German Wündertanks vs Shermans

Adolf directly created every one of those kessels, his insistence to stand and fight, against all advice.
Sort of

6th Army was doomed the moment it was trapped - it didn't have the mobility to break free - the Panzer divs could have but the other 80% of the force was in the bag.

The only thing that could have saved them was Paulus reacting to the initial reports and not committing (at least some of ) his Panzer divs to the attack and thus having the mobile reserve that could have cut one of the pincers at the root or at least held the Jaws open.

The reality is regardless of Hitlers hold at all costs - that's all 6th Army could do
Manstein made the obligatory attempt at relief and when that failed supported and encouraged 6th Army resistance as it enabled him to rebuild his front line - without Stalingrad holding them up - the Red Army would have stomped a lot further west before organised resistance would be encountered.

Manstein post war seems to have joined the it was all Adolfs fault we lost movement-
 
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The problem was that Germany ran out of oil in September 1941. The German loggies said this would happen and the combat geterals ignored them. So those genius German generals often didn't lose because Hitler said "no retreat", they lost because they didn't have the fuel to manoeuvre. Given the choice of standing fast in defensive positions as per a Fuhrer order, or breaking out, running put of fuel and getting slaughtered in the open as per a manoeuverist generals orders/wet dreams, which would you prefer?
They didn't run out of petrol, they, just had insufficient to maintain the offensive operations across the globe and had to start rationing it, which by 43, saw much of the german army de-motorised across Europe.

If adolf did not send Guderian south to kiev and instead focused on Moscow, the Germans would have reached that city and taken it, irrespective of the Balkan diversion and Barbarossa delay.. Soviet Union in 1942 without that city, is not Napoleonic Russia. The road and rail networks all went through Moscow and the red army would have struggled to maintain themselves. The Germans, would have been able to fight a stalemate and case Blue would likely have reached Grozny.
 

AlienFTM

MIA
Book Reviewer
I asked a question i.e. I didn't know the answer...
To then claim, I made sweeping statements, is a little bit of a stretch.
I was actually interested to know, how far out the flank security was either side of the MSR up to Eindhoven. The maps don't really give you that sense, of space.
It's a while since I read the history, but I seem to recall 15/19H Cromwells, leading 11 Armd Div eastward, regularly saw Inns of Court (Corps troops, I think*) armoured cars on the next road.

But I could be wrong.

* Edit. On the recent thread entitled Normandy is an OrBat for 11 Armd Div. It lists Inns of Court as 11 Armd Div Armoured Car Regiment. It hadn't occurred to me that an Armd Div would have both, even though I've read the Delaforce history of 11 Armd Div. It's the senility I tell yer.
 
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They didn't run out of petrol, they, just had insufficient to maintain the offensive operations across the globe and had to start rationing it, which by 43, saw much of the german army de-motorised across Europe.
De-motorised? Their logistics was largely horse-drawn from the start of the war, and remained that way throughout. From the wikipedia link:

The 6th Army, engaged in urban warfare in Stalingrad, was unable to feed or graze their horses and sent them to the rear. When the Soviets enveloped the 6th Army in November 1942, the German troops were cut off from their horse transport and would have been unable to move their artillery had they tried to evacuate the city. In an earlier envelopment, the Demyansk Pocket, 20,000 horses were trapped together with 95,000 men and airlifting fodder drained precious air transport capacity. However these horses also provided food for soldiers in an environment where the "axe rebounds as a stone from a frozen horse corpse."
 

jrwlynch

LE
Book Reviewer
Manstein post war seems to have joined the it was all Adolfs fault we lost movement-
The Scooby-Doo school of military history: "And we would have gotten away with it too, if it hadn't been for that damned meddling Fuhrer!"
 

jrwlynch

LE
Book Reviewer
They didn't run out of petrol, they, just had insufficient to maintain the offensive operations across the globe and had to start rationing it, which by 43, saw much of the german army de-motorised across Europe.
The Heer was mostly horse-drawn in 1940, and was de-motorising units in early 1941 because of shortages of POL and of rubber (spare tyres aren't glamorous or interesting until you can't get any...)

"So tight were fuel rations that in November 1941 Opel was forced to shut down production at its Brandenburg plant, Germany’s largest truck factory, because it lacked the petrol necessary to check the fuel pumps of vehicles coming off the assembly line. A special allocation of 104 cubic metres of fuel had to be arranged by the Wehrmacht’s economic office so as to ensure that there were no further interruptions."

Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (p. 412). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition.
 
