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"Green Berets On Trial"

I meant to add, in that clip I posted earlier, the Australians refer to the Viet Cong as "Nogs". Is that accurate? I never heard that before.

You'll also note that one of the SASR blokes gives the captive a tin of Budweiser. Now we all know it should a "VB"!
 
RP578 said:
I meant to add, in that clip I posted earlier, the Australians refer to the Viet Cong as "Nogs". Is that accurate? I never heard that before.

You'll also note that one of the SASR blokes gives the captive a tin of Budweiser. Now we all know it should a "VB"!

I think the diggers always referred to the enemy as 'nogs' or 'the enemy'.

A very good book on this subject is Tiger Men by Barry Petersen, who was in this situation up to the eyeballs, and makes Col. Kurtz look naive! I'm not sure if Petersen was THEM, but he did the 'Code of Conduct' course (RTI) during his build up training, and only sneaky-beaky types did that sort of training in those days.

I really recommend Tiger Men, if only to wonder how much the author had to omit!
 
Hi RP

Re: This bit.

That one flew right over my head. Does it really matter if personnel were temporarily placed under the command of an agency, or were in fact paid members of of it, if the results are the same?

I say yes it does, particularly given your first post which states:

The whole case sounds bizarre i.e. the CIA using SF to assinate agents and the US Army charging them for it. From what I can glean from Wiki, the Sec of the Army dismissed the case. Does anyone know anymore about what happened?

The point I was gently trying to make was that in Vietnam generally and in this case in particular, contrary to popular opinion, the CIA did not use SF or anyone else for that matter, to assassinate anybody. The CIA unfairly get the blame for the most famous Vietnam era assassination, that of the Ngo brothers in 1963, this came as a complete surprise to those who plotted the coup.

That the CIA ended up with the reputation as ruthless assassins as a result of their activities in Vietnam can be put down to journalists with a particular ideological bent. One of the most famous and flawed contributions to the oeuvre was Douglas Valentines “The Phoenix Program’. You can read it for free here, but that would deny you the opportunity to use the hard copy as toilet paper. A fate, which it so richly deserves.

Valentine, who already had an inbuilt bias, was utterly taken in by a brazen Walt named Elton Manzione. If nothing else, this episode shows the true benefits of the noble art of ‘Walt-hunting’ and the important contribution it makes to the way that history is recorded. :D


Now this is an interesting one! Correct me when I err here, but wasn't Australia initially very reluctant to deploy troops to Borneo (I realise that they had some on the Malay Peninsular throughout the Confrontation), doing so in 1964 after repeated British requests? The AATTV deploy to South Viet Nam in 1962 which would indicate a different set of priorities for the Australian Government.

I realise that Australia feared that the fighting in Borneo might have adverse effect on the Papua New Guinea border, but as with invasion of East Timor, it does seem as if successive governments in Canberra have preferred to avoid upsetting Jakarta.
[/i]

I am astoundingly impressed by the depth of your knowledge on this. :D You are dead right. It illustrates the point that Australia’s strategic interests and priorities were out of synch with the UK in the 1960’s. In 1961, Australia was very keen to commit the battalion with 28th Comm. Bde to intervene in Laos. The UK vetoed it in SEATO. The UK simply couldn’t afford it and it did not advance the UK’s strategic interests. Which at that time was to retain the favourable UK trading preference with its Asian ex-colonies.

Australia had to be pushed kicking and screaming into Borneo because it didn’t want to antagonise the Indonesians with whom we shared a long land border with in PNG. That all changed of course after Suharto’s ‘living dangerously’ speech. At which time Australia realised the seriousness of the situation and was prepared to commit one of its very few Infantry battalions to Borneo. In addition Australia felt insecure enough to want a bit of nuclear deterrence. Something the UK was generous enough to provide, with a flight of ‘V’ Bombers based out of Darwin.


I meant to add, in that clip I posted earlier, the Australians refer to the Viet Cong as "Nogs". Is that accurate? I never heard that before.
You'll also note that one of the SASR blokes gives the captive a tin of Budweiser. Now we all know it should a "VB"!


