German Wündertanks vs Shermans

Any more than him using a radio makes him the chief G6 or relying on beans, bullets and blankets being in place makes him the senior logistician.
All those functions are contined within own forces ORBAT, and for the most part occur behind, or no further forward than the FEBA. Different kettle of fish.
 
Not what I said.


Then you are flat wrong. Sorry.
Then I recommend some reading for you.

Peter Freeman was one of the drafters of the Butler Report. If you can get hold of it, his chapter on the 'Nature and Use of Intelligence' is a pretty good primer on the use of intelligence product. Most new ministers get it early in their post.

I'll quote from it to address your Balkan activities alluded to earlier:

'A hidden limitation of intelligence is its inability to transform a mystery into a secret....mysteries are essentially unknowable: What a leader truly believes, or what his reaction would be in certain circumstances, cannot be known, but can only be judged. Judgement must still be informed by the best available information, which often means a contribution from intelligence. But it cannot impart certainty.'

The strength of the British intelligence system is, and has always been, that it rigorously keeps seperate those who paint the intelligence picture and those who who decide what or what not to do on the basis of it.

Edited to add: When that seperation breaks down, when decision makers seek to direct assessment, we end up with the situation that led us to the Iraq war.
 
CS was a logical idea, when an army wasn't fully mechanised and still moved on foot. I am unaware of any operation which did not rely on a serious bombardment. The duration, been reduced over time, but volume of fire and destructiveness increased. Only the past 20 years, has things changed.
I fear you're msitaken. Cs doctrine came baout in the 1920's and that was at a time when the British army was very quickly becoming fully mechanised.

I could counter to your slight, to suggest, modern western military thinking, is overly keen on technology, particularly of the aerial kind and an assumption it will work against a first class enemy, is an educated guess.
IT wasn't a slight, none of my stuff ever is. Its more an attempt to show how military thinking is circular. However threats evolve and ideas to counter them come and go.
1:Tank beats infantry,
2: infantry get defences,
3: CS doctrine is developed,
4: CS doctrine falls out of favour as all tanks get the ability to perform as CS,
5: infantry Atk becomes so prelevant that we start again at 2.
 
I fear you're msitaken. Cs doctrine came baout in the 1920's and that was at a time when the British army was very quickly becoming fully mechanised.



IT wasn't a slight, none of my stuff ever is. Its more an attempt to show how military thinking is circular. However threats evolve and ideas to counter them come and go.
1:Tank beats infantry,
2: infantry get defences,
3: CS doctrine is developed,
4: CS doctrine falls out of favour as all tanks get the ability to perform as CS,
5: infantry Atk becomes so prelevant that we start again at 2.
I disagree, on CS every army had the concept, but there own local conditions made it more of an issue (France, Char, Germany, PIV), or discarded like the Italians due to there own local conditions.

Apologies, having been on the site only a month, one starts to develop an automated response to certain trigger words. I agree on the rock, paper, scissors analogy :)
 
The whole secrets and mysteries thing is paraphrasing Quinlan in the Butler report.

At the risk of a honking amount of thread drift take the current situation in NE Europe as an example. We can expect to discover the current Russian ORBAT. That's a secret. We can expect to know how it works and how well trained it is, those are secrets too. We know how the Russians have behaved in Ukraine, again a secret.

We can determine possible courses of action in the Baltic states and the indicators and warnings we can expect to see if those scenarios are coming to pass. That's analysis and assessment.

We do not nor can we know what Putin intends to do. Until he commits to a course of action his intentions are in his head and are a mystery.
Back in the old days Kremlinology was a recognised intelligence discipline; might not be a science, but I would fully expect (well, hope anyway) that today's desk officers can do a bit more than just shrug their shoulders and say "dunno" when asked about the various COAs open to Putin.
 
Back in the old days Kremlinology was a recognised intelligence discipline; might not be a science, but I would fully expect (well, hope anyway) that today's desk officers can do a bit more than just shrug their shoulders and say "dunno" when asked about the various COAs open to Putin.
Read on Macduff.
 
when decision makers seek to direct assessment,
Specifically he's talking about a certain Mr Blair directing his intelligence professionals to tell him the things he wanted to hear.