It's a while since I read the history, but I seem to recall 15/19H Cromwells, leading 11 Armd Div eastward, regularly saw Inns of Court (Corps troops, I think*) armoured cars on the next road.

But I could be wrong.

* Edit. On the recent thread entitled Normandy is an OrBat for 11 Armd Div. It lists Inns of Court as 11 Armd Div Armoured Car Regiment. It hadn't occurred to me that an Armd Div would have both, even though I've read the Delaforce history of 11 Armd Div. It's the senility I tell yer.
The armoured car regiments started the Normandy campaign as Corps troops but were fairly soon permanently attached to the various armoured divisions. Thus Inns of Court became the Recce Regiment of 11th Armoured, and 11th Hussars and Household Cavalry became the same for 7th and Guards Armoured. The actual Armoured Recce Regiments (8th Hussars, 15th/19th and Welsh Guards) were then freed up to become a fourth armoured regiment for each division. This gave a more balanced force with each armoured regiment in the division now paired with an infantry battalion.
 
* Edit. On the recent thread entitled Normandy is an OrBat for 11 Armd Div. It lists Inns of Court as 11 Armd Div Armoured Car Regiment. It hadn't occurred to me that an Armd Div would have both, even though I've read the Delaforce history of 11 Armd Div. It's the senility I tell yer.
In your defence I think it was a post D Day decision and allowed the recce Cromwell regiment to act as a 4th armoured regt** with an armoured car regiment assigned as divisional recce (I think they were previously corps level - but I could be making that up

That's at least my understanding of it from the history books

** Or rather formalising what was already the case on the ground


Edit
Ah Brewmeister already said this
 
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De-motorised? Their logistics was largely horse-drawn from the start of the war, and remained that way throughout. From the wikipedia link:

The 6th Army, engaged in urban warfare in Stalingrad, was unable to feed or graze their horses and sent them to the rear. When the Soviets enveloped the 6th Army in November 1942, the German troops were cut off from their horse transport and would have been unable to move their artillery had they tried to evacuate the city. In an earlier envelopment, the Demyansk Pocket, 20,000 horses were trapped together with 95,000 men and airlifting fodder drained precious air transport capacity. However these horses also provided food for soldiers in an environment where the "axe rebounds as a stone from a frozen horse corpse."
The german panzer and panzer grenidear divisions were motorised.
The infantry Divisions were largely horse drawn and particular so for there artillery, but had some limited mobility.

Later in the war, only the panzers retained any motorisation. The Divisions in Normandy, for instance were entirely bodenstag/static. Similarly, Op Bagration, the Infantry were entirely on foot, due to fuel rationing. They had to do staff work on fuel consumption, just to move a unit from A to B and often didn't have enough, so made the troops march part of the way.
 
Ahh here we are. Testing on a Harry Hopkins, but essentially the same suspension.
Designed to take a 6G impact, and it did.
Jumping test: 3ft ramp, at 40mph.

A lot of Russian official reports on Lend lease equipment always have something negative to say, normally something nebulous that can't be proved just by looking at the raw stats of the tank.
If memory serves there's a Russian report on the Churchill, saying it has poor cross country mobility and bad grip. Meanwhile British tankers are practically driving the Churchill on the ceiling singing "Spider-tank, Spider-tank, does whatever a spider-tank does!"
Homer walt
 
More to the point, that the Red Army lost, in the last 6 weeks of WW2, more men to enemy action, than your nation and mine (combined) lost in the whole 6 ( . . . oops, I mean 4) years of WW2 should at least give cause for sober reflection..
Mainly due to monumental callousness, stupidity and political interference, not something to wear as a badge of honour
 
Thing is, Germany lost the war on 3/9/39. The only question from then on was how many dead. So with that in mind, why not be cautious and prevent a major reverse that would mean more blood and treasure to reach the end goal. Essentially we could afford to be cautious, as we were going to win.
The Germans lost when their attack into Russia stalled reinforced by US entry in WW2
 
Mainly due to monumental callousness, stupidity and political interference, not something to wear as a badge of honour
True enough; Hastings' Armageddon and Beevor's Berlin The Downfall, both paint a horrific picture of what it was like to serve in the victorious Soviet Army. Combined with fanatical and desperate defence of the Reich, albeit patchy, the average Russian infanteer's lot was not a happy one.

We and the Yanks dodged a bullet by not taking on Berlin.
 
You're comparing apples to oranges. You are talking about things like drop tests while the Soviet evaluation was talking about what appear to be fatigue failures. The latter are not going to turn up in impact tests or raw stats.



