German Wündertanks vs Shermans

My regiment had fought from Alamein to Tunis and as soon as they were out of the bocage of Normandy fanned out into 'Desert formation', ran over several mines, bogged some tanks and came back to the roads pretty sharpish. I can't speak for anyone else but from what I was told this was a local decision, i.e. the Colonel and squadron leaders told the troop leaders.
And when you look at the distances they were advancing and the speed you can understand why. For @Ecomcon to say that the BA was road bound fails to remember, as you say, that they had just been traveling over a desert with no roads. Armies tend to take the path of least resistance that's why we have recce Regts. To say that only the Indian army could travel cross country (as a dig at the BA) informs us that he was not aware that the 14th Army build roads using hessian and tar and fired bricks at the side of the road. Without roads 14th Army would still be sitting in India now.
 
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My regiment had fought from Alamein to Tunis and as soon as they were out of the bocage of Normandy fanned out into 'Desert formation', ran over several mines, bogged some tanks and came back to the roads pretty sharpish. I can't speak for anyone else but from what I was told this was a local decision, i.e. the Colonel and squadron leaders told the troop leaders.
European terrain is more constricting, dutch terrain even more so. But, I was also thinking of the infantry.

Presumably, on foot across the boggy fields, flanking an armoured column, how far out did that line extend? you would assume, the MSR needs flank protection, either side, at least beyond mortar range, or better still artillery range. If there wasn't enough infantry, why didn't monty draft more in.

If that was a german operation and this been a schwerpunckt, they would have drafted in anyone with a rifle to provide added flank security.

Offog; It wasn't a criticism, I wanted to understand if the Indian Army were more conscious of terrain, whilst the UK based training, emphasised exploitation and speed. If you look at UK exercises of the time, particularly brigade or above, their is a lot of dashing manoeuvre.
 
That will be interesting to see. For reference, the specific Soviet report which is quoted in the article said the following about the suspension:
Ahh here we are. Testing on a Harry Hopkins, but essentially the same suspension.
Designed to take a 6G impact, and it did.
Jumping test: 3ft ramp, at 40mph.

A lot of Russian official reports on Lend lease equipment always have something negative to say, normally something nebulous that can't be proved just by looking at the raw stats of the tank.
If memory serves there's a Russian report on the Churchill, saying it has poor cross country mobility and bad grip. Meanwhile British tankers are practically driving the Churchill on the ceiling singing "Spider-tank, Spider-tank, does whatever a spider-tank does!"
 
European terrain is more constricting, dutch terrain even more so. But, I was also thinking of the infantry.

Presumably, on foot across the boggy fields, flanking an armoured column, how far out did that line extend? you would assume, the MSR needs flank protection, either side, at least beyond mortar range, or better still artillery range.
During rapid advance phases my understanding was that the tanks lead and the infantry were somewhere behind in their lorries. Flanks were covered, if at all, by the reconnaissance troop on the next road.
 
I'm not sure how much use they would have been unless they had been CS versions. The Littlejohns could not fire HE (a big problem which the early war British tanks had) so that means just a moving MG against infantry who had very good AT weapons.
Problem I think is that whilst Arnhem (Day One) was exactly the sort of scenario (key terrain, lightly held) that the airborne concept had been designed for, not much thought had been given to enhancing protected mobility when the objectives were not immediately adjacent to the drop zones.

This was put right to an extent the following year at the Rhine Crossings. In a similar vein, it took Dieppe to spark the innovative British approach to protected amphibious assault mobility in the form of Hobart's "Funnies"...
 
Offog; It wasn't a criticism, I wanted to understand if the Indian Army were more conscious of terrain, whilst the UK based training, emphasised exploitation and speed. If you look at UK exercises of the time, particularly brigade or above, their is a lot of dashing manoeuvre.
Define what you mean by "Indian Army were more conscious of terrain".

Horrocks was a corps commander in NAfrica (13 Corps) so had practical experience in the advance.

XXX Corps was to conduct a fast move forward, having Reginald Grunthorpe wandering through the countryside smelling the flowers would have reduced the advance to a walk. Ever wondered why Churchill tanks didn't equipe Armored Divisions. Risks had to be taken to ensure speed of the advance or there was no point in the advance in the first place. If you consider the speed of the advance up till this point you can understand why they saw that it was an acceptable risk.
 
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Define what you mean by "Indian Army were more conscious of terrain".

Horrocks was a corps commander in NAfrica (13 Corps) so had practical experience in the advance.

XXX Corps was to conduct a fast move forward, having Reginald Grunthorpe wandering through the countryside smelling the flowers would have reduced the advance to a walk. Ever wondered why Churchill tanks didn't equipe Armored Divisions. Risks had to be taken to ensure speed of the advance or there was no point in the advance in the first place. If you consider the speed of the advance up till this point you can understand why they saw that it was an acceptable risk.
Given Market Garden, was the 21st Army Groups signature operation to win the war, its surprising, how the Corp wasn't massively reinforced and secondary operations either side of the bridgehead, properly resourced.

On terrain, it was a query on whether the Officers who stayed in England following Dunkirk, until 1944, were different, to those who served in Italy or the far east. Where terrain effects mobility, PBI are still useful to flank the roads and occupy terrain feature which overlook the road.
 
laser like analysis, you could be the next CDS.
You continue to make sweeping and unsupportable statements, in this case extrapolating from one armoured advance that 21st Army Group was "road bound". IMHO, it's not worth wasting too many pixels responding.
 