I'm talking about the commander directing his intelligence professionals by being very clear about the questions that needs answered. Big difference.

Do you have any experience in intelligence work? You come over as a G3 man through and through.
 
I'd also say that Brownings allocation of so many gliders for his Corps HQ element to the 82nd lift on Day 1 was a totally waste of resources. That allocation would have brought in (iirc) another battalion or thereabouts into 1AB landing zones or allowed more vehicles/AT guns to be deployed.
While I agree it was a waste of resources, I think the impact is overstated. Browning's HQ filled 38 gliders. An Airlanding Bn filled 56 gliders and the only major glider-borne element to be bumped off the First Lift was two companies of 2 S Staffs. I'm not convinced that two more infantry companies on Day 1 would have had that much of an impact on the battle.

There were also no spare Airlanding AT Batteries spare to lift into Arnhem. 1st Airborne Division's entire allocation was already employed and as mentioned above, had already been beefed up by two extra troops of 17pdrs, plus the Poles. When M-G kicked off, those Airlanding Batteries with 6th Airborne Division were only just starting to reform in the UK following their late withdrawal from Normandy.
 
Specifically he's talking about a certain Mr Blair directing his intelligence professionals to tell him the things he wanted to hear.

I'm talking about the commander directing his intelligence professionals by being very clear about the questions that needs answered. Big difference.

Do you have any experience in intelligence work? You come over as a G3 man through and through.
Actually he wasn't talking specifically about Blair but the thrust of his argument is certainly relevant.

You seem to have changed the thrust of your argument now. Nowhere have I said that decision makers don't direct the intelligence cycle. Doctrinally DI has moved on from DCPD but OOTS was quite correct when he talked about direction being critical. Without limitless resource it's impossible for the UK to match the Kent Model of Intelligence production where the job of the analyst is to gather everything relevant. Instead we cut our cloth according to out means and focus on what is relevant to us, by which I mean the 'National Interest'.

I'm not going to give you my CV but yes I do have some experience in the intelligence profession. The stidy of same only made up a couple of modules of my MA though.

I can however be relied upon to use my G3 Flippers to illustrate a point in discussion though. :wink:
 
No. I have emphatically not. I'd suggest that you are very slowly (reluctantly, perhaps?) moving towards a proper understanding of the point that I have been endeavouring to convey to you :thumright:
Well you seem to have moved from the commander being the 'senior IO' because he is the end user of the product to he has the questions that need to be answered. Nowhere is he involved in the actual intelligence process.

I actually think we're quite close to agreement on a lot of things, but none of this is getting my rhubarb gin made.
 
Sorry didn't mean to imply anything ref your point. I do agree with Stonker about lack of authority.
The whole plan, ignoring the benefit of hindsight. How can an airbourne operation work, that distance from the clearly defined objective. You look out your window, at a point 8 miles away and it just seems, stark raving mad.
 

AlienFTM

MIA
Book Reviewer
In the hubris of the moment, though, even the characteristically risk-averse Monty was prepared to suspend disbelief and take an over-optimistic punt.
No, no. Monty held thumb and finger to map, then in the air, and said, "But it's only this far."
 
While the yanks made good use of the underground with the telephone contacts between 101st & 82nd zones via the power station connection, we did not & there was very little pre 17th Sept contact with the Dutch.
Wasn't the Dutch resistance the most thoroughly infiltrated in Europe? IIRC 75% or better of supply/arms drops for them were dropped directly to the Sicherheitsdienst?
 
Wasn't the Dutch resistance the most thoroughly infiltrated in Europe? IIRC 75% or better of supply/arms drops for them were dropped directly to the Sicherheitsdienst?
Seems believable. I recall being told by a respected historian (possibly Chris Donnelly) the early Waffen SS recruited a higher proportion of the Dutch male population than of the German one (although I have never established whether that was before or after the other heads of armed services managed to hoist Himmler on the Nazi Aryanization policies that were his personal petard)
 

ugly

LE
Moderator
Very basic stuff & believed by a large number of senior commanders as the only way to ensure coordinated attacks could be undertaken.
It worked in the desert though!
 

Similar threads

Latest Threads

Top