The one Soviet mention of this that I can find is this one:
Tank Archives: Lend Lease Impressions: Churchill


Here is the relevant counterpart from the T-34 mobility trials. It's almost the same conclusion.
Tank Archives: T-34 Prototype Mobility Trials


Soviet reliability and mobility evaluations tended to involve driving the vehicles over set distances on a combination of good roads, poor roads, and cross country. They would record what went wrong and often included recommendations on how to fix them. Surprise, surprise, a test regime of that nature will consist mainly of a record of what went wrong.

British and American tanks supplied to the Soviets were put through a similar testing regime as their own vehicles because the operating conditions there were often quite different than in western Europe. The Soviets put a higher emphasis on being able to operate in deep snow, mud, and temperature extremes and less on operating in high mountains. Sometimes changes were required, such as sort dealing with engines that had too much cooling in winter.

So when you are talking about mobility, the question will be mobility over what sort of terrain and in what sort of climactic conditions?
which sorta begs a question or two from the Russian Perspective, if you don't mind
(1) Why all those convoys to Russia when it was obviously out producing us and with equipment that was better than ours?( according to them)
(2) wouldn't it just have been easier to to extend credit arrangements to the USSR?
(3) in the spirit of allied accord couldn't we just have produced T34 etc under licence?
 
I'd suggest 22-Jun-41 is a more realistic date. Without a war with the Soviets I doubt we could have invaded mainland Europe, so it would have been the A-bomb or not, and without the Soviet invasion who's to say the Germans wouldn't have got their first.
The Germans lost when their attack into Russia stalled reinforced by US entry in WW2
I thought my rather bold claim might elicit some response.

But consider where Germany is located. Even at the height of her success she was surrounded and cut off from global trade and resources. All because Britain and her navy had her locked in tight.
To free that up you need to take the UK out of the fight. Germany had no way of doing that. In any fight if you have an opponent you can't actually beat, it doesn't matter how good you do, you can not win, and then its all down to how long it's going to take for the other guy to get lucky and put you down.

I'm not saying it'd be cheap or easy for the UK, equally it wouldn't have been over in the same time period. In fact it'd likely have stretched even further. But as Germany couldn't physically defeat the UK then it was going to loose.
 
which sorta begs a question or two from the Russian Perspective, if you don't mind
(1) Why all those convoys to Russia when it was obviously out producing us and with equipment that was better than ours?( according to them)
(2) wouldn't it just have been easier to to extend credit arrangements to the USSR?
(3) in the spirit of allied accord couldn't we just have produced T34 etc under licence?


The M4 was a much better tank. The Russians were very fond of it, christening it 'Emcha'. It was issued to elite Guards tank formations and a testament to its reliability in Russian service was that after VE Day, all the Emchas's on the Western Front were shipped East for the invasion of Manchuria in August 1945.
The Russians also never had a bad word to say about the Shamans alleged inflammability and it was much loved by its crews for its comfort, reliability and combat worthiness.
 
We and the Yanks dodged a bullet by not taking on Berlin.
But on the other-hand if Harry Hun had thought he was going to get captured by the nice western Allies, who, chances are, weren't going to shot him out of hand, bundle him off to their equivalent of Siberia or rape every woman age 8-80 they might not have put up such a struggle.....
 
De-motorised? Their logistics was largely horse-drawn from the start of the war, and remained that way throughout. From the wikipedia link:

The 6th Army, engaged in urban warfare in Stalingrad, was unable to feed or graze their horses and sent them to the rear. When the Soviets enveloped the 6th Army in November 1942, the German troops were cut off from their horse transport and would have been unable to move their artillery had they tried to evacuate the city. In an earlier envelopment, the Demyansk Pocket, 20,000 horses were trapped together with 95,000 men and airlifting fodder drained precious air transport capacity. However these horses also provided food for soldiers in an environment where the "axe rebounds as a stone from a frozen horse corpse."
What he said. The 'fact' that the german army was a motorised spear of tanks & other AFV's is a myth & it never attained any such capability. The 39-40 era BEF was more vehicle mobile than the boxheads ever were.

I asked a question i.e. I didn't know the answer...
To then claim, I made sweeping statements, is a little bit of a stretch.
I was actually interested to know, how far out the flank security was either side of the MSR up to Eindhoven. The maps don't really give you that sense, of space.
XXX corps was the lead ground element but both corps on their flanks were also pushing forward in tandem, however for various reasons never made similar gains. Check the after action maps for the slight bulge that was created at the base of the Nijmegen salient.
 

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