Graduated Commitment Model

I've heard a lot of comment about the Graduated Commitment Model on here but can't find any hard information about it, (yeah, I know, I know, it's a *rumour* service..)

Anyone got a linky/source for the report/proposals or whatever so I can educate myself as to what it actually (potentially) entails?

 

Basically it is a plan to turn the TA into a recruit training and junior soldier IR generating machine. No place for officers or SNCOs except as admin bitches and training enablers. There has been a paper kicking around the bazaars for a couple of months now, but IIRC it's 'RESTRICTED' - so you (probably) won't find it online....though it has been copied pretty widely (to all TA COs for a start).

 

Intresting, was there any input on retention both of the OR's and of the seniors and officers?

And if that is the idea why than call it 'Graduated Commitment Model', rather than 'Rerole the TA'? It sounds as if there is a sliding scale of commitment vs return.I'm assuming that there is more to it than just that, but that is probably the overal thrust of it.

 

There is a lot of guff around the edges - "more resources if preparing for operations" etc. But when you strip away the bullsh*t the net effect will be to deliver what the Army says it wants and needs. A source of cheap private soldiers to support surges of requirement; not formed units with command structures that are never going to be used on operations.

 

So the Army can supply and man enough Field Hospitals by itself? That will please the NHS.

GCM has nothing to do with what the Army "thinks" it needs for the next 2,3,4,5 or 6 decades but what HM Treasury "thinks" it can afford. Anything else is smoke and mirrors.

 

I am looking forward to seeing the TA training programme that is going to turn a recruit into a Consultant Anaesthetist or even a moderately competent Nurse in a timely and cost effective manner!

 

Well, the recruiters say they are battering potential recruits away from the doors with sticks - so the GCM appears to be the answer to yesterdays problem....

 

Ahhh, about right for introduction in around 6 months when they've *just* identified a totally different requirement then

Ta for the steer gents, doubt I'll get a nose at it as our CoC don't believe in passing out too much info but I shall watch with interest anyway.

Mind you, could be a queue for some monster mess functions before we all get laid off.
(at least until 6 to 12 months later when they realise it's fubar'd and quietly try to reverse everything on the cheap...)

Interesting times!

 

hook, line, and sinker? Ok, you got me.

here goes....the GCM (as I have been banging on about for ages) is indeed, the means by which the Regular Army finally 'controls' the TA, wipes out those irritating Officers and SNCOs, and 'caps' MTDs (control, control) for those 'wasters' who aren't able or willing to mobilise.

In a simple sleight of hand, the GCM will define the TA as a simplistic machine for generating IRs. Indeed, many Corps are already off down this line with the Infantry talking about all units becoming 'Training' Battalions and the Royal Signals (even they with so few to play with now) talking about 'generic signallers'.

In essence, the GCM splits the TA into 3 pools - Pool 1 is normal jogging, no commitment, 27 MTDs to achieve a basic level of training and attendance. Pool 2 is when, and only when, members of Pool 1 put their hand up as 'interested in being mobilised. It's not clear how long one stays in Pool 2, how it is administered, and how this links with FORM, the OCP and/or hybrid TA/Reg Units. However, the MTD allocation rises to circa 90 MTDs. Pool 3 is in the sand. When you have finished in the sandy bits, you either fall back into Pool 1 or possibly Pool 2 to 'share' the experience and/or train others on their way through albeit that again, this isn't clear. Pool 1 is about 75% of the force, Pool 2 about 20% and the rest are on Ops - how big the 'Force' will be though is again unanswered at this stage however, you can bet your life it won't be 30,000.

So, add this to the RTC Review (Regular commands?), the Review of the Reserve Estate (fewer bigger TACs), and hybrid TA/Regular Units, then the dearth of TA Officers and a screwed up funding system through the Divisions (soons to be axed) all will seem somewhat immaterial...

The Army in it's blind short term ignorance will get what it thinks it wants. By the time it realises that it ripped the heart out of the volunteer ethos, it will be a) too late and b) all those involved will have moved on, taken tea, received medals, and retired on a fat pension.

Don't think it is a myth - it was approved in the summer before the previous CRF moved on. It's coming to a TAC near you and soon. [edited to add...'and it really FCUKS me off']

RIP

 

so what happens when "the sand" stops, possibly within three years (5 even is still very short term but looking probable), are we left with an army and reserve which can only do one single type of operation? what happens when something different has to be dealt with?

 

It's rather a simplistic idea and won't sit well at all with the reality of what my unit currently does, and I doubt we're alone. SNCOs aren't all enablers where I am, most of us are analysts and it takes most people until they're a Sgt to become useful in that role. Now we can of course redefine ourselves as merely a LCpl generation unit, but that means a much smaller unit and the regs probably lose a Bn (and the CO / RSM roles they covet) as 3 and 5 would shrink and become ripe for amalgamation.

That of course means we'd be no more than a gap year provider of choice, and once commitment scales down there'd be no use for us at all, as normal jogging in the UK has openings for analysts not baby A3 LCpls.

I'm also puzzled as to how they think a unit providing a steady stream of IRs (us again) manages the switch from Pool 1 to Pool 2. How do we generate the critical mass for training without involving the rest of the Bn ? Also, how do you manage the inevitable missed weekends when the soldier's commitment doubles - after all, the other stuff they planned for weekends, pre-booked annual holidays and so on doesn't go away. It's not as if they can make us turn up after all. And let's not even mention where we get the instructors from. (Train more you cry - what, on 27 MTDs a year ? Ho ho.)

More importantly, it's hardly a compelling offer for those thinking of joining, particularly once AFG starts to scale down. The regular reserve has failed utterly, the Reserves Review noted that the TA was too small as a percentage of the regs ... and yet we get this. Bizarre, utterly bizarre.

 

Bizarre indeed, and so short sighted it beggars belief. It would be funny if it weren't true.

What I fail to understand is how this can be pushed through without anyone in the TA being proeprly consulted or indeed, our esrtwhile senior echelons putting a stop to it - are we now impotent that such systemic change can be foisted on us without even a whimper?

I suppose the R Signals debacle says it all.

 

The TA isn't a homogenous entity, it's a patchwork of small tribes - much as the regs are. I know the efforts the regs are making to keep us in the game as they value of what we contribute. However I doubt that the RSigs TA are perceived by their regular counterparts as bringing much to the game and so why bother ? That's not to defend the incompetence of the implementation by the way.

Now before all you scaleys start to call for my head I'm not trying to start a capbadge war or imply that individuals are to blame - I know you could do a lot more if funded, trained and equipped to do so. But look at the numbers - how many on Ops, what percentage of the unit, what ranks are needed and so on. Those are the metrics currently driving senior officer's perceptions and UK Ops is nowhere, particularly since JDP 02.

But, and here's the root of it, as budgets shrink and everyone's timeline shrinks down to 6 months and the next deployment anyone not generating operational effect right now this second is up for the axe.

Long term of course it's a really, really stupid thing to do. Losing a credible reserve means the Regular Army isn't credible as an effective warfighting organisation. But we've been committing the Army on Ops and underfunding it since 2001, and this is just one more thing that's giving under the strain.

 

Their impotence was clearly demonstrated by their inability to influence a cut as small as £20m...

msr