Australians often referred to all Vietnamese as ‘Nogs’, obviously a contraction of Nig-Nog so it was a derogatory and racist appellation that reflected typical attitudes of the time. VC/NVA enemy were referred to as Nigel Nog or simply Nigel, kind of similar to Terry Taliban or Terry. The more things change eh?

Regards

Mick
 
mnairb said:
I don't know about NZSAS, but Aussi SAS worked very successfully along the Cambodian border, intercepting supply trains along the Ho Chi Minh trail.

There is absolutely no reference to any such activity in the books published so far on the Australian SAS. However, you may be thinking about the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) units that worked with the Montagnards under CIA auspices in that area.

The AATTV is/was the most highly decorated unit in the Australian Armed Forces:
Victoria Cross (VC) 4
Distinguished Service Order (DSO) 2
Order of the British Empire (OBE) 3
Member of the British Empire (MBE) 6
Military Cross (MC) 6
Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM) 20
Military Medal (MM) 16
British Empire Medal (BEM) 4
Mentioned in Dispatches (MID) 49
Queens Commendation 4

Over the ten year period of their existence there were about 1,000 members of the team in total.

There is an excellent book about the AATTV called "The Team" by Ian McNeil. Unfortunately it is out of print but it is the best one detailing their history.
 
auscam said:
RP578 said:
I meant to add, in that clip I posted earlier, the Australians refer to the Viet Cong as "Nogs". Is that accurate? I never heard that before.

You'll also note that one of the SASR blokes gives the captive a tin of Budweiser. Now we all know it should a "VB"!

I think the diggers always referred to the enemy as 'nogs' or 'the enemy'.

A very good book on this subject is Tiger Men by Barry Petersen, who was in this situation up to the eyeballs, and makes Col. Kurtz look naive! I'm not sure if Petersen was THEM, but he did the 'Code of Conduct' course (RTI) during his build up training, and only sneaky-beaky types did that sort of training in those days.

I really recommend Tiger Men, if only to wonder how much the author had to omit!


Hi Auscam.

Petersen was never 'them', straight infantry he was.

Mind you the bloke he replaced was ex-UK 'them'.

The 'Code of conduct' course was not restricted to sneaky beaks. The course run at 'Phillip Island' always was. The finishing school was run by the UK out of Singapore. Not many did that one. Petersen's predecessor certainly did.

There is a lot that Petersen omits.

I simply chuckle when Petersen is tagged as the inspiration for 'Colonel Kurtz' The movie is a nonsense and he joins a long list of other 'inspirations' including Hackworth and the previously mentioned Rheault WTF?

Will the real inspiration please stand up?

While Petersen might have enjoyed the experience of 'going native', what military utility did his Truong Son Force achieve? You won't find that in Tiger Men. That is ultimately the most important bit he omits. What did they achieve?

Petersen probably achieved much more in terms of 'military utility' on his second tour with 2RAR in 70-71, when as a Company Commander he did quite well. He scored an MID for that one, at a time when even MID's were hard to come by.

Regards

Mick
 
chippymick said:
I am astoundingly impressed by the depth of your knowledge on this. :D You are dead right. It illustrates the point that Australia’s strategic interests and priorities were out of synch with the UK in the 1960’s. In 1961, Australia was very keen to commit the battalion with 28th Comm. Bde to intervene in Laos. The UK vetoed it in SEATO. The UK simply couldn’t afford it and it did not advance the UK’s strategic interests. Which at that time was to retain the favourable UK trading preference with its Asian ex-colonies.

Australia had to be pushed kicking and screaming into Borneo because it didn’t want to antagonise the Indonesians with whom we shared a long land border with in PNG. That all changed of course after Suharto’s ‘living dangerously’ speech. At which time Australia realised the seriousness of the situation and was prepared to commit one of its very few Infantry battalions to Borneo. In addition Australia felt insecure enough to want a bit of nuclear deterrence. Something the UK was generous enough to provide, with a flight of ‘V’ Bombers based out of Darwin.

This period has been a bit of a fascination for me for a good few years now. I've joked to the Mrs that if I ever get on the quiz show 'Mastermind' my specialist subject is going to be The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation 1963-66.

