Old cynic that you are, you should know better than that. Jesus could come again carrying a Baker rifle, wearing a faded rifleman's jacket, having won at Waterloo and the Peninsula and beaten off Hitler while smoking a big cigar and making 'V' signs, and there would still be **** all chance of him being able to noticeably change the Army in two years flat. The issue is whether Carter can bed in the changes he wants well enough that they don't get rolled back after he's gone. It's going to be a bit longer before we can judge that. If you don't like it, I'd cite the example of Richards and Newton (that well known stage pair) who fired in much-needed changes all over the shop during their short tenures. Many of them were shelved and forgotten shortly afterwards.
The stuff you are seeing in the media looks like fluff because it is the fluff that the media are interested in. Will it mean long term change? Possibly. But it's just stuff that was going to happen anyway eventually, but is now being gripped and done proactively. This gives the Army and Carter some space to maneuver politically, instead of the usual strategy of digging heels in about everything under the sun, then whining when it gets told to shut up and stand to. It is a strategy that has been used to good effect previously by other elements of Defence. The RAF are very good at it. In short, it is an easy win, or a way to avoid shooting oneself in the foot: not the main event.
There are other reforms going on all over the shop, but not all of them are obvious yet. Many of them the media wouldn't understand, so you are unlikely to hear about. A good number of the individuals Carter has tapped as his project leads, however, are saying interesting, slightly iconoclastic things. He very clearly has a plan, but his MO is to keep it compartmentalized and extremely close to his chest. Even most people in Army HQ are guessing about what other elements are doing. Given the likely resistance to some of the things he is doing, this is understandable, and while not exactly best practice in a functional organisation, is perhaps the wisest option in the dysfunctional monolithic beast he has to work with.
He does have an unfortunate tendency to focus on "the grown ups", i.e. those at a rank between himself and CO level. At no point has anyone I've talked to had the impression that he is a "listen to the voices on the ground" kind of guy. He is also clearly more focused on sorting out the officer corps than addressing problems with soldiers, although I suppose he would argue that the former is necessary to get the latter right. He has also, as far as I can make out, so far dodged real reform of the MS system, except at the General Staff level (which is too late). Aside from the media-friendly fluff like this stuff, the inertial fug of Glasgow seems to grind on to oblivion, broken gears chewing up the machinery as it goes. None of these are ideal, but then you go to war with the reformer you have, not the reformer you'd want.
The clearest steer about where this is all going to go will be after SDSR. That will decide a couple of key elements, such as whether the Reserves project will survive, and whether significant deployments are likely to figure in the next 5 years. Until then, wait out!