During rapid advance phases my understanding was that the tanks lead and the infantry were somewhere behind in their lorries. Flanks were covered, if at all, by the reconnaissance troop on the next road.
One of the key criticisms by the germans of the allies on the western front from 44 onward was an obsession with exposed flanks. Something many german reports say reduced allied effectiveness in attack when possible successes couldn't be exploited due to over-caution of a US or UK units' perceived exposed position.
 
One of the key criticisms by the germans of the allies on the western front from 44 onward was an obsession with exposed flanks. Something many german reports say reduced allied effectiveness in attack when possible successes couldn't be exploited due to over-caution of a US or UK units' perceived exposed position.
Given that the Germans lost a quarter of a million soldiers when the Russians turned their flanks at Stalingrad; 200,000 on the Baltic coast; 60,000 in Falaise; 70,000 at Korsun; 20-30,000 at Colmar; 50,000 at Debrecen...

...maybe the Germans should have shown a bit more caution?
 
One of the key criticisms by the germans of the allies on the western front from 44 onward was an obsession with exposed flanks. Something many german reports say reduced allied effectiveness in attack when possible successes couldn't be exploited due to over-caution of a US or UK units' perceived exposed position.
Thing is, Germany lost the war on 3/9/39. The only question from then on was how many dead. So with that in mind, why not be cautious and prevent a major reverse that would mean more blood and treasure to reach the end goal. Essentially we could afford to be cautious, as we were going to win.
 
Ahh here we are. Testing on a Harry Hopkins, but essentially the same suspension.
Designed to take a 6G impact, and it did.
Jumping test: 3ft ramp, at 40mph.

A lot of Russian official reports on Lend lease equipment always have something negative to say, normally something nebulous that can't be proved just by looking at the raw stats of the tank.
You're comparing apples to oranges. You are talking about things like drop tests while the Soviet evaluation was talking about what appear to be fatigue failures. The latter are not going to turn up in impact tests or raw stats.

If memory serves there's a Russian report on the Churchill, saying it has poor cross country mobility and bad grip. Meanwhile British tankers are practically driving the Churchill on the ceiling singing "Spider-tank, Spider-tank, does whatever a spider-tank does!"
The one Soviet mention of this that I can find is this one:
Tank Archives: Lend Lease Impressions: Churchill
Track links do not make good contact with the ground. The poor traction severely limits the tank's ability to go up and down inclines and tilt.
Here is the relevant counterpart from the T-34 mobility trials. It's almost the same conclusion.
Tank Archives: T-34 Prototype Mobility Trials
Traversing grades and tilts in winter and summer conditions is limited by the traction of tracks on terrain, which is insufficient for winter-spring conditions. It is necessary to quickly develop a device to increase traction of tracks and terrain: spurs or winter tracks.
Soviet reliability and mobility evaluations tended to involve driving the vehicles over set distances on a combination of good roads, poor roads, and cross country. They would record what went wrong and often included recommendations on how to fix them. Surprise, surprise, a test regime of that nature will consist mainly of a record of what went wrong.

British and American tanks supplied to the Soviets were put through a similar testing regime as their own vehicles because the operating conditions there were often quite different than in western Europe. The Soviets put a higher emphasis on being able to operate in deep snow, mud, and temperature extremes and less on operating in high mountains. Sometimes changes were required, such as dealing with engines that had too much cooling in winter.

So when you are talking about mobility, the question will be mobility over what sort of terrain and in what sort of climactic conditions?
 
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Thing is, Germany lost the war on 3/9/39. The only question from then on was how many dead. So with that in mind, why not be cautious and prevent a major reverse that would mean more blood and treasure to reach the end goal. Essentially we could afford to be cautious, as we were going to win.
I'd suggest 22-Jun-41 is a more realistic date. Without a war with the Soviets I doubt we could have invaded mainland Europe, so it would have been the A-bomb or not, and without the Soviet invasion who's to say the Germans wouldn't have got their first.
 
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You continue to make sweeping and unsupportable statements, in this case extrapolating from one armoured advance that 21st Army Group was "road bound". IMHO, it's not worth wasting too many pixels responding.
I asked a question i.e. I didn't know the answer...
To then claim, I made sweeping statements, is a little bit of a stretch.
I was actually interested to know, how far out the flank security was either side of the MSR up to Eindhoven. The maps don't really give you that sense, of space.
 
Ahh here we are. Testing on a Harry Hopkins, but essentially the same suspension.
Designed to take a 6G impact, and it did.
Jumping test: 3ft ramp, at 40mph.

A lot of Russian official reports on Lend lease equipment always have something negative to say, normally something nebulous that can't be proved just by looking at the raw stats of the tank.
If memory serves there's a Russian report on the Churchill, saying it has poor cross country mobility and bad grip. Meanwhile British tankers are practically driving the Churchill on the ceiling singing "Spider-tank, Spider-tank, does whatever a spider-tank does!"
Praising Western/foreign equipment could be injurious to a Russian's health, no matter how good it was. No foreign tank was ever to be praised in any fashion that hinted that it was better than a T-34.
 
Adolf directly created every one of those kessels, his insistence to stand and fight, against all advice.
The problem was that Germany ran out of oil in September 1941. The German loggies said this would happen and the combat geterals ignored them. So those genius German generals often didn't lose because Hitler said "no retreat", they lost because they didn't have the fuel to manoeuvre. Given the choice of standing fast in defensive positions as per a Fuhrer order, or breaking out, running put of fuel and getting slaughtered in the open as per a manoeuverist generals orders/wet dreams, which would you prefer?
 

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