The bit about potential SEATO intervention in Laos is interesting. It's forgotten now what a Cold War flashpoint Laos was considered back in the early 1960s. SEATO itself though was always going to be a bit of toothless tiger as best described in this blurb from Wiki:

Despite being intended to provide a collective, anti-communist shield to Southeast Asia, SEATO was unable to intervene in the conflicts in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam because an intervention required a decision of unanimity, which was never reached; France and the Philippines objected. Intervention in the Vietnam conflict was sought again later, but France and Pakistan withheld support.

Unlike the NATO alliance, SEATO had no joint commands with standing forces. Also unlike NATO, an attack on one member was not automatically considered an attack on all. Consequently, each member could effectively block any or all collective SEATO action. Given the declining interest of France (after 1954) and the United Kingdom (after the end of the Indonesian-Malaysian conflict, in 1966) in Southeast Asia, SEATO failed to be effective as a collective security organization.

Point taken on the role of the CIA. I vaguely recall a documentary many years back by the Australian journalist John Pilger, where Pilger implicated "Australian intelligence" as having run assassination teams. Reviewing Pilger's work over the years though, a lot of it seems to come from the Wilfred Burchett school of arranging the world to fit his politics.


p.s. It was actually Sukharno who gave the "year of living dangerously" speech and not Suharto.
 
Hi RP

Re: This bit


RP578 said:
p.s. It was actually Sukharno who gave the "year of living dangerously" speech and not Suharto.

Quite right. :oops:

Sometimes I'm embarrassed to be Australian by assosciation; Burchett and Pilger are the two that I'd most like to disown.

But hey, the Kiwi journo's were just as bad!

Have you had a look at Peter Arnett and Operation TAILWIND yet? Same theme - similar result.

More journalists suffering from cognitive dissonance and more Walts telling them what they want to hear.



Regards

Mick.
 
"The 'Code of conduct' course was not restricted to sneaky beaks. The course run at 'Phillip Island' always was. The finishing school was run by the UK out of Singapore. Not many did that one. Petersen's predecessor certainly did."

Mick, at the risk of being proved wrong and thread drift, I think that the island was the one just inside Port Phillip heads and not Phillip Island.

Will admit to possibility of being wrong on this but did once have the island pointed out to me as I flew near it once.

Cheers
 
BaronBoy said:
"The 'Code of conduct' course was not restricted to sneaky beaks. The course run at 'Phillip Island' always was. The finishing school was run by the UK out of Singapore. Not many did that one. Petersen's predecessor certainly did."

Mick, at the risk of being proved wrong and thread drift, I think that the island was the one just inside Port Phillip heads and not Phillip Island.

Will admit to possibility of being wrong on this but did once have the island pointed out to me as I flew near it once.

Cheers

BB, you’re not wrong, you are absolutely correct it was Swan Island in as you say ‘Port Phillip Bay’, my bad, sorry. I’ve never even flown over it. :oops:

As I have established myself as an unreliable witness you should get the real story from the horse’s mouth rather from the other end.


Peter Jarratt was an Armoured Corps officer who was an early advisor in Vietnam. He was interviewed as part of the Australians at war film archive project and you can read the transcript of his interview here. Jarratt ended up working for the ‘Combined Studies Division’ working on a project called ‘Peoples Action Teams’, these eventually evolved into ‘provincial reconnaissance Units’


His story is a ripping yarn and the whole thing is well worth reading. Many of the issues raised in this thread are candidly discussed by Jarratt.

The ‘Code of Conduct Course’ is discussed at 04:00:30:15

Although most of Jarratt’s transcript regarding training on Swan Island is embargoed until 2034, what he is able to say about it, can be found from 04:22:00:05

Barry Petersen’s operation at Ban Me Thuot is covered from 05:00:30:11

An explanation of how and why Australasian Advisors worked for the CIA starts at 05:35:00:00

The ramifications of crossing the borders are covered at 06:07:30:12

Barry Petersen’s film archive interview transcript can be found here.


One of the most effective Australian Advisors working with the PRU was Len Opie, His is a fascinating story, and you
can read it here.


The Australian Film transcripts are a terrific resource; I wish that the UK and the US had something to match them.

Regards

Mick.
 
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