P-8 although latterly including the Japanese P-1 (which in many respects is superior to the P-8 ) as these were the only types which could meet UK requirements.

Finally, Indian P-8Is were ordered around the time the MRA4 was cancelled and when UK aid was still being paid to Delhi! However, the P-8I is a very different aeroplane to the P-8As being operated and procured by the USN, RAAF, RAF and RNorAF.

...I heard that during MRA4 the Americans asked about new airframes for their P3 replacement and IIRC the Boeing smarts inside P8 are ex MRA4 anyway to some level.
The P-8A uses the same Boeing mission as the Nimrod MRA4. Indeed, former MRA4 Seedcorn aircrew massively de-risked P-8A op test and evaluation at a time when the USN were encountering some of the issues we'd overcome at Warton.

Regards,
MM
 
The UK were not 'slow to recognise the need to have such a capability.'

The USN and RAF were originally going to replace their P-3Cs and Nimrod MR2s respectively with the P-7, a very heavily modified and new build variant of the Orion.

When the P-7 Programme was cancelled in 1990, the RAF ordered the Nimrod 2000 which was later redesignated MRA4. Had that aircraft been built to modern standards it would have been the finest MPA in the world. Unfortunately, a combination of funding constraints and BAeS/DE&S idiocy meant that the decision was taken to produce new build wings and attach them to refurbished MR2 fuselage.

Old and bold BAeS workers at Woodford who'd been involved with Nimrod production for decades told the fast jet centric BAeS leadership this was a VERY bad idea but were ignored. This decision was a key factor in the MRA4's subsequent failure.

When the MRA4 was cancelled in 2010, the RAF negotiated places for 30 MR2 and MRA4 aircrew to related posts flying P-8A, P-3Cs, MQ-4C and RQ-21 with the USN, RAAF AP-3Cs, RNZAF P-3K2s and RCAF CP-140s. These 'Seedcorn' personnel were used in the belief that MPA remained very much relevant to the UK despite widespread criticism from some in the RN that we didn't care about MPAs, and when the Army and HMG were questioning the relevance of anything that wasn't directly relevant to COIN ops in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Army were particularly critical of the Seedcorn programme.

Meanwhile, the RAF then started an influence campaign to justify the re-establishment of a UK MPA capability focused almost entirely on the P-8 although latterly including the Japanese P-1 (which in many respects is superior to the P-8 ) as these were the only types which could meet UK requirements.

Finally, Indian P-8Is were ordered around the time the MRA4 was cancelled and when UK aid was still being paid to Delhi! However, the P-8I is a very different aeroplane to the P-8As being operated and procured by the USN, RAAF, RAF and RNorAF.



The P-8A uses the same Boeing mission as the Nimrod MRA4. Indeed, former MRA4 Seedcorn aircrew massively de-risked P-8A op test and evaluation at a time when the USN were encountering some of the issues we'd overcome at Warton.

Regards,
MM
Did we get any money off for the Services of the Seedcorn guys? Is the increased UK activity (investment/employment) by Boeing related to this?
 
Did we get any money off for the Services of the Seedcorn guys? Is the increased UK activity (investment/employment) by Boeing related to this?
Not off the P-8 I wouldn’t have thought; the benefits were primarily ours and the USN. What we have done though is to get some of the most experienced P-8 guys around before we’ve even got any in RAF markings.

That means we can hit the ground running when the first one arrives in 2 years.

Regards,
MM
 
When the MRA4 was cancelled in 2010, the RAF negotiated places for 30 MR2 and MRA4 aircrew to related posts ...
And how much of that seedcorn is still current and available to the RAF, rather than retired or transferred to thier host's AF?
 
The book was written by General Sir Alexander Richard David Shirreff, KCB, CBE who is a retired senior British Army officer. From March 2011 to March 2014 he served as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, he seems to have had an insight into the subject from a different level to the rest of us.

'You fail to read this book at your peril' - Admiral James G Stavridis, US Navy, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Closely modelled on his NATO experience of war gaming future conflicts, 2017 War With Russia is a chilling account of where we are heading if we fail to recognise the threat posed by the Russian president.
Is he up to speed on ASW and other naval capabilities? No ASW escorts - really?
 
And how much of that seedcorn is still current and available to the RAF, rather than retired or transferred to thier host's AF?
Pretty much all of it.

Regards,
MM
 
The UK were not 'slow to recognise the need to have such a capability.'

The USN and RAF were originally going to replace their P-3Cs and Nimrod MR2s respectively with the P-7, a very heavily modified and new build variant of the Orion.

When the P-7 Programme was cancelled in 1990, the RAF ordered the Nimrod 2000 which was later redesignated MRA4. Had that aircraft been built to modern standards it would have been the finest MPA in the world. Unfortunately, a combination of funding constraints and BAeS/DE&S idiocy meant that the decision was taken to produce new build wings and attach them to refurbished MR2 fuselage.

Old and bold BAeS workers at Woodford who'd been involved with Nimrod production for decades told the fast jet centric BAeS leadership this was a VERY bad idea but were ignored. This decision was a key factor in the MRA4's subsequent failure.

When the MRA4 was cancelled in 2010, the RAF negotiated places for 30 MR2 and MRA4 aircrew to related posts flying P-8A, P-3Cs, MQ-4C and RQ-21 with the USN, RAAF AP-3Cs, RNZAF P-3K2s and RCAF CP-140s. These 'Seedcorn' personnel were used in the belief that MPA remained very much relevant to the UK despite widespread criticism from some in the RN that we didn't care about MPAs, and when the Army and HMG were questioning the relevance of anything that wasn't directly relevant to COIN ops in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Army were particularly critical of the Seedcorn programme.

Meanwhile, the RAF then started an influence campaign to justify the re-establishment of a UK MPA capability focused almost entirely on the P-8 although latterly including the Japanese P-1 (which in many respects is superior to the P-8 ) as these were the only types which could meet UK requirements.

Finally, Indian P-8Is were ordered around the time the MRA4 was cancelled and when UK aid was still being paid to Delhi! However, the P-8I is a very different aeroplane to the P-8As being operated and procured by the USN, RAAF, RAF and RNorAF.



The P-8A uses the same Boeing mission as the Nimrod MRA4. Indeed, former MRA4 Seedcorn aircrew massively de-risked P-8A op test and evaluation at a time when the USN were encountering some of the issues we'd overcome at Warton.

Regards,
MM
I was working in BAE MA when Nimrod was announced - just before I jumped ship to MES and Astute, proving that someone has a sense of humour. So I have some insight into the problem at first hand.

Thing is, Nimrod (and Astute) were caused by the post Cold War cuts removing expertise from all three players - industry, DE&S and the forces. Those failures were very much a joint effort. You cannot single one out as dominant.

Industry lost the ability to do the job as the work dried up and they had to make mass redundancies to survive. That meant they were desperate for work so as not to close more factories - after all BAE had a stark choice, win Nimrod or close Woodford.

DE&S cut savagely and bought into the mantra that they would get industry to take over their traditional roles, the only problem being that now they couldn't understand what industry were doing.

The RAF cut savagely, broke military airworthiness as documented by Haddon Cave, and while that meant they weren't an intelligent customer any more they were unfortunately arrogant enough not to realise this.

So, the blind working for the blind, supervised by the blind. Never going to end well.

Astute of course only survived as it was vital for the deterrent and so UK plc was prepared to fund importing expertise from EB. Nimrod wasn't.
 

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